

# SECRET WAYS OF THE MIND

A Survey of the Psychological Principles of  
Freud, Adler, and Jung

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

Psychology was elevated to the dignity of the experimental laboratory, and thus became a science, in the second half of the nineteenth century. Before that, there was plenty of psychology, but it was interwoven with philosophical, cosmological, and moral speculations, and so did not deserve the name scientific. Perhaps the first psychologist in the western world was Heracleitus (500 B.C), who declared that "you will not find the boundaries of the soul by traveling in any direction, so deep is the measure of it."

But as psychology became more scientific it grew more impoverished. The craze for measurement and exactness swept over it—for how could psychology be a science unless it imitated the quantitative methods of the exact sciences?—till, in the present day, its original subject-matter, human nature, the soul, is hidden behind a mass of statistics more intricate than those of Lloyds' insurance office. The academic experimental psychologist does not even dare to talk about the soul, because from the point of view of materialistic science, which hangs like a sword above his head, there may after all be no soul. And the layman who childishly believes that he will

learn something from the ordinary books on psychology about human nature as he sees it in the sufferings, deceptions, joys, ambitions, loves, and aversions of everyday life, will be bitterly disappointed as he plows through the pages on sensation, perception, and representation, the statistics of learning curves and intelligence tests, the hypothetical physiology of nerve impulses and brain structure.

Meanwhile, as the official psychology has grown more and more sterile, an unofficial psychology has sprung up and swept over Europe and America. "Man's chief object of study is man," \* and the interest in human nature will not be denied, even though it can not be compressed into the schemes of measurement and the statistical tables of the academic experimental psychologists. This new psychology is also scientific, but in a different sense from the old. It originated in applied science, in medicine, and has developed in the insane asylums and psychological clinics of France, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland during the last thirty years. The ideas of its most important early representative, Freud, reverberate through the culture of the first quarter of our century—through its literature, its art, and its morality. The reason is probably the one that Jung, the second great representative of this new psychology, gives in his Introduction to this

\* David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Introduction.



book, "that the Freudian psychoanalysis is not only a scientific endeavor and achievement, but a psychological symptom," a symptom of man's need in the present day to understand himself anew and to free the living forces in him from the repressions of a mechanized and specialized civilization, which is slowly damaging his soul—the soul that even the official psychologists do not believe in.

In this Preface to Dr. Kranefeldt's sketch of the psychologies of Freud, Adler, and Jung, together with their predecessors, the early investigators of hypnotism and double personality, I want to indicate some of the general, philosophical aspects of this new psychology. For it is by no means restricted to the field of medicine.

Psychological analysis, as practiced by the doctor on the patient, is a method of restoring mental balance to persons who are suffering from neuroses, that is, to persons who are unable to adjust themselves to life and who manifest this inability in pathological symptoms such as compulsive fears, deep depressions, drunkenness, hysterical paralysis, sexual abnormalities, and so on. But the analysis that cures neuroses is not a pill to be swallowed and forgotten. Mental balance is ultimately restored to the patient only by giving him, or causing him to create from within himself, a philosophy of life, a new attitude toward himself, his fellow human beings, nature, social institutions—and the gods.

Thus, this new psychology can be viewed from the standpoint of the philosophy, or philosophies, of life it tends to produce.

A neurosis lies on the border-line between a moral and a medical problem. Insane people were once thought to be possessed by devils, and were treated as moral outcasts. Adler characterizes the neurotic as a person who shirks the tasks of life; the neurotic leads a provisional life, according to Jung; he suffers from a failure to fulfill the ideals of his super-ego, his conscience, according to Freud. A conflict between light and darkness, good and evil, usually rages in the neurotic, and all his accepted standards of conduct are of no avail in stilling this clash of opposites. In fact, they contribute to the division in his personality; their insufficiency for life is a large part of the cause that has driven him to a neurosis. No ordinary moral advice is of any use to the neurotic. He needs a new set of values, a new religion if he can find it. The wide prevalence of neurosis and the immense interest in psychoanalysis at the present time are mass phenomena pointing to the general need of a new and wider moral attitude.

It is not surprising that in this scientific age a new philosophy of life should come from applied science, from medicine. In Protestant countries we have lost faith in priests and ministers of the gospel, but not in science. It is as if mankind must have some ultimate belief to rest upon, and if we can no



longer accept the God of Christianity, we can at least accept the doctor.\* Thus science, which is largely responsible for the skepticism of the present day, having shaken our faith in the religion that gave mental balance to other generations and enabled them to live without destructive inner conflicts, is producing a cure for its own ill effects in the new psychological therapy.

Freud, Adler, and Jung differ widely in the general aspects of their psychologies, yet it can be truly said, I think, that all three represent a pre-Christian attitude toward life. Their psychologies vividly recall the Greek maxim, "Know thyself," and the Greek idea that "Virtue is the health of the soul." For Christianity, virtue has often been a sickness of the soul, a provisional toleration of the ills of this life in the hope of blessedness in the next, a sacrifice and repression of one half of the self—the dark, creative forces of sexuality, the powers of the earth—in favor of the other half. The psychological analyst teaches that life is to be lived here and now, and not provisionally, and that the means to life are expression and self-knowledge.

But in the setting of this new psychological ther-

\* Jung recently sent out a questionnaire asking, "Would you, in a serious difficulty of life, seek the advice of a physician qualified in psychology, or of a priest or minister of the gospel?" The answers from Protestants were overwhelmingly in favor of the doctor, the chief reason given being that ministers of the gospel were bound by traditional, dogmatic religious ideas. The Catholics preferred to consult the priest.



apy, the maxim, "Know thyself," has a more profound meaning than it had for the Greeks. For the self is conceived not as the small area of ideas and motives that stand clearly before the light of consciousness; these are only a fragment, thrown up from a vast, infra-conscious mass of impressions, memories, acquired and inherited mental tendencies, which form the *unconscious*. Nine-tenths of the self is submerged, it is hidden in forgetfulness, or—according to Jung—in the obscurity of impersonal, racial memories. The conscious personality, what we think and will ourselves to be, and what other people see in us, is an efflorescence on the surface of the psyche, within which the past—back to our infancy and the infancy of the human race—is still alive and effective. Insidiously, this past, the unconscious, overwhelms and possesses us, negates our conscious efforts of will and destroys our schemes of life, if we can not integrate it with the conscious self. For the unconscious is the bed-rock of personality, it encloses our destiny, and we can attain freedom only by understanding the necessities of our own nature as embodied in the unconscious.\*

The unconscious is not a theoretical construct, but a fact of human nature revealed in dreams and fantasies, in hypnosis and madness. To understand what the dream or the fantasy, or the delusion of the

\* Spinoza: "Freedom is the understanding of the necessity of one's own nature."

madman, *means* is to take hold of the unconscious. This is usually something very remote from the person's conscious thoughts, it may be their direct opposite, a reflection on himself and his attitude toward life that is extremely hard for him to face. Psychological analysis is built upon the fact that madness and dreams have a meaning. They reveal the shadowy, outcast portions of the self, which become more insistent and destructive the more we refuse to know and live with them. Thus, the health of the soul, for this therapy, is the widening of consciousness to include and make use of all the powers of the psyche, those that may appear evil from some point of view, as well as those that may appear good. For who can know what is finally good or evil?—and who can say whether the dark and the ugly are not as necessary to life as their opposites, the bright and the ideal? Wholeness, inner power, completeness of growth in the direction one's own nature must take, are values that rank higher for this psychology than the relative and changing distinctions of good and evil, made in different ages and civilizations.

Freud drew attention to the part of human nature that is most obviously outcast in modern life, namely, sexuality, "the dirty little secret," as D. H. Lawrence calls it. His conception of the unconscious differs from Jung's. In comparison with the wealth of inherited images, mythical motives, and ancient, im-



personal wisdom which Jung's "collective unconscious" contains, Freud's "system *Ucs*," the unconscious, is poverty-stricken. It is composed of infantile sexual wishes, erotic ties or aversions to the parents, and forgotten childish sexual experiences, usually of a harmful sort. Yet Freud himself suggests a wider view of the unconscious, which he does not develop. In the interpretation of dreams, he declares, the unconscious factors connected with the past are of two sorts: "first, there is the pre-history of the individual, infancy; secondly, so far as each individual reproduces in abbreviated form, in the course of his infancy, the entire development of the human race, there is the pre-history of the race." \*

Freud's theories shocked the world, and at the same time became a topic of drawing-room discussion everywhere, not merely because they dealt with sex, but because they made sex the central motive of human nature, and summoned before the fancy all of its most primitive and unmentionable aspects. Even to-day, the Freudian theory that the child is erotically drawn to the parent of the opposite sex, that the boy entertains incestuous wishes toward his mother, and the girl, incestuous wishes toward her father, arouses the most violent opposition in persons unacquainted with psychoanalysis—and with their own unconscious.

\* *I.e.*, the phylogenetic pre-history. Quoted from Freud's *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Ch. XIII.

There is no doubt that Freud's psychology is too specialized; Dr. Kranefeldt indicates its limitations in this book. Yet we owe to Freud the discovery of the important sexual elements in the first layer of that immense, submerged portion of the psyche which is the unconscious. He has shown us how infancy can persist in the adult, how childhood can cling to us and bind us without our knowledge, how our erotic destiny is determined by ties to our parents and by early sexual experiences, whose effects endure in the hidden strata of our mentality, despite many changes that occur upon its conscious surface. Only by becoming aware of this inner infantilism through the analysis of dreams or fantasies, or in some other way, can a person who has remained in this stage grow beyond it.

Freudianism might have developed into a pan-erotic philosophy, a mysticism of love, like that of the Platonic "Symposium," where the growth of eros in the soul is pictured. Beginning with the crudest sexual urges, the Platonic eros gradually expands and comes to a knowledge of itself, till it no longer turns toward sexual ends—Freud's *sublimation*—but finds its fulfillment in the love of the purely ideal.

That Freudianism did not take this direction is probably due to the fact that it developed in the setting of nineteenth century materialistic science, which does not show the slightest trace of mysticism. Though Freud's object is to free and educate the



instincts of life (he speaks of sexuality in his later work as the instincts of life, of renewal, in contrast to instincts of death, of repetition, order, and rationality), he is nevertheless a materialist and rationalist of the most hard-boiled variety, as is proved by his last book, *The Future of an Illusion*. He takes no interest in the striving, purposiveness, and creativity of the soul, but explains its present states wholly in terms of past causes. His theory of love rests on simple physiological facts, sucking at the mother's breast, the passage of urine and intestinal excreta, the transference at puberty of a generally diffused excitability from erogenous zones on various parts of the body to the genital organs, at which time sex normally becomes adult and centers on procreation. He even expects that chemistry will ultimately confirm his theory of sexuality and its transformations.

There is no mysticism, no nonsense, here. These are exactly the sort of clear and distinct ideas that fit the scientific temper of the nineteenth century. To an age that was interested in reducing all phenomena, including life, to the clash of tiny, indestructible particles of matter, this reduction of the psyche—or a large part of the psyche—to one of its most primitive elements, sexuality, would naturally seem reasonable and hard-headed. Sex, as Freud conceives it, is the material aspect of the soul. Driven by the sexual urge, man tends to seek

direct satisfaction in libidinous pleasure, without thought for the realities of life, the need to preserve himself and the social order. And where, through the influences of childhood or later life, the sexual urge can find no direct expression, it takes the distorted forms characteristic of neuroses. Man must learn to understand, to sacrifice, control, and finally *sublimate* in other more useful activities, all of his sexual energy which is not directed to the end of procreation. (It is doubtful that sex can be sublimated in this way, that the sexual urge can be "turned into piano-playing," as Jung puts it, any more than hunger can be.) This is the Freudian ethics—simple and "scientific," in the sense that it is clear and easy to understand. It presents no flattering picture of human nature, but acknowledges the bare—perhaps too bare—facts of the soul's material side, and attempts to make the best of them. It shows that Freud, far from having intended to let loose devils upon the world to destroy the established moral order, is really the apostle of rationality and common sense in conduct.

The Greek maxim, "Know thyself," has a practical, if a somewhat disillusioned, ring in Freud's mouth.

But one of the ills from which the modern world has suffered, since the rise of science in the seventeenth century, is an excess of rationality, common sense, and practicality. Western civilization has



paid for its mechanical efficiency by destroying our feeling for the irrational, our sense of depth and mystery in life. And it is just this feeling which needs to be restored to us—that the dry certainties of reason are not, after all, so certain; that man, who has created scientific explanations, is greater than his own creation; that his myths, his art, his gods, his dreams, are equally as vital to him as the products of his reason. When Freud touched the unconscious, he released much more than infantile sexual wishes. He opened the doors to that shadowy realm of fantasy, myth, primitivism, and the irrational, which had been blotted out by the bright light of western rationality. This is Jung's collective unconscious.

When Jung says, in his Introduction to this book, that he lays less emphasis on the past than Freud does, he means the personal past. For the impersonal past, the forms of thought, feeling, and action deposited in the psyche through generations of inheritance, back to our animal ancestors, controls our lives in a much more important sense than the personal past. In the collective unconscious, Jung has discovered from the psychological angle what contemporary philosophers like Whitehead and Bergson insist upon from a metaphysical point of view, that *the whole of the past is alive in the present*, that history does not die, but persists as the fecund soil from which a unique, individual future is born.

Though Jung protests that he is no philosopher, but a doctor, his concept of the unconscious confirms this insight of the most recent philosophy, that history is a real dimension of the world process, the dimension of creativity, uniqueness, and individuality, not exhausted or explained by general abstract laws.

The figures of our progenitors—at least their ways of reacting to psychological situations—still dwell in some obscure part of us. Thus, Negro music, Negro humor, Negro religious feeling, slang, gestures, eroticism, are filtering into the psyche of the white American, because he harbors in his unconscious a primitive man, the brother to the Negro. Deep beneath the surface in everyone is the animal, mystically bound to nature, dumb, long-suffering, ready to claw, beget, and preserve its life at all costs. The process of organic evolution and human history did not transpire on the external stage of the outer world, alone. They took place also in man's soul, and they are still present, enfolded in us. We are our history.

Hence, Jung's therapy rests on the paradoxical truth that self-knowledge leads away from the personal to the impersonal, from subjectivity to objectivity, and culminates in the emergence of individuality. Our personal history is determined by the age we live in. Its conflicts are local, as seen against the background of human life in its whole perspective. And as long as we are absorbed in personal



problems, let us say, the problem of overcoming sexual repressions, we are not individuals at all. We are replicas of patterns of distorted psyches produced by the special conditions of our time. But the whole past and the future as well are striving within us to carry us beyond our local conflicts and make individuals of us, if we can only widen our consciousness to assimilate the inner, objective world of the unconscious; and they are threatening also to shatter us with madness, if our minds are too rigid to give under their pressure. Destruction and creation lie close together, for the psyche is composed of opposites.

The vast archetypal images of the collective unconscious may produce not only prophets, poets, artists, and sages, but also lunatics. Whatever the causes in his personal life may be, the madman is invaded by the collective unconscious and is unable to hold his own against its flood of images. They speak to him as voices, they take on bodily forms before his eyes, and cause him to sink back into archaic modes of behavior. He may become Dionysus, crowned with the leaves of the vine, or Apollo, naked and radiant like the sun. The Dionysian or Apollonian spirit, that has been alive beneath the surface of his mind, then *possesses* him, instead of feeding and enriching his conscious ego. To a lesser extent, the same thing is true of the neurotic. He is at the mercy of the unconscious, and his con-

flict is, at bottom, an attempt to accept the impersonal forces in himself without succumbing to them.

The difference between Jung's and Freud's views of the unconscious gives a very different coloring to their attitudes toward sex. For instance, the phallus is, for Freud,—just the penis. Anyone who, in later life, displays an unusual interest in this organ, has remained unconsciously at an infantile stage. But this is a part, and not the whole, of the story. For the phallus is also the symbol of creation, and of the masculine principle of order and mastery in the world. Men have carved the phallus on the walls of temples and worshiped it. In certain early, naïve Christian paintings, the Holy Ghost is represented as descending upon Mary through the phallus of God.\* For us, the same background of meaning is present in the unconscious. This, and not the fact that the phallus is the source of "libidinous pleasures," explains the power of this image to possess the mind, as it does for instance in D. H. Lawrence's long hymn to generation and phallic love, *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, or in Walt Whitman's *Leaves of Grass*. For Jung, the facts of sex are not only physiological occurrences. They are also symbols, expressive of some of the deepest feelings that unite man with nature. The cure for morbid sexuality is not sexual sophistication, or even a scientific

\* See Jung, "Mind and the Earth," in *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, New York, 1928, p. 109 ff.



knowledge of the causes of this morbidity; it lies in the restoration of the psychical overtones of sex, buried in the unconscious.

The ancient philosophical principle of opposites pervades Jung's thought and gives it a dialectical subtlety that removes it from the black and white categories of nineteenth century science. He writes in the spirit of Heraclitus, who first emphasized the passage of all things into their opposites: "the way up and the way down is one and the same thing; it is the opposite which is good for us." \* The conscious is the opposite of the unconscious. A man has a woman, his *anima*, within him, and a woman, a man, her *animus*. The extravert, the person of action and quick adjustment to the outer world, conceals in his unconscious an inferior introvert, a visionary and recluse; and the introvert shelters an inferior, unconscious extravert. The man of high ideals and straining will dreams of his *shadow*, a lazy, perhaps a loose, ne'er-do-well. The bright, the fiery, the spiritual, the Yang of Chinese philosophy, contains the seed of the dark, the damp, the earthy, the Yin. The Devil is a fallen angel, and God, the creator, is incomplete without his inferior creation, man.

But it is as if the tension of opposites were too great for human consciousness to bear. Almost every age rejects some opposite, which returns to

\* Heraclitus, fragments, as given in J. Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy*.

goad man from the unconscious. Thus, Christianity eliminated the female principle from the godhead; it reappeared in the cult of the Virgin, in some cases, a black Virgin. That which we reject is not lost; it falls into the unconscious and may in the end overwhelm us, against our wills. For individual life and history are a rhythm of opposites, and wholeness of personality is the acceptance and use of the opposite. The idealist needs to become acquainted with the shadowy materialist in himself, so that his ideals may be less sterile and more human, otherwise they will crack. The virile male needs to learn that there is an emotional, unreasoning female beneath his crusty exterior, otherwise she will master him, and he will become a neurotic.

Finally, the whole western world needs to relax its tension of will, its concentration on material, external ends, its fever of competition and progress, and allow the opposite—the smiling calm and inward poise of the East, the Eastern sense of oneness with creation—to emerge from the unconscious. In its most sweeping form, this is what the principle of opposites means for contemporary occidental life.

Science in the twentieth century is no longer sure of its fundamental categories, as it was in the nineteenth. For facts are not so simple as they seemed, and there may even be an ultimate irrationality in them which defies abstractions. The thought of this century has become more subtle, and at the same



time more experimental, than that of the last. Jung's psychology—with its emphasis on the complexity and relativity of psychical occurrences, and its astounding, yet empirically verifiable, concept of the collective unconscious—reflects this freer scientific spirit of our day. Though Jung is not a mystic and irrationalist, as he is sometimes said to be, neither is he a realist and a rationalist. I can only characterize his thinking in terms of his own principle of opposites. He is both mystical and realistic; he repudiates, and at the same time accepts, rationality. For the personality can not become whole by growing in one direction alone.

I have not dealt with Adler in this Preface because the concept which seems to me to be of most philosophic interest in this psychological movement, the unconscious, plays a less prominent rôle with him than it does with Freud and Jung.

This book originally appeared in 1930 under the title, *Die Psychoanalyse, Psychoanalytische Psychologie*, in the *Sammlung Götschen*, published by Walter de Gruyter and Co., in Berlin. The translation was made in Zürich, where only a few English copies of the relevant literature were available, and I must apologize for not having given many of the references to other works in English, where these have been translated.

I am indebted to Dr. Raphael Demos, of Harvard

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RALPH M. EATON.

Zürich, 1931.



## INTRODUCTION

By C. G. JUNG

At the present time, one can say, it is still quite impossible to draw an inclusive and hence a proper picture of all that commonly goes by the—much abused—name “psychoanalysis.” What the layman usually understands by “psychoanalysis,” namely, a medical dissection of the soul for the purpose of disclosing hidden causes and connections, touches only a small part of the phenomena of psychoanalysis. If we regard psychoanalysis from a wider angle—in agreement with Freud’s concept—as essentially a medical instrument for the cure of neuroses, this broader point of view does not at all exhaust the nature of the subject. Above all, psychoanalysis in the more limited Freudian sense is not only a therapeutic method, but also a psychological theory which does not confine itself in the least to neuroses and to psychopathology in general, but attempts also to bring within its province the normal phenomenon of the dream, and beyond this, wide ranges of the mental and moral sciences, literature, the creative arts in general, biography, mythology, folklore, the comparative history of religions, and philosophy. It is a somewhat curious and remarkable fact in the history of science—although it pertains to the pe-



culiar character of the psychoanalytical movement—that Freud, the creator of psychoanalysis (in the narrower sense), insists upon identifying the analytical method with his sexual theory, and thus has placed upon it the stamp of dogmatism. The “scientific” infallibility of this explanation caused me, in due time, to break with Freud, for dogma and science are to me incommensurable quantities which mutually interfere with one another through their confusion. Dogma as a factor in religion has inestimable value just because of its absolute standpoint. But when science thinks that it can do without criticism and skepticism, it degenerates into a sickly hot-house plant. One of the elements of life necessary to science is extreme uncertainty. Wherever science is inclined to dogmatize, and thus to be impatient and fanatical, it is very likely that a justifiable doubt is concealed and that an uncertainty, which is only too well founded, has been explained away.

I emphasize this unfortunate state of affairs not because I want to make a critical attack upon the Freudian theory, but rather to point out to the unbiased reader the significant fact that the Freudian psychoanalysis is not only a scientific endeavor and achievement, but also a psychical symptom which has proved to be more powerful than the analytical art of the master himself. As Maylan's book, *Freud's Tragic Complex*, has shown, it would not

be at all difficult to deduce Freud's tendency to dogmatize from the premises of his own personality—he has of course taught these methods to his pupils and has himself applied them with more or less success; but I do not wish to turn these weapons, which are his own, against their creator. For in the end no one is completely out of reach of his personal limitations. Everyone is more or less imprisoned by them—especially when he pursues psychology. I find these technical defects uninteresting and believe it is dangerous to emphasize them too much, since they divert attention from the one important fact, namely, that even the most independent mind is most limited and dependent exactly at the point where it seems to exhibit the greatest freedom. In my own private opinion, the creative spirit in man is by no means his own personality, but a sign or “symptom” of a contemporary movement of thought. His personality is important only as an agent that acknowledges a conviction arising out of an unconscious, collective background—a conviction that deprives him of his freedom and forces sacrifices, errors, and mistakes upon him which he would mercilessly criticize in another. Freud is borne along by a particular movement of thought which can be traced back to the period of the Reformation, and which has gradually freed itself in our times from many veils and disguises, and prepared for the coming of that sort of psychology which Nie-



tzsche, with the insight of the seer, prophesied—a discovery of the soul as a new fact. Sometime it will be clearly known upon what tortuous paths modern and ultra-modern psychology have made their way, from the obscure laboratories of the alchemists through the intermediate stages of mesmerism (Justinus Kerner, Ennemoser, Eschenmayer, Baader, Passavant, and others) to the philosophical anticipations of a Schopenhauer, a Carus, and a Hartmann; and how this psychology finally reached Freud, through the school of the French hypnotists, proceeding from the dark native soil of everyday experience in Liébeault and, still earlier, in Quimby (the spiritual father of Christian Science). This stream of ideas flowed together from many obscure sources, gaining rapidly in power in the nineteenth century, and winning many adherents, among whose ranks Freud is not an isolated figure.

What is commonly indicated in the present day by the catch-word “psychoanalysis” is not really a single thing, but comprises many different subtle nuances of the great general psychological problem of our age. Whether this is or is not recognized as such among a large public, does not alter the fact of its existence. In our time the soul has become a problem. Psychology has acquired a power of attraction which is astounding. This explains the extraordinary, world-wide spread of so-called “psychoanalysis,” which has had a success compara-

ble only to that of Christian Science, Theosophy, and Anthroposophy. Not only is psychoanalysis comparable in success to these movements, but also in character, for Freud's dogmatism comes very close in its essential nature to the attitude of religious conviction that characterizes Christian Science and Anthroposophy. And moreover, all four of these movements are definitely psychological. When we add to this the almost unbelievable rise of occultism of every form in all civilized parts of the western world, we have an approximate picture of this stream of thought, which is of course everywhere somewhat tabooed, yet none the less compelling. Modern medicine also shows a marked inclination toward the spirit of Paracelsus, and is increasingly aware of the importance of the soul in relation to illnesses of the body. Even the traditional standpoint of criminal law begins to give way before the claims of psychology, through the suspension of sentences and a more and more frequent consultation of psychological experts.

So much for the positive aspects of the psychological movement. But these positive aspects correspond on the other hand to equally characteristic negative ones. With the Reformation consciousness had already begun to break away from the original metaphysical certainty of the Gothic period—a separation that has grown more important and extensive in each century. At the end of the eight-



eenth century, for the first time, the world saw the truths of Christianity publicly dethroned, and in the beginning of the twentieth century the government of one of the greatest countries on earth is making every effort to uproot Christian doctrines, as if they were a psychical illness. Meanwhile, the intellect of the white races as a whole has grown away from the Catholic dogma, and Protestantism has succeeded in splitting itself up into more than four hundred denominations, through its elaboration of subtle and trivial distinctions. These are clearly negative aspects, which play their necessary part in any human movement from which an important truth can be expected to come.

Religions are systematic cures for the ills of the soul. Neuroses and similar illnesses arise, in each and every case, from complications in the psyche. But a disputed and questioned dogma has lost its healing power. A person who no longer believes that a helpful, comforting, meaningful god, with a knowledge of suffering, will have mercy upon him, is weak and a prey to his own weakness, and he becomes neurotic. The many pathological elements among our population constitute one of the most powerful factors that favor the psychological tendency of our time.

But another and by no means an unimportant group is composed of all those who have awakened, after a period of belief in authority, with a sort of

resentment, and who find satisfaction mixed with self-torture in advocating a so-called new truth, destructive to old and still living convictions. For such people can never keep silent, and must always flock together into proselyting bands, because of the weakness of their conviction and their fear of isolation; thus their quantity at least makes up for their doubtful quality.

And finally there are the persons who are earnestly searching for something and who are wise enough to be thoroughly convinced that the soul in each of us is the origin of all psychical distress, and also the dwelling place of all the healing truths whose good tidings will ever be brought to suffering humanity. The soul produces the most senseless conflicts for us, yet we also look to the soul for a solution or at least a valid answer to the tormenting question—why?

A person does not have to be neurotic in order to feel the need of healing, and this need exists even among those who deny with the deepest conviction that such healing is possible. In a weak moment these people can not help glancing curiously into a psychological book, perhaps only to find a clever prescription as to how a refractory partner in marriage can be brought back to reason.

To this tributary stream belong the best and soundest people, upon whom the entire hope of a future psychical culture rests.



The heterogeneous influences of these wholly different motives of public interest are represented in the variations upon the theme of "psychoanalysis." The Adlerian school, which grew up side by side with Freud, emphasizes particularly the social aspect of the psychical problem, and thus becomes more and more differentiated as a system of social education. It departs not only theoretically but also practically, in all its essential elements, from the original Freudian direction of psychoanalysis—in fact to so great an extent that, with the exception of certain theoretical principles, the original points of contact with the Freudian psychology can scarcely be made out any longer. Thus Adler's so-called Individual Psychology can hardly be brought under the concept of "psychoanalysis." It is a psychological system of an independent character, the expression of another temperament and another philosophy of life.

No one who is interested in "psychoanalysis," and who therefore wishes to make a somewhat adequate survey of the whole field of modern medical knowledge of the soul, should fail to study the Adlerian writings. He will find them extremely stimulating, and will then for the first time make the very important discovery that exactly the same cases of neuroses can be explained in an equally convincing way from the standpoint of Freud or of Adler, despite the fact that the two methods of explana-

tion seem to be diametrically opposed to one another. But what falls hopelessly asunder in theory, lies close together without contradiction in the paradoxical soul of man: a human being has an instinct for power as well as a sexual instinct. Consequently, he displays both of these psychologies, and every psychical impulse in him has subtle overtones coming from the one as well as from the other direction.

Now, since it is not at all decided how many primary instincts exist in man or in animals, the possibility at once arises that an inquiring mind might discover still another psychology which apparently contradicts all the rest, and yet produces highly satisfactory explanations. In view of the possibility of such further discoveries, the matter is by no means so simple that anyone can merely sit down and take, for instance, the artistic impulse and develop a new psychological system out of it. Neither the Freudian nor the Adlerian psychology came into existence in this way. But rather, as if they were absolutely predestined to do so, without freedom of choice, both investigators have confessed to their chief principle, their own personal psychology, and thus to their way of regarding other human beings. This sort of thing is a matter of deep experience, and is not a feat of intellectual conjuring. It is to be hoped that we might have still more confessions



of faith of this sort, so that the portrait of the soul's possibilities might become more complete.

My views and school are equally psychological, and are therefore subject to the same limitations and criticisms that I have allowed myself to urge against these other psychologists. So far as I myself can pass judgment upon my own point of view, it differs from the psychologies discussed above in this respect, that it is not monistic but, since it is based on the principle of opposites, at least dualistic, if it is not actually pluralistic—in that it recognizes a multiplicity of relatively autonomous psychical complexes.

It can be seen that I have deduced a theory from the fact that contradictory, and yet satisfactory, explanations are possible. In contrast to Freud and Adler, whose explanatory principle is essentially reductive in nature and thus always returns to the infantile conditions that limit human nature, I lay a somewhat greater stress upon a constructive or synthetic explanation, in recognition of the fact that to-morrow is of more practical importance than yesterday, and that the whence is less essential than the whither. In any evaluation of history, the creative spirit seems to me to have the greatest meaning for life, and I am convinced that no insight into the past and no revival—however strong—of pathogenic, sickening memories can be as effective in freeing man from the grip of the past as the

construction of something new. I am of course very well aware that, without insight into the past and without an integration of important memories that have been lost, something new and living can not be created. But I regard it both as a loss of time and a misleading prejudice to rummage in the past for alleged specific causes of illness; for neuroses—no matter what the original occasion may be from which they once arose—are conditioned and maintained by a wrong attitude, which is continually present and which, once it is recognized, must be corrected *now* and not in the early period of infancy. Further, it is not enough merely to bring the causes into consciousness, for the cure of neuroses is, in the last analysis, a moral problem and not the magic effect of the revival of memories.

My view differs further from those of Freud and Adler through the fact that I give a different value to the unconscious than they do. Freud, who ascribes a far more important rôle to the unconscious than Adler (this school as a whole permits the unconscious to recede completely into the background), has a more religious temperament than Adler, and for this reason he naturally concedes to the psychical non-ego an autonomous, though negative, function. In this direction I go some distance further than Freud. The unconscious is for me not only the receptacle of all unclean spirits and other odious legacies of dead situations—such as that store of



historical *opinion publique*, for example, which constitutes Freud's "super-ego"—but it is, in particular, the one ever-living and creative seed-ground, which manifests itself through ancient symbolical images, and yet by means of these points to a renewal of the spirit. To be sure, a new spirit does not usually come ready made from the sphere of the unconscious, like Pallas, full-armed, from the head of Zeus, but it is only when the products of the unconscious are brought into a serious relation to the conscious that important effects follow.

Thus, in order to understand the "products" of the unconscious, I found that a wholly different interpretation of dreams and fantasies was needed. So far as it seemed appropriate to the nature of the case, I no longer reduced these, as Freud does, to personal matters, but I exhibited their analogy to the symbols of mythology, of comparative religious history, and other materials, in order to learn what direction they were preparing to take. As a matter of fact, this method yielded extremely interesting results—none the less so, in that it permitted a wholly new reading of the contents of dreams and fantasies, so that it became possible to bring archaic tendencies, which could not otherwise be united with consciousness, into unity with the conscious personality. I had long before thought of this unification as the end that should be sought, since neurotics, and also many normal persons, suffer at



bottom from a dissociation of the unconscious from the conscious. Since the unconscious contains, on the one hand, the sources of instinct and the whole prehistoric nature of man down to the animal, but also, along with these, all the creative seeds of the future and the roots of all constructive fantasies, a separation from the unconscious through neurotic dissociation means nothing less than a separation from the sources of life themselves, for good as well as for evil. Thus the primary task of treatment seemed to me to be the endeavor to restore this lost contact, this necessary, life-giving parallelism. Freud depreciates the unconscious and tries to find security in the knowing consciousness. But this way is futile and leads to desiccation and torpor, wherever a consciousness that is firmly founded but lacking in the necessary life already exists. For such a consciousness keeps at a safe distance from the unconscious, which is its opposite and apparently its enemy, though it needs the unconscious for its own renewal.

However, this way is not always futile, for it is not always the case that a firmly founded consciousness already exists. The latter presupposes a large amount of experience of life and thus a mature age. Young people, who are still far from knowing definitely who they really are, would be in great danger if they were to increase the obscurity which naturally already exists in their knowledge of themselves by

allowing the nocturnal forms of the unconscious to stream into their immature, labile consciousness. Hence, in such cases, a certain depreciation of the unconscious has its justification. From such experiences I have become convinced that there are not only various temperaments ("types"), but also various stages of human psychology, so that one can properly speak of an essential difference between the psychology of the first and the second half of life. Here again I differ from the others in maintaining that the same psychological criteria are not applicable to various levels of age.

If, to all these considerations, the further fact is added that I distinguish extraverts from introverts, and again divide both of these types by the criterion of their most differentiated basic function (of which I can clearly make out four), it then becomes plain that my function as an investigator in the field of psychology consists chiefly in this—to break rudely in upon the situation, which is simple to the point of monotony as seen from both of the other standpoints, and to call attention to the inconceivable complexity of the soul as it really is.

Most people have wanted to ignore these complexities, they have complained more or less loudly against them. But how can a physiologist assure himself that the body is simple? Or that the living protoplasmic molecule is simple? If the human psyche is anything, it is inconceivably complicated



and of an unlimited multiplicity, so that it can not possibly be approached through a mere instinct psychology. I can only stop and gaze with admiration and awe at the depths and heights natural to the soul, whose non-spatial world conceals an untold abundance of images, amassed and organically consolidated throughout millions of years of development. My consciousness is like an eye that penetrates the most distant spaces, but it is the psychical non-ego which fills these spaces, though not spatially. And these images are not pale shadows, but powerful, active conditions of the psyche. The most that we may be able to do is to misunderstand them, but we can never rob them of their power by denying them. Beside this picture I would like to place that of the starry vistas of the heavens at night, for the only equivalent of the world within is the world without, and just as I reach this world through the medium of the body, so I reach that world through the medium of the soul.

Thus I can feel no regrets for the complexities introduced into psychology through my contributions to it; for science has always thoroughly deceived itself whenever it has had the idea of discovering how simple things are.

In this introduction I hope that I have given the reader the impression that the psychological tendencies included under the layman's concept of



“psychoanalysis” extend very much further historically, socially, and philosophically, than the catch-word indicates. At the same time, it should be clear that the field presented in this work is far from being a separate and easily delimited territory. On the contrary, we have here a growing science, which is only just preparing to leave its medical cradle and become a psychology of human nature.

The following presentation does not attempt to describe inclusively the whole range of present-day psychological problems, but it confines itself to an orientation in the elements and fundamental problems, as they are dealt with chiefly in the province of the physician. I have added in my introduction materials which extend further than this, so as to give a more general orientation.

**SECRET WAYS OF  
THE MIND**





## CHAPTER I

### EARLY STUDIES OF DOUBLE PERSONALITY

Psychoanalysis literally translated means "a loosening of the soul."<sup>1</sup> It would be well to know, first, what is meant by soul in the sphere of psychoanalysis. But concepts of the soul are in general very numerous, and in psychoanalysis this notion has no single meaning. Though the various psychoanalytical schools or movements of to-day are united on the principle of analysis, they are separated by their assumptions—not stated—as to what is meant by soul.

Here at the outset we need only remember that in the beginning of psychoanalysis soul indicated simply the opposite of body. Freud, in his first publications at the end of the last century, wanted to show that so called functional illnesses,\* which till then for lack of a better way had been treated physically, were expressions of mental states. The psychical super-structure was emphasized, typical patterns of mental life were taken as the basis of

\* Functional in contrast to organic, *i.e.*, with a recognizable material basis; particularly hysteria and other forms of neuroses.

a theory of neuroses, so that the nerve specialist could now employ a psychical treatment, could find his way in the soul of his patient, and loosen up pathological forms of expression, whether these showed themselves in physical symptoms, functional paralysis and the like, or in mental disturbances in a narrower sense, obsessive fantasies, disturbances of sleep, uncontrolled impulses, compulsive acts, and so on.

Freud gave the name "psychoanalysis" to this technique, created and developed by him, for the treatment of neuroses. To-day, the Freudian psychoanalysis has stepped far beyond its peculiar medical boundaries, and so also have other similar movements called forth or influenced by it—movements which must equally be counted as a part of psychoanalysis in the broader sense. Here belong chiefly the Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, of Vienna, and the Analytical Psychology of C. G. Jung, of Zürich. Mention should also be made of William Stekel (Vienna), who has worked over a great deal of pathological sexual material from the analytical point of view, and yet has kept himself happily free from the Freudian dogmatism.

Our short survey of psychoanalysis will deal with Freud and Jung, and will also briefly sketch Adler's point of view. But to begin with, our attention must be turned to those considerations which form, at least indirectly, the source or basis of psychoanaly-



sis. We speak of these sources as indirect since Freud's later theories, in particular, have again essentially covered them up. We mean the notions of double consciousness (*double conscience*), as they were worked out by the French investigators of hysteria and hypnosis in the second half of the 19th century, those connected with the names of *Charcot*, *Azam*, *Janet*, *Liébeault*, and *Bernheim*.

The psychological investigation of hysteria, the most frequent form of neurosis, was then being carried on in France with the greatest interest and freedom from prejudice. It was concluded that persons, whether spontaneously or under the influence of hypnosis, that is under suggestion, can pass through various states of mind so sundered from one another that no bridge of memory from the one to the other exists. These various layers of consciousness are like many partial personalities in a human being, and, generally speaking, are opposed to each other when there are only two. It is important that, from the standpoint of one of these, the deepest, most inclusive layer of consciousness, all other personalities or partial personalities are remembered, while from the parts to the whole there is no access, that is, the latter is unconscious.

Thus, in the following case of the well-known *Félida X.*, given by *Azam*,<sup>2</sup> no recollection of her crisis arose in her normal consciousness, although the reverse process occurred: the memory material



of the latter was included in the former.\* Félicité was a girl of simple origin in whom such marked nervous disturbances had shown themselves from her thirteenth year as to suggest insanity to the casual observer. By trade a seamstress, she was of a gloomy, even morose temperament in her normal condition, and gave herself exclusively and with earnest tenacity to her work. But during her work, in fact daily and quite suddenly, her crisis came upon her, beginning with a brief condition resembling sleep. She awoke by herself, but in her second consciousness, and was now lively, gay, and full of interest in life. In fact she seemed now for the first time in full possession of her powers.

This secondary state (*condition seconde*), which in the beginning alternated in the proportion of about one to ten with the normal condition, became more powerful in the course of the development and finally changed Félicité's character, so that one could speak of a mutual reconciliation and harmonious blending of the patterns of consciousness, originally sharply separated. "The two characters were equalized, as if melted into one another," as Azam expresses it. The opposites, pathological in their narrowness and one-sidedness, had joined themselves in a normal mean, suited to life.

\* Here, obviously, the normal consciousness was only a partial personality, while the personality appearing in the crisis represented the deeper, more inclusive layer of her psyche.—Trans.

Pierre Janet studied many similar cases. He indicates the alternating states of consciousness of his subjects by numbers, and speaks for instance of Lucy I, II, or III. In his book, *L' automatisme psychologique*, which appeared in Paris in the 80's, he develops a detailed theory of these phenomena. Proceeding from observations on catalepsy \*—where catalepsy is taken as a condition of "empty consciousness"—he describes how a single image introduced into this empty consciousness immediately expresses itself in an appropriate action. What is inwardly an image appears outwardly as a movement. An arm movement, for instance, made by the experimenter, will immediately be imitated by the cataleptic subject when the latter's attention is turned to the experimenter. Thus a completely one-sided consciousness—if one can speak of consciousness at all in such a case—is immediately expressed in outward action. This action proceeds automatically till the first contrasting image enters and stimulates a more complete consciousness of the action; whereupon the action may or may not be continued, depending on the circumstances. Before consciousness is aroused by a contrasting image, a whole series of detailed acts may unroll automatically, provided there is a corresponding series of mental images which are

\* Catalepsy is a state of loss of consciousness which arises in persons thus disposed as the result of a shock or strong excitation, or occasionally it can be brought about through experimental hypnotism (hypnotic catalepsy).



linked together by habit or other causes, so that they can operate as a whole.

Such connected series of images constitute, for instance, the "infra-conscious personalities," whose formation is attributed by Janet to a sufficient enrichment of certain groups of ideas. These operate as distinct egos, under whose influence the waking ego correspondingly changes its character. Alternations of this sort are very noticeable in hysterical cases, but the same phenomenon also occurs in normal persons when certain realms of the psyche, lying in the shadowy portion of attention, are not integrated with the normal, conscious personality. A fully inclusive consciousness would not be subject to hypnosis. On the contrary, the narrower the field of consciousness, the more easily is the person influenced. The statement, "I can only be hypnotized—or succumb to suggestion, which is the same thing—if I am willing," is at once true and false. For the question is much more, whether I know all that I am willing to do; whether I have all my longings and impulses really under my control; whether, and to what extent, I meet the suggestion with an unconscious preparation. If the suggestion is *effective*, this is a proof that the unconscious is ready for it.<sup>3</sup> There are as many tendencies pressing within me for realization, that is, effective in me, as there are unconscious or infra-conscious patterns of activity, *i.e.*, personalities. Normally, however, these tend-



encies not only balance one another, but are held in check from the side of consciousness. Certain impressions, or suggestions, may destroy the state of inner balance and activate one of the impulses. This occurs all the more easily when the activity of consciousness is suspended, a condition that can be brought about in many persons merely by closing the eyes, reclining, or by similar means employed in the technique of hypnotism.

But the possibility of exercising this sort of influence depends, also, on that strange *préférence* of the subject for the doctor, which even Janet emphasizes. Where this preference, which is closely and unmistakably related to the Freudian "transference," does not arise, the suggestor or the doctor—for that matter often the diagnostician as well—does not touch the background of the person's mind, and thus may overlook positive possibilities in him. He can judge only of the "primary self with its gaps." (Janet.)

The more marked such infra-conscious tendencies or functional patterns (personalities) are, and the more determinate their form, the more must we reckon with this *préférence*—and also with its reverse side, which is the phenomenon that Freud later designated as "resistance." Since Freud in his later theories has essentially altered the whole situation, it seems especially advisable to bear in mind the psychological basis of these processes—namely, the

competition between individual impulses and their consolidation into a unique state of balance. Thus, from Freud's point of view, for instance, the patient is blamed for his resistance, as an expression of his neurosis, even if the fact is only this, that he can not accept the psychoanalytical theory.<sup>4</sup> Theory alone should not determine whether a resistance is or is not neurotic. The resistance noticed by Janet can also develop against the preferred suggestor, and in fact can become stronger as the psyche is re-integrated, as in the case of Félicité's gradual growth toward mental balance. Resistance can thus be a direct sign of health. For only while psychical contents that should really be integrated into consciousness operate exclusively beneath the surface of consciousness, does the individual remain dependent, and abnormally susceptible to hypnotic practices or doctrines.<sup>5</sup> Janet believed that the cause of an abnormal preponderance of such automatic psychical phenomena was *a weakness of the synthetic power of the mind*, and he gave to the illness thus conceived the name, "psychasthenia."<sup>6</sup>

Every automatic phenomenon is the result of a preceding synthesis of images, tendencies, ideas. On the other hand, the continued effort to create further syntheses (which include these previous patterns of ideas, and hence check the automatic processes flowing from them) produces new material for future automatic phenomena. Thus, the same activity—



mental synthesis—is both the cause and the check of automatic phenomena: so far as this activity is not used to produce wider syntheses, the automatic phenomena depending upon previous syntheses continue to follow their own course.

It is important that Jung, too, while he was still pursuing his university studies in the 90's, had the chance to observe a case of an hysterical split personality, not unlike the classical French examples.<sup>7</sup> The girl, whom he studied for two years, was fifteen and a half years old when her sisters noticed that she gave very extraordinary answers to questions put to her in her sleep. She was found to have somnambulistic powers; the girl was what is called a "medium." Through hypnosis she fell easily into a trance, from which she awoke later as from a sleep. During this trance-sleep she displayed several personalities or characters,—the spiritualist would have said, "spirits." Jung found that through suggestion he could talk to or call up one or the other of the personalities, and in fact could exercise a formative, educational influence upon each of these unconscious figures.

Though these phenomena seemed to him at first inexplicable, one thing seemed clear: that, psychologically speaking, behind the conscious world was hidden, in some strange way, another world of fantasy, with which the girl could come into contact. The fantastic occurrences which appeared in her



trance-sleep could not be wholly absurd, despite their oddity. Perhaps they had a meaning that could be understood through the girl's psyche. The girl came from a family that was formerly of good standing but had fallen almost completely into decay, both financially and culturally. She lived in very mean circumstances, which were in no way sufficient to satisfy her need for education and development. Characteristically, one of her infra-conscious manifestations was an idealized figure of a woman, equipped with all the material and spiritual advantages which she herself lacked. Jung suspected that the material which would break through and shape the later character of the girl was contained in this idealized figure, while the other figures in her trance-condition appeared to embody characters destined to be eliminated. In fact the further development of the girl seemed to show that he was correct.

Stimulated by the general interest she encountered in the séances, and by her outer and inner needs, the girl naturally at first went off into a dangerous world of unreal fantasies and seemed further away than ever from any real improvement in her condition. One day, however, this mood of false exaltation collapsed: the products of her fantasy had gradually exhausted themselves, the séances lacked content, they degenerated into deception and so came to an end. But in this way, the girl's inflated life of fantasy had reached its normal end,

she found herself again in a real but altered world, where she was now able to work. She trained herself to be a seamstress and later went to Paris, where she established her own workshop and became highly valued for the excellence and originality of her taste.

About the same time, in the middle of the 90's, a book by the Viennese physicians J. Breuer and S. Freud appeared,<sup>8</sup> which attempted to exhibit scientifically a causal connection between hysteria—a name under which all the psychical phenomena yet mentioned were grouped—and sexuality. This notion was not new, but had had its representatives from the earliest times. In fact the name hysteria comes from “hystéra,” the Greek word for uterus, and according to Galen,<sup>9</sup> who worked over the remnants of Hippocrates, it was derived from the women who occupied themselves among the ancients with the treatment of illnesses of their own sex. It was probably these women also, as Galen believes,<sup>10</sup> who discovered, or at least made use of, the “*confrication de la vulve*” as a means of calming hysterical attacks. Up to the last century physicians looked upon the sexually unsatisfied uterus as the cause of hysteria: in the beginning, in a crude material sense, as a hungry animal that ranges to and fro in the body; later the idea became more subtle and was represented by “juices”<sup>11</sup> or “vapors,” a cur-



rent description for hysteria in the 17th and even in the 18th century.

Along with this sexual theory of hysteria, there existed from ancient times a conception of hysteria as a holy sickness. The writings of Hippocrates describe it thus, and the physician-priests of Babylon and Egypt, the holy men of Epidaurus and other places,<sup>12</sup> worked by means of suggestion, of sleep in the temple. These were psychological measures, for they obviously were dictated less by interest in the causes of these states than in the contents experienced in them.

Only in the 19th century did the view, represented a hundred years earlier by Sydenham, penetrate into the practice of medicine, that the material substratum of hysterical phenomena was the central nervous system. This at least opened the way in the field of medicine for a psychological point of view. For it no longer seemed a wide step from what were supposed, but not known to be, "extremely subtle alterations in the covering of the large brain," to psychical occurrences as such. Till then attention had been drawn to these occurrences only under more crude material disguises.

Briquet expressed the hope that the verse of the poet, who said of hysteria, "It is Venus, fastened completely upon her prey," was a thing of the past, and that the sexual taint was forever removed from this illness. But this hope seemed to collapse when



psychological therapy again attacked the problem of hysteria from the side which had always seemed to the popular mind the most obvious.

<sup>1</sup> *Psyche* (*anima*, originally "breath") is equivalent to soul; *analyo* means "I loosen."

<sup>2</sup> Azam, *Hypnotisme, double conscience et altération de la personnalité*, Paris, 1887, J. B. Baillière et fils.

<sup>3</sup> See below, p. 141.

<sup>4</sup> See Nachmansohn, *Die wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse Freuds, Darstellung und Kritik*, Berlin, 1928, pub. by S. Karger, Karlstr. 39, which originally appeared in issue No. 45 of *Abhandlungen aus der Neurologie, Psychiatrie, Psychologie, und ihren Grenzgebieten*.

<sup>5</sup> See below, p. 166 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Asthenic* means "powerless," "weak."

<sup>7</sup> The case is published in Jung: *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*; originally published in German by Oswald Mutze, Leipzig, 1902, under the title *Zur Psychologie und Pathologie sog. okkultur Phänomene*.

<sup>8</sup> *Studien über Hysterie*, 1. Auflage, 1895; a third unchanged edition appeared in 1916, published by Franz Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Briquet, *Traité clinique et thérapeutique de l'hysterie*, Paris, Baillière et fils, 1859.

<sup>10</sup> See Briquet, *loc. cit.*, p. 126 ff.

<sup>11</sup> The pathology of "humors"—*retentio seminis!*

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Arnold Sack, *Hippocrates*, Berlin, 1927, pub. by Jul. Springer.

## CHAPTER II

### THE TRAUMA HYPOTHESIS—CATHARSIS

Breuer and Freud developed the following conceptions of the growth and cure of hysteria.

The various symptoms, which till then had been thought of as spontaneous effects of hysteria, are connected with a psychical *trauma* [wound] <sup>1</sup> which has occasioned them. "Any experience that arouses intensely unpleasant emotions of terror, anxiety, shame, or mental pain, can have this effect, and, as is easily seen, it depends on the sensitivity of the person in question whether the experience operates as a trauma." <sup>2</sup>

The connection is, to be sure, not always directly observable. Either it is unknown to the patient himself, so that it can not be discovered simply through questioning him, or "there exists only a symbolical relation—so to speak—between the occasion and the pathological phenomenon, such as might be formed in a healthy person in a dream, or when for instance a neuralgic pain is associated with a psychical pain, or vomiting with the emotion of moral disgust." <sup>3</sup>

For this reason it could be said, "the hysterical person suffers, for the most part, from reminis-

cences"—from recollections of an emotional sort that he has not been able to deal with himself, since he has failed to react in a suitable way to the original occasion, the trauma. What is meant by this can be gathered from the following: "The reaction of the wounded person to the trauma has in fact a fully '*cathartic*' [purifying] effect only when this is an adequate reaction, such as revenge," says Freud.<sup>4</sup> Yet Freud takes speech as a substitute for action, and believes that through its help something "very near to a counter-reaction [*ab-reaction*]" to the emotion can be attained.<sup>5</sup>

The idea was that such a trauma, "so far as its recollection goes, will otherwise have further effects like those of a foreign body in the organism."<sup>6</sup>

The event in question may be completely forgotten, for instance, when "it has to do with things that the patient wishes to forget, and which he therefore pushes away, extrudes, and suppresses from his conscious thoughts. It is just such painful things which are revealed through hypnosis as the basis of hysterical phenomena (hysterical delirium of saints and nuns, of abstaining women, of well-brought-up children)."<sup>7</sup>

Here for the first time Freud mentions his concept of *repression*—and, moreover, in close connection with sexuality, as can be gathered from the examples he gives. This connection is destined to play a dominant rôle in the work that comes afterwards



from Freud. However, the repression of *these* painful experiences is regarded, at first, as an exceptional case among those in which, taken quite generally, "a reaction to a trauma has not taken its adequate course." <sup>8</sup>

Further cases are those where a proper reaction does not arise "because the nature of the trauma prevents such a reaction, as in the case of the apparently irreparable loss of a beloved person, or because social circumstances make such a reaction impossible." <sup>9</sup>

Reactions can, further, remain inadequate when the events, or ideas, with which they are connected, "though they have no particular significance in themselves, owe their preservation to the fact that they arose in a difficult, paralyzing emotional situation, as for instance one of terror, or under abnormal psychical conditions, so that a split in consciousness was already present." <sup>10</sup>

That the presence of such a split in consciousness is at least indicated in every hysterical case, had already been declared by Möbius in 1890: "The basis and condition of hysteria is the existence of hypnoid states." <sup>11</sup> A trauma, then, must either cause a split, or a split already existing must be the condition that permits any sort of experience whatsoever to assume a traumatic character. Therapeutic measures must reawaken the emotion that was aroused on the occasion of the trauma, must bring

it into a proper setting of associations, must raise the emotionally stressed thoughts into "normal consciousness," in order to "effect a unification, with the ego-consciousness, of psychical elements that have been split off." <sup>12</sup>

This is, in brief, the state of the facts as set forth in the paper written in 1892, "Preliminary Communication on the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena." <sup>13</sup> When this essay reappeared as a book in the year 1895, the theoretical considerations were somewhat altered, as the preface declared. The case-histories of patients now added to the essay were taken as proofs that "sexuality plays a leading rôle in the pathogenesis of hysteria, as the source of psychical trauma and as the motive of 'defence,' that is, of the repression of ideas from consciousness." <sup>14</sup>

When one reads the case-histories given in the book from this point of view, the conclusion from the first case (Anna O., of Breuer) is negative; for Breuer says that this twenty-one-year-old woman patient, "whose life became transparent to him as that of one human being seldom does to another, had never experienced love, and that in the whole multitude of hallucinations connected with her illness, at no time did this [sexual] element of her psychical life break forth." <sup>15</sup>

In Freud's first case—a forty-year-old widow, who married at twenty-three and lost her husband after



a short period of marriage—the conclusion is in fact positive, and it is strange that Freud, now fully occupied with his search for traumata, does not seem in the least to have noticed this conclusion. For, how else can we understand him when he says: “It also struck me that in all the intimate communications which my patient made to me, the sexual element, which *more than any other* is the cause of a trauma, was *completely lacking*.”<sup>16</sup>

In the following third case, the main object is to show how a quantity of psychical excitation, or emotion, may “take a wrong course toward bodily manifestations, through an intentional suppression of its cause from consciousness.” Freud calls this phenomenon *conversion*: the excitation proceeding from an idea that is charged with a lively emotion becomes converted into a bodily symptom.

In the fifth case as well, psychical disturbances—it is a question of pains in the legs—are viewed chiefly as phenomena of conversion. The patient walked with the upper part of her body bent forward, complained of severe pains and rapid fatigue in walking and standing. In the course of the analytical investigation, she surprised the physician one day by the statement that she now knew why the pains proceeded from one spot on her thigh and were most severe there. While she had nursed her sick father, his swollen leg had rested each morning on this spot as she changed his dressings. The nurs-



ing of her father was closely related in her mind to a great many important experiences. Yet, for a long time, she had not thought of these associations.

At this point Freud comes to an important elaboration of his concepts. He says: "When the patient closed her account of a long series of events with the complaint that, in them, she experienced a *sensation of painfully 'standing alone,'* when she never tired of repeating in connection with another series that the *painful thing* was her feeling of *helplessness*, the *sensation* that *'she would not get away from this place,'* I was forced to concede to these *reflections of hers an influence upon the development of her difficulties in walking*; I had to assume that she was directly seeking a *symbolical expression* for the thoughts so painfully stressed in her mind, and that she had found this expression in the increased intensity of her suffering."<sup>17</sup> Freud thus views these difficulties in walking not only as a bodily expression of a repressed chain of thoughts ("functional paralysis through psychical association"), but also as a symbolical expression of a judgment on her whole situation ("symbolical paralysis of a function"). The patient, he believes, has "created or reënforced" these difficulties in walking as symbols for her inability to bring about a change in her situation. She has discovered the bodily expression which recaptures the "original, literal sig-

nificance" of language, or which perhaps, "rather than taking the usage of language as its pattern, draws upon the common source from which this usage springs."<sup>18</sup> Further examples of the same thing are cases where certain experiences are accompanied by a "stitch" in the region of the heart, "there was a stitch in my heart"; or where "a pain like nails in the head," characteristic of hysteria, proves to be a painful thought, "something is stuck in my head"; or when a singer is seized by a nervous disturbance of her voice, "choking and strangling in the throat," which suggests the form of speech "swallowing something down," used to describe an insult that has not been answered.

The trauma theory was not able to produce a special psychology of hysteria. But it is an important step on the way to a psychology of neuroses in general.

Meanwhile, the most that had been accomplished psychologically was, that attention had been turned to emotions which were capable of giving to any—often extremely banal—occurrence the character of a trauma. Through a later counter-reaction [ab-reaction] to these emotions, it was thought that the person could be freed from the ideas upon which his mind had remained fixated, so that they would become colorless and harmless and could be fitted



again without difficulty into the unity of the psyche. Following a later happy formulation of Bleuler, emotions can be said to arise at those points where the person is not adapted to reality. Thus, if emotions are able to work havoc for years in the soul and body, "like a foreign substance," this can have no other *psychological* meaning than that the same insufficient attitude toward the personal problem in question always persists. A therapy of mere counter-reaction [ab-reaction] is finally of no use whatsoever if this attitude of mind is not revised, and this may often occur without any counter-reaction. Yet, with the trauma hypothesis, it is the same as with every other psychological theory. It was not applied merely as a possible point of view, but was based on the concrete factual situation, upon which the recovery of the patient inevitably depends. And so it has come about that even to-day many patients must therapeutically "ab-react" from trauma before they can be dismissed as cured. This naturally introduces a state of confusion as to what was correct in Breuer's and Freud's psychological observations.

It must be added that an ab-reaction can have not only beneficial, but also harmful effects, to which W. MacDougall and C. G. Jung have called attention.<sup>19</sup> For it all depends on whether the dissociation in the psyche can be overcome. Through foolish ab-reactions, this dissociation can be deepened and directly sanctioned.



<sup>1</sup> Trauma, in Greek, is "wound."

<sup>2</sup> Breuer and Freud, *Studien über Hysterie*, pub. 1895 by Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>8</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. in this connection the book of Charles E. Maylan, *Freud's tragischer Komplex, eine Analyse der Psychoanalyse*, 2nd ed., 1929, pub. by Ernst Reinhardt, Munich. It may be assumed that Freud's idea—that revenge alone could be an adequate reaction with full cathartic effect—can be completely understood only from Freud's own personal psychology.

<sup>10</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>11</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 8 ff.

<sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 13 and 16.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Neurologisches Zentralblatt*, Nos. 1 and 2.

<sup>14</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Preface.

<sup>15</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>16</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 88. The author's italics.

<sup>17</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 132 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *loc. cit.*, pp. 154 and 159 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. W. MacDougall, review of work by Wm. Brown on "The Revival of Emotional Memories," Oct. No. 1920, of the Medical Section of the *The British Journal of Psychology*; and C. G. Jung, "On the Question of the Psychological Value of the 'Ab-reaction.'"

## CHAPTER III

### FREUD'S PSYCHOANALYSIS

#### 1. *Defense Neuroses*

The next thing Freud recognized was that the possibility of psychological analysis was not restricted to the forms of illness that clinical medicine includes under the name hysteria. Hence, he decided to examine all other forms of functional nervous disturbances to determine whether a split in consciousness underlay them. This seemed in fact to be the case, and from then on Freud—assuming that the cause of this split was the repression of an idea incompatible with consciousness—spoke quite generally of “defense neuroses,” under which name he grouped together hysteria, compulsive ideas, and phobias.

It appeared that in all these neuroses a conscious effort of will was made to tear away the emotion, the quality of excitation, from an idea incompatible with consciousness. The result was that the idea itself became neutral, while the released excitation flowed off either into *bodily* symptoms (conversion hysteria) or upon *psychical* contents that were *not* incompatible with consciousness. Through the

“emotional charge” coming from a foreign source, the latter became *compulsive ideas* or *phobias*.<sup>1</sup>

Freud spoke, henceforth, of a *quantity* of psychical excitation, a sum of emotion, “which is capable of increase, decrease, displacement, and removal, and which spreads over the memory traces of ideas somewhat as an electric current does over the surface of the body.”<sup>2</sup>

In the meanwhile he had been forced to recognize that the reason for the defense—or for that matter the split—must be sought always in sexual factors. But he further believed that not only defense neuroses but also mere nervous weakness (neurasthenia) had a sexual cause. For the former he postulated a sexual trauma in childhood (seduction and the like); for the latter, some sort of actual harm to the person’s sexual life. His assumption was that, beyond a certain degree, bodily sexual excitement was transformed into psychical excitement and, in its *abnormal application*, resulted in a neurosis. In cases where this energy was *unsuitably* applied, neurasthenia made its appearance, but in cases of sexual abstinence, anxiety neuroses appeared.<sup>3</sup> A “freely floating” sense of anxiety can seize upon any content, which in itself need not be recognized as connected with sexual life. Anxiety neuroses as well as defense neuroses pointed, therefore, in the same direction, so that psychological



analysis came to the same thing as a "retranslation back into sexual terms."<sup>4</sup>

Naturally, such sexual causes in the case of simple neurasthenia as well as in psychoneuroses—another name for defense neuroses—were not difficult to discover. Since, into the bargain, it was supposed that a childish sexual trauma could be postulated as the specific cause of the psychoneurosis, the sexual point of view gained all the more in probability when the patient himself knew nothing whatsoever about such a trauma. For this seemed to be no argument against the theory. Here the sexual factor was supposed to lie in "what might be called a prehistoric epoch of life," and it had been "forgotten only in a certain sense."<sup>5</sup>

Thus, the reminiscences underlying the conflict in psychoneuroses were "repressed thoughts" having "logical or other associative connections" with "infantile sexual experiences."<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile the technique of treatment underwent a change: Freud gave up hypnosis and replaced it by the method of free association. Not all patients were subject to hypnosis, and the experiments of the Bernheim clinic had, moreover, shown that patients were able to remember in the waking state their experiences under hypnosis, provided that every outer distraction was avoided.

Since any such distraction arose from the events of waking life, that is, from the judgments of waking

consciousness, the following rule (*a basic psycho-analytical rule*) was henceforth applied. The patient must be prepared to give all associations whatsoever, without any restriction, exactly as they presented themselves to him. None were to be rejected, no matter what the reasons, no matter how unimportant, irrelevant to the question, improper or commonplace they might appear.

When the patient gave himself up completely to his associations, he opened the way for that state of consciousness which, otherwise, manifested itself in hypnosis, where his every-day consciousness was more or less deeply submerged in sleep. The method of free association was a sort of trick to get round the peculiar attitude of the normal state, and to present to consciousness material which was foreign to it, that is, other possible attitudes.

As contrasted with hypnosis, this procedure had the great advantage that it gave the physician an insight into the dynamics of the mental processes of the patient. Not all associations made their appearance without contradiction. Resistances became evident, particularly those against associations upon which the burden of repression habitually rested.

When the patient succeeded, in this way, in suspending his conscious attitude and concentrating on his inner experience, his own associations were often so astonishing to him that Freud had almost "the



impression of a reflective intelligence outside of consciousness, which gave order to a great quantity of psychical material, and had arranged this in a meaningful way, so that it could again be introduced into consciousness.”<sup>7</sup> To be sure, the patient did not always produce “forgotten memories,” which would have been in simple agreement with the theoretical expectations of the physician. More often, it was material which Freud viewed as “intermediate links between the first idea and the pathogenic ideas that were sought.”<sup>8</sup> Naturally, he looked for what was postulated in his theory. And although the physician required that the patient should be completely unprejudiced, the significance of the fact that he excepted himself from this requirement and always kept his theory in the background as an implicit guiding principle, must not be forgotten. Through this method of fantasy—free association is nothing other than fantasy—connections of meaning extending beyond the conscious attitude were sought. But the implicit assumption always was that consciousness causes sexual inhibitions and that its suspension brings sexual impulses to the surface. It is clear that there is a circular argument here—a *petitio principii*. Only this much is true: when the conscious attitude excessively inhibits sexual impulses, the most common motives of fantasy may be of a sexual nature.

Having thus theoretically determined the limits



of the mental impressions from which the phenomena of psychoneuroses were supposed to arise—"through supplementation"—Freud announced for the first time in the year 1898 that he had worked out a therapeutic procedure based on Breuer's cathartic method, and that he would give this the name *psychoanalysis*.

In his *Studies of Hysteria* and his *Earlier Works on the Theory of Neuroses*, all the themes whose later development constitute the theoretical structure of psychoanalysis have already been hit upon.

In the end, this development left the original subject-matter, neuroses, far behind, yet still retained the conceptions reached in this connection. Thus, though the assumptions were unaltered, the subject-matter was more and more lost in generalities and finally formed that whirlpool into which the mental and moral sciences, art, religion, ethnology, and many other subjects were drawn, when an attempt was made to envelop all cultures, present and past, in the mists of this theory of neuroses.<sup>9</sup>

## 2. *The Association Method as Developed in C. G. Jung's "Studies in Word Association"*

When we wish to consider more closely the main features of the association method—anticipating the development of Freud's ideas—we must turn to the work of the Zürich Psychiatric Clinic, as it appears in the *Studies in Word Association*.<sup>10</sup> The type of

method there used was introduced into psychology by *Wundt* and was transferred to the field of psychopathology by the school of *Kräpelin*, and particularly by *Aschaffenburg*.

The scheme of the investigations was as follows. A table of about a hundred words chosen at random (stimulus-words) was drawn up, and these were read off in order to the patient, the subject of the experiment. He was instructed to respond *as quickly as possible* with whatever first occurred to him. The time between the calling of the word and the answer was measured with a watch, marking fifths of a second. The answer (reaction) and the time were noted on the table, and the answers were later analyzed, that is, in conjunction with the subject they were brought into the particular setting into which they fitted. Jung speaks of the association process as an extraordinarily flighty and variable psychical occurrence, which is influenced by innumerable mental factors that are, for the most part, withdrawn from conscious control. It is directed mainly by *attention*, and this "joins the process of association, by countless threads, to all the remaining phenomena represented in consciousness, whether their source is physical or mental."<sup>11</sup>

The following observations were made. When attention was relaxed the type of reaction became, in general, more shallow; that is, associations having deeper relations to the psychology of the subject



were withdrawn in favor of more superficial, linguistic-motor, and sound associations. This most important psychological factor of the relaxation of attention lay within the psyche itself, and in fact depended upon contents that Jung described as *emotionally stressed complexes*.<sup>\*</sup> He included under an emotionally stressed complex the totality of ideas which were related in a certain pattern, emphasized in feeling. Complexes operate as centers which suck up the energy of the psyche, absorb it into themselves, and draw attention away from the outer world. Thus, when superficial forms of reaction appear in the association tests, this is, in general, a sign that a complex has been touched or constellated by the stimulus-word.

The cultural level of the subject of course plays a rôle in bringing about the reaction.

In the case of well-educated persons, outer reactions, and in particular mere sound associations, appear very frequently. But for these persons, such associations must be viewed as due to an arbitrary preference for a certain mode of reaction. In these cases, however, a more valuable type of reaction is favored by a relaxation of attention, wherever this is possible.

The general rule can be laid down, that in cases where it is possible to throw the association process

<sup>\*</sup> *Affektbetonte Komplexe*, sometimes translated "affectively toned complexes."



out of the focus of attention, all those forms of association will arise which do not follow where the reaction is clearly conscious.

The *individual variations* in the association process can be grouped under the following types:

1. *The realistic type.* This type understands the stimulus-word in its objective meaning and reacts accordingly, or takes the stimulus-word as a purely linguistic stimulus.

2. *The ego-centric type.* This type reacts subjectively, brings in personal factors which belong to one or several complexes and which are either undisguisedly expressed, or are referred to in a veiled manner; in which case a repression that may be either conscious or unconscious is revealed. The *evaluating type* belongs here also. This type always reacts with a value-judgment, agreement or disagreement.

Such a table of associations made possible a clear survey of the dynamic relations in the psyche under investigation. These dynamic connections were expressed in the variations of the reaction-time, that is, of the interval between the calling of the word and the answer. A stimulus-word which constellates a complex has too long a reaction-time; and while the aroused waves of feeling are still in movement, the reaction-time to the following stimulus-words is above the average. This can occur quite without the knowledge or will of the subject. The whole

series of ideas remains unconscious, and *the associated word then represents a portion of the latent material of the series*. It is the task of analysis to uncover the links of this series.

All the materials of memory seem to be grouped in such thought-complexes, colored by a particular tone of feeling. These complexes form, as it were, psychical unities analogous to the ego-complex (consciousness). Through their feeling-tone they have a power of self-direction (constellation) which may be so strong in pathological cases that the psyche falls completely under their influence. They then operate as partial psyches of greater or less independence (autonomy). Thus Jung spoke of these complexes, stressed in feeling, as *causa morbi*, the causes of neurotic illness. The phenomena of hysteria or of compulsion neuroses are produced by one or several complexes. Their symptoms—whether bodily or mental—can be viewed as *likenesses of the pathogenic complex*.

Therefore, in reality, free association was not free, but was determined by psychical conditions, and was a kind of *symptomatic activity* (Freud)—symptomatic of a subjective state.

The chief complexes touched upon through the analysis of the answers were connected with sexuality, money, ambition, friendship, and the like. They assume the rôle of a “second consciousness” when they remain latent. Where the complex has



attained an enormous independence, the directive (constellating) power of the ego-complex undergoes a corresponding degradation. The complex exhibits a tendency to lead an active existence of its own. Through this second personality, whose inclinations, judgments, conclusions, take the direction of the complex, the remaining parts of the ego can be consumed and forced into the rôle of a secondary, dominated complex.

These studies in association further disclosed important insights into the *correspondence of reaction tendencies within a family*,—and its psychological meaning. The investigations of E. Fürst<sup>12</sup> yielded the conclusion that *relatives* have a tendency to agree in their type of reaction, since the average difference is considerably lower both for male and female relatives than for unrelated persons. So far as female relatives are concerned, in some respects they are sharply differentiated, but in others they correspond much more closely than related men. A mother and her children show a relatively great and even correspondence, while a father and his children generally correspond to a lesser degree. The correspondence of a father and his sons is about as near as that of a mother and her daughters. The greatest agreement exists between parents and children of the same sex. The children differ more among themselves than they do from the parents; *they differ more from the father than from the mother*;



the daughters approach somewhat nearer to the mother than the sons to the father. The unmarried daughters agree more among one another than the sons, as in general women relatives agree more than men relatives. *Married* sisters, on the contrary, differ considerably from one another.

The importance of these observations can be recognized in pathological cases. Indeed, the pathological enlargement and coarsening of psychological facts is often an excellent way of clarifying them. Lang<sup>13</sup> showed what far-reaching consequences these family ties can have. He observed that "small children of ten, or even of only five years, show an amazing agreement in reactions with the parent whom they *love* most."<sup>14</sup>

A ten-year-old girl reacted in thirty-five percent of the associations with the *same word* as her mother. In cases of such close agreement between parents and children, there is an intensive tie of feeling which must be overcome in some way at a certain age, in the interests of the further development of the child. In this effort, an extremely hostile attitude can develop from the originally positive attitude (transference) toward this same person, where the attempt to gain freedom does not lead to the required adaptation outside the family, but remains incomplete.

In obviously pathological (schizophrenic) cases, it appeared that the ill person most clearly represents

the reaction-type of the family, and selects as his persecutors, that is, believes himself to be persecuted by, those members of the family with whom he has the greatest agreement in type of association. The sex of the person seemed, on the contrary, to play no rôle in this connection, and Lang assumes that the persecutors are nothing more than objectifications of the family type, from which the patient must necessarily free himself. Thus Lang describes the delusion of persecution as an effort toward health, which goes astray because the battle for freedom, instead of being conducted on the subjective level (psychologically), is transferred to the objective plane (to reality). A certain mental capacity is required to avoid this error, and the presence or absence of this capacity can be estimated from the table of associations.

These results of experimental investigations of association, briefly sketched here, form an essential basis for the so-called *Zürich movement* in analytical psychotherapy. It must be emphasized that they remained throughout strictly psychological. They presupposed a psychical, but no biological factor; and this psychical factor can be described in Bleuler's expression as "emotionality" (affectivity). In other words, this is *feeling-tone*, which is peculiar to all mental occurrences and which becomes marked in connection with complexes—at "complex-spots." We have already said that complexes may be viewed,



in a certain sense, as bundles of psychical energy exhibiting themselves through the re-agency of emotion. Where feeling-tone is almost completely lacking in the normal mode of reaction, as is for instance the case to an extreme degree in schizophrenia (insanity through splitting of the personality), there are corresponding quantities of psychical energy which are not accessible to consciousness and are not under its control. The association experiments furnish us with a survey of the distribution of energy and make its slightest variations evident.

If we describe the psychological nature of consciousness as a *relation* subsisting between the ego and its known object, it must then be said that such a relation is more or less impossible for the ego as soon as a complex may become its object. For this complex, because of its charge of feeling, prevents the establishment of a relation from the side of the ego. It makes demands upon the ego and, as it were, binds the ego. Thus a state of greater or less identification with the complex arises.<sup>15</sup> The quantity of energy left to the ego for establishing conscious relations is correspondingly limited. Since consciousness has the quality of the waking state, we can also say that the ego, so far as it is dominated by complexes, is in a state of sleep or hypnosis. It is dissociated from the everyday, conscious world, and its paths of association correspond to this dissociated state. Sensitivity to distinctions is lowered,



experimentally, by an artificially induced dissociation or fatigue; so also in life the dissociating effects of emotionally stressed complexes can be recognized by similar phenomena. Associations having the character of superficial linguistic connections appear. As the dissociation increases, complexes proclaim themselves more and more directly, often through bundles of words or coined expressions, which arise as condensations, or as interference phenomena from several complexes. This sort of thing is especially common in schizophrenia (*dementia præcox*), and also, normally, in the dream, which has been called, with a certain appropriateness, a "delirium of complexes."<sup>16</sup>

This notion indicates only one of the possibilities of the dream, but it is the best introduction to an understanding of dreams, which play such a great rôle in psychoanalysis, for it introduces no theoretical prejudices. To develop the meaning of dreams from the meaning of complexes is to move, in any case, upon psychological ground where there is no danger of rigid dogmatism.

### 3. *Freud's Sexual Theory*

These emotionally stressed complexes (Jung) mark the boundaries of that realm of the psyche which is immediately continuous with the so-called *unconscious*. An emotionally stressed complex is never really conscious in all of its ramifications; in-

deed, its effectiveness depends on the very fact that it belongs for the most part to the unconscious.

Complexes, as we have seen, have a distracting effect. The occasion and degree of their influence upon the emotions indicate, at the same time, the occasion and degree of the individual's failure in outer adaptation. For emotions constantly make their appearance at places where the individual is incompletely or defectively adapted to reality (Bleuler). Slight variations in reaction-time, indicating an aroused feeling-tone, are the first signs, accessible to experiment, of a disturbance of adaptation. Thus emotionally stressed complexes always constitute the most immediate psychological problems of the individual, and are the natural means of access to the unconscious. To work out their content and their meaning for the life of the psyche, is the first task of psychotherapy. The first step in accomplishing this object is *to make what is unconscious conscious, to widen consciousness* in the directions indicated for that individual.

Freud's psychology assigns to *one* of these emotionally stressed patterns—*the sexual complex*—a special position, extending beyond pure psychology. Upon this complex, Freud bases the whole dynamic process of the soul. He sees in sexuality an intermediate concept between that of soul and body, since (sexual) stimulations proceed from the bodily



organs and exercise a compelling influence over the soul through its connection with the body.

It is clear that in our civilization especially, and at a certain period of life, the sexual complex may be responsible for an overwhelming majority of situations that arouse feeling. The sexual urge is the cause of powerful emotional storms, of the most intense longings and the deepest despairs, of secret worries and the most painful impressions. Freud's psychology traces the operation of this instinct in all its ramifications through the human soul. Freud himself calls his theory a "superstructure" which must, some time or other, be placed upon its organic foundation—namely, that of a future sexual chemistry; or in other passages he speaks of "psychological preliminaries," all of which must one time be placed "upon the solid ground of an organic support."<sup>17</sup>

Freud elaborated his notions in a detailed theory of the sexual urge. The source of the dynamic process of the soul lay in the body—though of course as such it could no longer be an object of psychological study. In mental life, instinct is known to us only through its goal. The goal of an instinct is always the satisfaction of the instinct. This is achieved through some object. The object is not necessarily a foreign thing, but can also be a part of one's own body. The object is the most variable factor connected with an instinct; it can be



easily altered. When the tie to the object is a more inward one, he speaks of "fixation."

These general reflections on the nature of instinct \* allude, of course, to the sexual urge, which is conceived by Freud, however, as a plurality of partial or fragmentary impulses. Thus "object" always means "sexual object." On the other hand, Freud distinguishes the sexual urge from the ego urge, the instinct of self-preservation. He calls both original instincts. But since the instinct of self-preservation can be composed of an undetermined number of libidinous (sexual) components, the sexual urge thus remains the peculiar, single motive force in his psychology; particularly in the beginning of life does no "unity comparable to the ego" exist.<sup>18</sup> Just as the sexual urge is generated by the whole body, so the partial urges are generated by the erogenous zones, which Freud distinguishes upon the human body. Where the development of the individual's instinct is normal, the partial urges unite into the sexual urge, which is directed toward the goal of procreation. This comes about through the fact that "organic changes and psychical restraints" are set up. Among the latter, Freud includes shame, disgust, sympathy, and the "social structures of morality and authority." If these restraining factors do not operate, sexual perversions appear, which

\* The German word is *Trieb*, which can be translated "impulse" or "urge" as well as "instinct."—Trans.

must be viewed as stages of arrested development of an infantile character. From this angle, neuroses appear to Freud, in some degree, as the negatives of perversions, since we can say that the inclination to perversion manifests itself negatively in a neurosis. Such sexual tendencies rest, on the one hand, upon a *fixation* at an infantile stage, and on the other, upon a *regression* to this stage through the blocking of other channels of sexual activity.

Sexual development has its beginning in the child. Even in taking nourishment, according to Freud, the child enjoys sexual satisfaction, and it then attempts to procure this satisfaction from its own body through thumb-sucking, or sucking of any lustful sort.<sup>19</sup> Its (own!) nipples and genital organs are favorite places for these pleasurable activities. The earliest phase is called that of "oral eroticism"; a second phase is characterized through the domination of sadism and anal-eroticism, and only in the third phase does the primacy of the genital organs manifest itself. Freud assumes that there is a period of latency in sexual growth from the fifth to about the eleventh year of life, in which period the production of sexual energy is not suspended, but is turned toward ends other than those of sex; here the capacity of the person for a higher stage of culture, as well as for a neurosis, arises according to Freud. (In these concepts, the theoretical coupling of sexuality with the development of culture should be



noted, for in the end this comes out again in reverse order from the Freudian psychoanalysis.)

So long as one's own body is the sexual object, Freud speaks of *autoeroticism*. He mentions the mother's breast as the sexual object of the first phase lying beyond the body itself. He says, in his own words, "It [the sexual urge] loses this object only later, perhaps *exactly at the time* when it is possible for the child *to form an idea of the person as a whole* to whom this organ that dispenses satisfaction belongs."<sup>20</sup> This is a statement of true psychological content and is highly significant, but it is made only incidentally in the Freudian sexual theory.

In addition, the intercourse of the child with the person who cares for it offers "an endlessly flowing source of sexual stimulation." This intercourse yields "a satisfaction proceeding from the erogenous zones,"<sup>21</sup> particularly when the nurse, who is usually the mother, "tends the child with feelings originating in her own sexual life." The sense in which this statement is meant follows from Freud's supposition that the mother would be shocked if this explanation were given her. And, indeed, she would certainly not be able to understand the statement, due to the fact that the actual psychological situation, as it exists, is interpreted through a concept having the color of the typical male attitude toward sex. Where is the woman who takes this position



toward her sexuality, in this sense—unless she is under the influence of the neurotic attitude of a man! Throughout Freud's work the sexual, in the widest sense, is equivalent to that which gives rise to aversion, disgust, shame, and the like. This is, without doubt, the expression of a special attitude, which in its turn presents a psychological problem. We must bear in mind the size and difficulty of the problem of the soul—which the psychoanalysis of Freud does not touch and does not want to touch as a general problem, however much it may speak of the "psychological." And we must conclude that nothing whatsoever can be known about the soul so long as such an important factor, *i.e.*, sexuality, is kept under repression, that is, so long as it forms an object of fear on the one hand, and desire on the other.

Freud speaks of a disposition toward "polymorphic perversions" in the child. For, before the normal restraints come into operation, childish sexual life is distinguished from that of the adult by five characteristics:

1. Through the fact that it sets aside the barriers of the species, the gap between man and animal.
2. Through the fact that it oversteps the barrier of aversion, or disgust. *Coprophilia*, interest in its own excrement, with which the child plays, or through which it obtains sexual pleasure, by holding back its stool, which then causes excitement in

passing through the anus. With anal-erotic activities is coupled, also, the childish hypothesis as to where babies come from—an hypothesis that can be formulated thus, “conceived through eating, born through the bowels.” In this connection comes the sucking child’s high opinion of dirt (excrement), which he treats as a “gift” to be conferred only upon favored persons.

3. Through the fact that it oversteps the barrier of incest, which later expressly excludes the beloved persons of childhood from among the objects of sexual choice, because of their blood relationship. Freud, on the one hand (doubtfully), counts the incest barrier among the acquisitions of the human race, which in the case of many individuals have already become fixed through organic inheritance. And, on the other hand, the incest barrier is also the determining agent of the so-called Œdipus-complex, which is quite plainly the central complex of the Freudian theory.<sup>22</sup>

4. Through bisexuality.

5. Through the fact that the rôle of the genital organs is transferred to other organs and parts of the body.

In contrast to these ideas, Jung speaks only of a *polyvalent disposition* in the child. The sexuality of early childhood certainly forms the seed of sexuality in the adult, but it includes also the seeds of spiritual activities. For the childish sexual interest



is centered much more upon the development of thought than upon the attainment of a sexual goal. Thus, the sexuality of the child is not only restrained in its lustful practices by thought, but it actually craves thought; namely, to form a set of ideas, often extending far beyond the "correct" explanation, *i.e.*, that of the adult, which serve the interests of the child's own world, as constructed by himself. The explanation of the adult is set aside when it does not meet the requirements of this world, from whose pattern the childish sexual interest originates. Thus, it is just as mistaken to insist on the acceptance of the "right" explanation—as if it were a question of analysis—as it is mistaken to impose upon the child with lies. Even at the adult stage of life the remnants of infantile sexuality persist as the seeding-ground of important spiritual activities.<sup>23</sup>

Freud further assumes that sexual manifestations in childhood, autoeroticism and masturbation, have a thoroughly masculine character, with girls as well as with boys. Yet there seems to be a certain contradiction between this idea and the notion that, with girls, "where partial urges are noticeable," the passive form is preferred. In any case, the leading erogenous zone for the female child is the clitoris. The development of the little girl toward womanhood is thus bound up with the "destiny of the excitability of her clitoris," and puberty means for a girl a "renewed wave of repression which is directly



concerned with the sexuality of the clitoris. This is a fragment of male sexual life, and at this time it is given over to repression." Erotic sensitivity must then be transferred from the clitoris to the entrance of the vagina. In this alteration of the principal erogenous zones, and in the thrust of repression at puberty, through which infantile masculinity is set aside, Freud sees *the main conditions for the predominance of neuroses in women*.

In addition, the dominant changes occurring at puberty are the "subordination of all other sources of sexual stimulation to the primacy of the genital zones, and the process of search for an object." The choice of an object is characterized at puberty by a renewed display of sexual inclination on the part of the child toward its parents and nurses—*on revient toujours à ses premiers amours*. But this search is averted from these persons, because of the incest barrier erected in the interval, and is directed toward other similar persons: the *dependent type* of object choice.\*

Freud makes use of the concept of *libido* to indicate the degree and distribution of sexual excitement, which, as he believes, is overcome by mental processes. He understands by this concept a quantitative, variable force for the measurement, or estimation, of *sexual excitement* in its psychical ex-

\* *Anlehnungstypus*, literally "leaning-up-against" type, translated usually the *anaclitic* type.

pressions. This force is not identical with psychical energy in general, but is qualitatively different, because of its peculiar origin. This peculiar origin consists in an assumed chemistry of the sexual processes, different from that of the processes of nourishment. Through this chemistry, sexual excitement arises, but it is produced not only from the "so-called genital organs," but *from all the organs of the body*.<sup>24</sup> Freud speaks of this surprising idea as an insight gained through the analysis of perversions and psychoneuroses. This process of production, distributed throughout the whole body, gives rise to the psychical phenomenon of the libido and in particular, to the "ego-libido," whose increase, decrease, distribution, and displacement is meant to serve as an explanation of *psychosexual phenomena*. But only when this libido is applied to an object, only as object-libido, does it become accessible to analytical study: when it fastens upon sexual objects, fixates itself there, abandons them, passes on to others, and thus directs the sexual activity of the individual, leading to partial or occasional extinction of the libido in satisfaction.

Freud's assumption is, however, that in the beginning of the life of the individual, no such unity as the ego exists. At first the autoerotic instinct alone is present. This may assume a *narcissistic* character if the "ego-urges" are not purely self-preservative in function, but have received a libidinous color-



ing. The sexual behavior of the *narcissistic* person is characterized by the fact that he turns to his own body for pleasure. His psychical behavior is similarly characterized, by an absorption in his own ego, which can not attain to any outer object; it is as if the ego stood in its own light. The expression *narcissism* comes from Havelock Ellis, who chose it as a description of the behavior of persons who make a sexual use of their own bodies.

Thus an opposition arises between the ego-libido and the object-libido.\* The more use that is made of the one, the more the other is impoverished. The highest phase attainable by the object-libido seems to Freud to be the state of being in love, which results in something like a surrender of one's own personality. This is plainly along the line of the familiar and ancient idea of "losing one's self to find one's self"; "give away all that thou hast and thou shalt receive." But the consequences of this idea lie beyond psychoanalysis—"our rough analysis," as Freud himself calls it.

A theoretical difficulty in Freud's theory of the libido grows out of the problem of schizophrenia.

\* The reader should bear in mind that the ego-urge (*Ich-Trieb*) and the ego-libido are not the same. The ego-urge is the instinct of self-preservation. The *libido*—which is the *psychical* form of the purely instinctive sexual urges—may be turned inward, concentrated in the ego; it is then the *ego-libido*. And in this form the libido is narcissistic. Or the libido may be turned outward, concentrated on objects; it is then the *object-libido*.—Trans.



Schizophrenia—insanity through the splitting of the personality—is a pathological condition that can no longer be brought under Freud's concept of neurosis. There is a definite contrast between schizophrenia and so-called *transference neuroses*,\* e.g., hysteria and compulsion neuroses. (Freud includes the latter here.) For in these, an outer object is striven for, even though it may be in a subjective and unrealistic way. In contrast to these neuroses, there are *introversion neuroses* (Jung), in which psychical energy becomes introverted, turned upon an inner object. Schizophrenia can be psychologically described as such an introverted condition. The loss of contact with reality passes far beyond the limits which would be explicable by a turning-inward (introversion) of *erotic* tendencies. Freud calls to his aid the assumption that the libido, withdrawn from the outer world in schizophrenia, is not directed toward imaginary, that is, fantastic, objects, as in the case of transference neuroses, but is turned directly upon the ego, so that a condition like *narcissism* results.<sup>25</sup> Since Freud supposes that a primary libido of narcissistic character is already present, he assumes that this secondary, supplementary quantity of libido can bring about the megalomania

\* Transference neuroses are, roughly speaking, those in which the patient can most easily experience a "transference" to the physician, and thus be benefited. Cf. Freud, *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Ch. XXVII.—Trans.

which appears often—but not always!—in schizophrenia.

Yet it is by no means true that schizophrenia produces no constructs of fantasy, or only megalomania. With equal or even greater truth, this type of insanity can be spoken of as a condition replete with images of inward origin. Jung has explained how these images often touch upon the most ancient inheritances of humanity, and has developed therefrom his concept of the “collective unconscious.”

The secondary narcissism of Freud does not always have these harmful consequences, *i.e.*, schizophrenia. It may also remain within normal limits, and it then forms the basis of the *narcissistic type of object-choice*, which Freud opposes to the dependent type of choice. The choice of an object always means the choice of a sexual object. These types of choice are arranged by Freud in the following scheme:

“A person loves

1. According to the narcissistic type:

- (a) what he himself is (himself),
- (b) what he himself was,
- (c) what he himself would like to be,
- (d) some person who was a part of himself.

2. According to the dependent [*anacletic*] type:

- (a) the woman who nursed him,
- (b) the protecting man.”<sup>26</sup>

“Complete love of the object according to the



dependent type" is characteristic of men; narcissistic love, of women. "Such women, strictly speaking, love only themselves, with an intensity like that of a man's love for them." But a way of escape from narcissism to objective love is open to them when they are confronted, in their own child, with a part of their own body, which is at the same time a foreign object. In this light, parental love appears to Freud as "nothing other than" the re-born narcissism of the parents.<sup>27</sup>

The dependent type is supposed, further, to include persons whose libido has been disturbed in its development, such as perverts and homosexuals. They do not choose after the pattern of the mother, but after that of their own person. Such disturbances in the development of the libido can arise only through the fact that partial impulses have not normally surmounted the different stages of the process, or that the normal flow of the libido is blocked by insurmountable obstacles; that is, by obstacles which seem to the person to be insurmountable. The first case is spoken of as *fixation*, the second as *regression*. In regression, earlier stages of development are revived. Where there is a condition especially favoring fixation, the outward cause required to start the regressive movement and establish the fixation may be extremely trivial. The type of regression characteristic of hysteria restores the primary incestuous sexual objects; that characteristic



of compulsion neuroses, on the other hand, reinstates the early stages of the sadistic-anal sexual patterns. Freud declares that the compulsive idea—"I want to murder you"—means at bottom, "I want to enjoy you in the act of love." There is no doubt that the psychological significance of this statement becomes clearer when we recall the association studies of Lang, who follows Jung in interpreting a compulsive idea as a need of freedom from the family type—a need lived out in the sphere of objects, rather than in the subjective, psychological sphere. There is, then, no necessity for Freud's hypothesis of a "simultaneous regression in respect to the object," in order to explain the fact that such compelling impulses are for the most part connected with the nearest relatives of the person.

The concept of *regression* is closely connected with that of repression. The distinction is artificial. Repression is for Freud a dynamic idea, not necessarily including the idea of backward movement. In a dynamic sense, a psychical act is considered as repressed if it is fixated upon a lower level of the unconscious. On the other hand, a regression of the libido never leads to a neurosis, but only to a perversion, unless the factor of repression is added. He therefore speaks of regression when he views the phenomenon from the side of instinct, and of repression when he views it from the side of the ego.

The outward factor leading to fixation, or re-

gression, is "denial"—namely, of the normal sort of satisfaction. Yet this does not necessarily result in illness, though it may have this outcome, for a human being can support only a certain quantity of unsatisfied libido. The neurotic conflict is caused by denial at the time when the individual is faced with the problem of finding new paths and objects of satisfaction. If a part of the personality resists these new possibilities of satisfaction, indirect approaches then become necessary, and these may lead to the formation of symptoms. Thus it is really a sort of inner denial which causes outward denial to become a source of illness. This inner protest arises from the non-sexual instinctive forces, the "ego-urges." Through this protest, the conflict between the ego-urges and the sexual urges becomes acute, and this, according to Freud, constitutes the essence of neuroses.

Both of these developments, that of the ego and the libido, can be viewed as processes that retrace in abbreviated form, in the individual, a path that has been traversed by humanity from the most ancient times onward. The demands of self-preservation, of existence, were always the powerful factor, determining this path and holding the libido under control through denial. The ego-urges learn more readily to submit to the necessities of existence and to accept the *principle of reality*. The sexual urges are much more difficult to educate, for they continue



much longer to follow the *principle of pleasure*. The transition of the ego from the principle of pleasure to that of reality is "one of the most important factors of development."

On the basis of the explanation given in these concepts, the formation of a neurosis can be represented as follows. Essential elements in the permanent groundwork are childhood experiences, which operate upon the foundation of an inherited sexual constitution and cause a certain type of fixation of the libido. That is, they create a definite disposition for which certain experiences have a traumatic effect. Such infantile experiences may subsequently be strengthened in their pathological effects if they are revived through regression. The formation of symptoms is due to the fact that the regression extends so far backwards—"and must, moreover, reach back to the period of the suckling child"—that an infantile mode of satisfaction is again experienced. This mode of satisfaction is what appears as a symptom, though it is twisted, under the influence of the "censorship of the repressing ego," to the point of being unrecognizable. Under the influence of repression, pleasure is turned into suffering. In place of acts which affect and change the outer world, a pathological form of adaptation arises.



#### 4. *Further Developments of the Freudian Theory of Instincts*

Freud's speculations on the instincts and their rôle subsequently took the following forms. After the introduction of a narcissistic, that is, a libidinous "urge of self-preservation," the original contrast between sexual urges—*i.e.*, those directed toward an object—and ego-urges was altered. He now spoke of a contrast between libidinous ego-urges and urges directed toward an object, the latter being also libidinous. The neurotic conflict sprang from this opposition. Then this contrast was replaced by a new one, between ego-instincts plus objective instincts (both libidinous in nature), and other instincts localized in the ego, which he called "instincts of destruction" or "death instincts." Here the opposition, or mysterious entanglement, of love and death seemed to be hinted at in the psycho-analytical theory. But as it appears here, it is nothing more than a metaphor for the assimilative and dissimilative [destructive] processes in the body; and the existence of a destructive [dissimilative] death instinct remained still to be demonstrated. Freud discovered such an instinct, at least in a distorted form, among the components of the sexual urge, that is, in the sadistic component. After the notion of sex had been widened, and the concept of narcissism had been intro-

duced, this seemed to be the third step in the theory of instincts. Freud himself says that he could not ask for the same certainty here as in the first two steps, but still, that his theory rests upon observed facts. Among these he includes the compulsion toward repetition, which can be observed in the lives of non-neurotic persons and may operate even against the otherwise all-powerful principle of pleasure. But we cannot go further into these considerations. They are all artificially constructed. Obviously, Freud was very anxious to demonstrate, as against Jung's concept of the libido, the universal dualism of his own theory. He himself confesses ". . . we will be suspected of having tried to get out of a most confusing situation at any price."<sup>28</sup> A change of theoretical basis was indeed necessary from the moment when the discussion no longer centered upon hysteria and other repression neuroses, and a general theory of the psyche came into view. A libidinous, that is, a sexual, libido is a reductive principle, but to reduce and analyze are two different things.\* A non-specialized concept of psychical energy seems to be the *conditio sine qua non* under which psychical acts can be correlated, in an unprejudiced way, with their intended objects.

\* The Freudian principle is "reductive" because it reduces the psyche to its past experiences—and particularly to infantile sexual experiences. Cf. Jung's *Introduction*, p. xxxvi, where he says, "I no longer *reduced* dreams and fantasies to personal matters, as Freud does."—Trans.



This avoids the error of that "nothing-but" psychology, which must necessarily end in rigid and sterile dogmatism.\*

In the so-called *Œdipus-complex*, Freud sees the psychical effects of the sexual complex of the period of early childish sexuality. As late as 1924 he calls this the central phenomenon of that period, and in other places,<sup>29</sup> the high-point of infantile sexuality, whose after-effects have a determining influence upon the sexuality of the adult. Every newcomer among humanity is confronted with the task of mastering the *Œdipus-complex*, and those who do not succeed are caught by a neurosis.<sup>30</sup> Thus, he wishes to show that this complex is present "in the unconscious of every adult," and to "attribute it also to every dreamer, who in later life has escaped from the conflict with his parents."

Plainly, the *Œdipus-complex* is primarily a complex of the male child. For the girl—"strange to say," as he declares—Freud's data are "much more obscure and less complete." The sexual development of the boy toward the *Œdipus* situation, whose formula as is well known runs, "to kill the father and woo the mother," is as follows. The first object of the "partial urges in the oral phase" was the breast of the mother. Then the child took auto-erotic possession of his own body. Then the phallic

\* "Nothing-but" psychology, i.e., the psychology that holds the soul to be "nothing but" sex, etc.—Trans.

phase, which is at the same time that of the Œdipus-complex, begins. However, this phase does not develop further to the definite genital pattern, but instead subsides and is superseded by a period of latency.

In the phallic phase, which betrays itself in copious manual occupation with the *membrum*, the boy directs his feelings of affection toward his mother in such an explicit way as to have only that meaning which often manifests itself in later life in dreams: namely, a sexual relation with the mother. To this phase corresponds a contemporaneous hatred for the father, who is considered the only obstacle to the relation. The sexual excitement activated by the Œdipus attitude is dissipated through masturbation, which owes its character for all later periods to this origin.

The Œdipus-complex offers not only a possibility of active satisfaction, but also one of a passive form. Not only can the boy put himself in the position of the father in a masculine way, but he can allow himself to be loved by the father in a feminine way.

The reason why the Œdipus situation is considered so important is, that far-reaching chains of psychological consequences are deduced from it. Namely, when the child has turned his interest to his own genitals, he exposes himself to the "threat of castration" coming from the mother or another per-



son who looks after him. Thus the *castration-complex* is developed. The child is threatened from an authoritative quarter—often in conference with the father or even with the doctor—with an amputation of his member! At first the boy does not believe the threat and pays no attention to it. Yet he has already learned a lesson from two experiences: the final and consistent withdrawal of the mother's breast, and—as Freud puts it—the daily, necessary “parting” (*Abtrennen*) from the contents of his bowels. These occurrences, which we must suppose are subsumed by the unconscious under experiences of “dismemberment” (*Abtrennen*),<sup>31</sup> do not suffice, however, to make the danger of castration really compelling. Then, into this prearranged situation, comes the frightful sight of the genital parts of a little girl, where quite plainly the thing that has been threatened is a reality. This causes the castration-complex to become acute.<sup>32</sup>

The ambivalent attitude<sup>33</sup> of the little “penis-bearer” (Freud) in the Œdipus situation is, at the same time, the basis from which the development proceeds when the “Œdipus complex has been destroyed by the castration-complex.” The fear of castration is the powerful motive which, in part, desexualizes the libidinous tendencies of the Œdipus-complex. Freud believes that the period of latency in the sexual development of the child begins here.

The concentration (*Besetzung*)\* of his libido upon sexual objects is now relinquished, and is replaced by an *identification* with these objects. Through this identification, the authority of the father or parents is taken into the ego and forms there the core of the super-ego. Freud ascribes the function of conscience to this super-ego and calls it "the substitute for the Œdipus-complex." For instance, the consciousness of guilt is the expression of a tension between the ego and the super-ego, for the ego realizes that it has been remiss in fulfilling the demands of its *ideal*, of the super-ego. The super-ego retains the essential characters of the persons, *i.e.*, the parents, *introjected* [taken up] into it: their strength, their severity, their tendency to supervision and punishment. In this connection Freud says, "the categorical imperative of Kant is thus a direct inheritance from the Œdipus-complex." † This statement is very striking indeed from the psychological point of view; but on the other hand, it contains a philosophical misconception, from the point of view of the theory of knowledge. It is, in fact, one of the most crass examples of reckless psychologizing.<sup>34</sup>

\* *Libidobesetzung*, the "investment in," "concentration upon," or "charging of" objects with libidinous energy from the subject, a term technically translated *cathexis*.—Trans.

† Kant's *categorical imperative*, the self-evident moral principle of duty, requires that "one should so act that the principle of his act could be taken as a universal moral law."—Trans.



In the case of the little "yoni-proprietress," \* as the psychoanalytical maiden might be called, the relations of the Œdipus situation take the following form. Her inclination is preferably toward the father; the mother is her rival; the child would like to take the mother's place in relation to the father.<sup>85</sup> Her clitoris at first "behaved exactly like a penis," but the girl soon noticed that "it has become too short." She thinks she has a penis that has been lost through castration. She therefore accepts castration as an accomplished fact, whereas the boy has a terror of it. Thus, the fear of castration is, as a matter of fact, absent in her case, and so also is the "powerful motive for the construction of the super-ego and the dissolution of the infantile genital pattern." The girl "slips over—by a symbolical equation, one might say—from the idea of the penis to that of a child; her Œdipus-complex culminates in the . . . wish to bear a child from her father." Both wishes—for a penis and for a child—remain in the unconscious, strongly preserved. It seems to Freud that, along with the "atrophy of the penis," goes a decrease in the strength of the sadistic component of the sexual instinct, and that the transformation of crude sexual impulses into "tenderness, limited in its direction," is thus facilitated.† The

\* *Yoni*, the Hindu symbol for the female genital parts.

† At this point the *fantastic* character of the Freudian theories becomes particularly clear. As fantasies—clothed in the language of natural science, to be metaphorically understood—

feeling that she has been placed in the background, that she suffers from disadvantages, or that she is "envious of the penis" belongs, in the case of the girl, to the castration-complex.

The polarity of *male-female* arises only at puberty. At the stage of the sadistic-anal period it was the *active-passive* contrast, and at the stage of the infantile genital period, the *male-castrated* opposition. "The characteristic of the male consists in being the active subject—in the possession and activity of the penis. The characteristic of the female is displayed in being the passive object. Thus the vagina is esteemed as the shelter of the penis and enters upon the inheritance of the mother's womb." <sup>36</sup>

In the Freudian theory, *sublimation* has a central position, along with repression, among the attitudes that a person may take toward his instincts. Freud they would continue to retain their value, and as such would be neither true nor false. They lose their significance only when they are taken as real (hypostatized). The clitoris is not at all a little penis, and the smallest penis is by no means a clitoris; nor need this be so even in fantasy. And who can tell whether a child has experienced or must experience the thing in this way, or whether his experiences of this sort would be properly expressed in this kind of fantasy? But it never occurs to Freud that the sexual content of dreams is symbolical. (Cf. below p. 78 ff.) One must avoid this error, of generalizing a product of fantasy so widely that it ceases to be fantasy and begins to be real. The abstract deductive language in which Freud clothes his views makes it easy to forget what region of the mind they come from, and what value should be given to them. His fantasies have, therefore, in the present day been hypostatized as "psychoanalysis."



includes sublimation as one of the "destinies of instinct," among which he also counts, beside repression, "transformation into an opposite" and "direction against one's own person." Since he holds that the sexual urge is, to a large extent, a synthesis, its components, the partial urges, also have their destinies. Only a portion of the latter are turned to the uses of sexual life. Another portion are dissociated from sexual ends and directed toward other goals. Such a deviation from the sexual goal is called by Freud sublimation. In the period of sexual latency, "counteracting structures, counter-forces, such as the sense of shame, disgust, and morality, are formed in the life of the psyche, at the expense of energy released from the erogenous zones."<sup>37</sup>

The separation of the libido from objects is effected through the fact that the ego identifies itself with these objects. In this way the ego is altered, and Freud inclines toward the view that *character* is to be understood as the residuum of impulses toward the possession of [sexual] objects, which have been given up. For him the character of a human being is constituted by the—sublimated—material of sexual excitation. Thus, the social feelings proceed from the homosexual attitude toward the object; obstinacy, frugality, regularity, from the transformation of anal-erotic tendencies; ambition is conditioned by a strong *urethreal-erotic* disposition.<sup>38</sup> Through identification, the libido recedes from the

object upon the ego, and at first constitutes a secondary narcissism. At this point Freud comes to the question of *multiple personalities*. Where the identifications are altogether too numerous and are incompatible with one another, the ego may as a result split into pieces, as the different identifications alternate in consciousness and struggle with one another. The most important of all is the first identification, that with the father. It assumes a special position, for it stands over against the "other contents of the ego, as the ideal of the ego, or the super-ego." The idea of *God* is the supreme result of the sublimation of the idea of the father.

For psychoanalysis, the most important of the destinies of instinct, practically and theoretically, is *repression*. Its essence consists in rejection and extrusion from consciousness, in a sharp separation of conscious and unconscious psychical activities.<sup>39</sup> For Freud, repression and unconsciousness correspond to such a wide extent<sup>40</sup> that the nature of repression becomes intelligible only through the differentiation of the unconscious from the conscious. He assumes that there is an *original repression*, which consists in this, that acceptance in consciousness is denied to the psychical "representative" of instinct. *Particular repressions* are associated with this original repression. These may arise through pressure from the side of the ego, or through the attraction exercised by the material of this original



repression. The repressed contents are further organized in the unconscious, they breed descendants, and bind themselves into fraternities. Repression operates in an extremely individual way. Its effect upon instinct can be of three kinds: either the instinct is completely suppressed, or it appears as a factor that lends color to some emotion, or it is transformed into fear. The substitute constructions and symptoms of neuroses represent *a return of what has been suppressed*. The rejected idea is often replaced by something small or indifferent: *displacement*.

It is by no means clear how this original repression comes into existence.<sup>41</sup> In any case the concept seems to posit an original split or cleft between the biological reservoir of instinct, the "it" (Freud), and the contents of the psyche. Psychologically, the "it" \* is the "mother," who appears on another level as the sexual object of the Œdipus situation.

So far as the relation of instinct and the psychical to consciousness is concerned, instinct as such is forever excluded from consciousness, and, in fact, from the psychical in general—whereas the psychical is,

\* In German "das Es." The "it" is the vast *impersonal* background of the psyche, and is distinguished from the ego (Ich), which embodies the personal, willful elements of the psyche. We say in English, as in German, "it occurred to me that I should do so and so"; and this implies that it was not "I" who made the decision, but something in me, "it," which operates in an impersonal way. Naturally, the "it" is deeply unconscious. "Das Es" is also translated as "the Id."—Trans.

for its part, not restricted to consciousness alone. In the conscious as well as the unconscious, instinct is represented by ideas, and hence is always perceived only indirectly, in so far as it attaches itself to ideas. In consciousness, the *proper* ideational representative of an instinct is often *replaced* by an improper one. Yet the latter is taken by consciousness as the fundamental representative of the instinct, so long as it is not known that this has in fact been repressed. Thus, "false connections" arise, and these must then be fitted into their proper relational setting. In the unconscious itself, on the other hand, the mobility of libidinous forces (*Besetzungsintensität*), *i.e.*, of wish-impulses or representatives of instinct, is far greater, and these form the "core of the unconscious." Through the process of *displacement*, the whole libidinous charge of one idea can be transferred to another, or through *condensation*, the whole charge of several others can be transferred to a single idea.

This distinction between the "system *Ucs*" and the "system *Cs*," as Freud calls the unconscious and the conscious, seems to have very little validity—particularly since the displacement of emotions upon other ideas, and the condensation of a number of experiences into one, are everyday psychical occurrences which need not be unconscious at all. Thus as a practical matter, it is well to hold to what has been said,<sup>42</sup> namely, that "a sharp separation of



the two systems appears only at the time of puberty." This corresponds to the notion, very often found in Freud's work, that the content of the unconscious is nothing but *unconscious wishes* which "are present from childhood onward in the life of the soul, but are usually *repressed* and excluded from conscious existence."<sup>43</sup>

Still, "the unconscious has the wider boundaries; what is repressed is a part of the unconscious," he declares.<sup>44</sup> And yet, "repression and the unconscious are correlative to so great an extent"<sup>45</sup> that a deeper insight into the nature of repression can be gained only "in the process of psychical development [passage from stage to stage], and in the differentiation of the unconscious from the conscious."

This passage from one psychical stage to another brings about a higher organization of mental contents, and thus the unconscious, system *Ucs*, can be viewed "in the case of mature persons . . . as, strictly speaking, nothing more than a preliminary stage of this higher organization."<sup>46</sup> The essential character of the unconscious, system *Ucs*, is that it wants to discharge the libidinous power of its wish-impulses directly, in action. Moreover, "these impulses stand beside one another without mutual influence, and yet are not in contradiction to one another."<sup>47</sup> This must mean that they are diametrically opposed, and hence that they contradict one

another, but only in so far as they become conscious. A self-evident statement!

To the *foreconscious* system (*Fcs*), belong those contents which are capable of becoming conscious. Here a check already reigns over the tendency toward discharge in action. The notion of psychical exchange<sup>48</sup>—or passage from stage to stage—between these three systems, the unconscious (*Ucs*), the foreconscious (*Fcs*), and the conscious (*Cs*), means that a psychical act passes through two phases, between which “a sort of examination intervenes,”<sup>49</sup> which Freud calls *censorship*. If the act is rejected by the censorship, then it does not enter into the next higher system and it is spoken of as repressed. But if it has become capable of being conscious—foreconscious (*Fcs*)—then it can be made an object of consciousness “without any particular resistance.” For certain contents of the foreconscious (*Fcs*), a further censorship, still, intervenes. This is intended to express the idea that to become conscious is “not a mere act of perception,” but corresponds to a further progress in mental organization.<sup>50</sup> Unconscious processes are “knowable for us only under the conditions of the dream and of neuroses,” since the “processes of the higher, foreconscious system (*Fcs*) are reduced by dreams and neuroses to a lower level.”<sup>51</sup>

On this view, therefore, the essence of neuroses could be negatively formulated as the result of



repression, and positively, as the work of a censorship that proves to be untenable—since it corresponds psychologically to an attitude which is too narrow and one-sided and should therefore be given up.

It should also be noticed that Freud, in the essay of 1923, "The Ego and the Id," writes: "A part of the ego—God only knows how important a part of the ego—can be unconscious, and is certainly unconscious." And he finds himself obliged to "set up a third unconscious, which is not repressed."<sup>52</sup> To these un-repressed and yet unconscious psychical contents, which are extremely important in their effects, he ascribes self-criticism and conscience; hence, in brief, "the highest in the ego—the super-ego." As a matter of fact, nothing further, either of practical or theoretical importance, has come from this idea. It merely raises the earlier conflict, which took place between the ego and the sexual instincts, to the higher plane of the super-ego. But the latter is in its turn—or rather was—fully dependent on instinctive, sexual forces, since it owes its existence to the conflict between the ego and the sexual urges in the earliest, prehistoric period of life.

Looking at the question as a whole, we must conclude that—apart from complications—the unconscious is, in fact, not the sexual urge itself, but that part of the sexual urge in the psyche which wants to attain its goal as directly as possible [principle of

pleasure] without bothering about the demands of the real world [principle of reality]. That the unconscious becomes sufficiently differentiated from the conscious only at puberty means that an *infantile* character must be attributed to it—an idea which appears again in the Freudian theory of dreams. The *infantile sexual* character of the *unconscious* is also far-reaching for Freud as the basis of his interpretation of the symbolism of the unconscious.

### 5. *Transference*

After this survey of the purely theoretical aspects of the Freudian psychoanalysis, there remain still to be considered two elements which are of first importance in the procedure of practical treatment. These are *transference* and the *interpretation of dreams*. Transference is like a source of energy for mastering the resistances through which the neurotic attitude is maintained. As early as the period of the catharsis-theory, it struck Freud that the person of the physician was peculiarly important to the patient. The concept of transference emerges for the first time in the "Studies of Hysteria." Freud's psychological interest was then directed wholly toward the past, to trace out the originating trauma, and he thus saw at first only the historical aspect of the phenomenon of transference. He called it "false coupling." For example, a woman patient "remembered without the accompanying circumstances, her



wish to be kissed by a man—a wish which, at the time, had been immediately banished into the unconscious.” The false coupling consisted in this, that this “painful idea” was directed toward the physician, it was transferred to him.

In the beginning this seemed undesirable for the progress of the treatment, since the emotion thus aroused acted as a resistance. But Freud soon saw the legitimacy of the phenomenon; moreover, he held that it was a matter of indifference whether he worked psychologically upon a phenomenon in the patient’s history, or upon the situation at hand. For the transference seemed to him a “compulsion” and a “deception” that vanished at the conclusion of the analysis.<sup>53</sup> Later Freud saw in the transference “a most important experience . . . confirming his assumption of the instinctive sexual forces in neurosis.”<sup>54</sup> For, the “tender emotions—mixed often enough with hostility—which were directed toward the physician,” originated, in his opinion, from “the patient’s previous fantasy wishes; these had become unconscious,” since they were founded on no actual relation. The patient again experiences a portion of his feeling-life in relation to the physician, and thus “becomes convinced of the existence, as well as the power, of these unconscious sexual emotions.” To speak of these emotions summarily as unconscious is an exaggeration; for it is important that the attitude revealed in them is not confined to rela-

tions with the doctor, but appears in the human relations of the patient in general. Indeed, the less the patient attends to the fact that a psychological problem may be contained in this attitude, the more prominent does the attitude become. The physician is usually the person who directs the patient's attention to this attitude; that is, who takes it as a problem and uses it for the benefit of the patient. So long as this attitude is effective, the patient remains attached to the physician, and should remain so; for the treatment must be built on the subjective presuppositions that the patient actually creates. He thinks of the physician under one of those "images" <sup>55</sup> of persons from whom he was "accustomed to receive love" (Freud); he sees him as father, spouse, mother, teacher, or master. Freud divides this positive transference into feelings of two sorts, "those that can become conscious, and the extension of these feelings into the unconscious." The latter proceed from sexual sources. Freud believes that all our feeling relations are originally joined to sexuality, and, however pure they may appear, that they develop through the "weakening of their sexual aim." <sup>56</sup> Transference therefore corresponds for Freud to a "concentration of the libidio upon the sexual object."

The course of the analytical treatment is definitely dependent upon the emergence of a transference to the physician. And where a tenable feeling relation



to him no longer exists, as in definite cases of schizophrenia, the analytical therapy is no more effective than any other. For then the peculiar phenomenon that links the patient directly to an object in the real world is absent. It is through this tie to an object that reality—*viz.*, the patient's attitude toward reality—becomes a fresh problem for him, in a direct and compelling way.

The phenomenon of transference sets a task for the neurotic, *i.e.*, the inadequate, reality-function of the patient; namely, that of forming a relation to the doctor. Thus, at the same time, the problem of raising the reality-function to a normal level, suited to the purposes of life, presents itself. A solution is, of course, possible only if the physician himself has an unobjectionable attitude to the real demands of life. He must not, himself, be neurotic; that is, he must have overcome the neurotic attitude. The following statement of Jung is pertinent to this point: "Analysis demands a sacrifice which no other science ever demands, namely, unsparing self-knowledge; it must always be emphasized anew that the practical and theoretical understanding of analytical psychology is a function of analytical self-knowledge."<sup>57</sup>

If we connected the transference solely with the previous history of the patient, our psychological formulation of it would be one-sided. But the same would also be the case if we derived it merely in a general way from the patient's psychology. For, so

far as the patient is concerned, the *actual, present meaning* of the transference is always in the foreground—apart from all historical conditions and all analogies to the past. Then, too, the rôle of the physician in the relation of transference must not be overlooked. Not that he does, or should, play an active part. Nothing is more laughable than the pains many analysts take to “get transferences.” To think that such efforts are of any use is to misunderstand fundamentally the subtleties of this psychological relationship. The transference is nothing other than the patient’s *projection* upon the physician—namely, the projection of a quantity of unconscious psychical energy, in Jung’s sense, which can not otherwise take on form. The patient begins to have some notion of the existence of this energy through and in the person of the doctor, for this energy is constellated in the patient by the doctor. It is self-evident that certain qualities of the physician must accord with the unconscious expectations of the patient. Projections take hold only at points where there is, at least in appearance, something significant to which they can attach themselves. The “*points de repère*” [points of contact], activated in post-hypnotic suggestion, present a similar phenomenon, but with this difference, that such points of contact with the physician, in the case of transference, correspond to some of his actual qualities. And these qualities can not be replaced by sugges-



tive behavior or authority. Occasionally, authority or suggestive behavior might be sufficient to activate the transference libido in the patient, but it would disappear only too rapidly, or be forced to change into its opposite.

By projection we mean the outward displacement of subjective contents into the object. A relation to objects, and thus consciousness in the subject, develop from a state of unconscious oneness, or identity; <sup>58</sup> and projection is the state of first separation—the first entrance into consciousness—of the subject-object relation. But the terms of the relation are still unequally divided. The object contains, in a good as well as a bad sense, more than it should, as a mere object. This excess consists in contents which belong to the subject, but which are perceived as belonging to the object because a partial identity with the object still exists—*i.e.*, these contents appear to the subject in projected form.

These subjective contents represent the object under aspects that become more fantastic as the experience of the object becomes more unreal, or subjective. It is all the more urgent then to overcome these fantastic conceptions in the interests of a real relation, and all the more important, for the psychology of the subject, to withdraw the projected elements.

The relation of transference is also expressed in the patient's unconscious fantasies: in a general,

non-individual form, as an impulse toward relations, for instance, of a sexual sort; in an individualized form,<sup>59</sup> often as mythological images from the "collective unconscious" (Jung). These are to be variously appraised and treated, depending on the various levels of relationship which they anticipate in fantasy.

August Vetter points to the deep bond between the analytical process and the Christian doctrine of the saviour's mission: according to this doctrine, the fall into sin, the estrangement from the creator, is connected with the adult consciousness of sex, and redemption is attained through a mediator who freely takes the sins of the world upon himself. Through this "transference" he offers to those who are lost the possibility of their own salvation.<sup>60</sup>

### 6. Freud's "*Interpretation of Dreams*"

In the year 1900 Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* made its appearance. Science owes to this work the proof that dreams have a *psychological* meaning, hence that a unique *significance* can be derived from them. Thus, Freud's interpretation of dreams will always mark the beginning of a new epoch in practical psychology, though it works out only *one* aspect of the problem of dreams, and also makes the mistake of taking this aspect for the whole and of laying down dogmatic conclusions. His point of departure in the investigation of dreams was the study of psy-



chopathic constructs. Freud calls the dream "the first member in the series of abnormal psychical manifestations, whose further members are hysterical phobias, compulsive and delusive ideas."<sup>61</sup> Dreams constitute for him the royal road [*via regia*] to the unconscious, and thus, from beginning to end, he views dreams with a certain odium, as being pathological.<sup>62</sup>

The following statements recapitulate roughly the essential features of his theory of dreams.

1. Every dream has the significance of a wish-fulfillment. There is only one exception to this rule, namely, the dreams of persons suffering from accident-neuroses. These dreams again and again lead the dreamer back to the situation of the accident—scarcely in accordance with his wishes. Here too, according to Freud, the "compulsion toward repetition"—which in a certain sense triumphs over the "principle of pleasure"—again dominates the "psychical apparatus." The repetition serves the purpose of compensating for the failure to master the exciting cause, which gives rise to traumatic neuroses.<sup>63</sup>

2. Most dreams are distorted; the dream is "the disguised fulfillment of a subverted, repressed wish." The distortion is the work of censorship, which forms the "manifest" dream from the "latent dream-thoughts." The "latent dream-thoughts are in no way distinguished from . . . our conscious psychi-

cal activity; they could have been conscious at a certain time in waking life, but they become mixed with unconscious impulses in sleep, and to a certain extent are depressed to the level of unconscious thoughts.”<sup>64</sup> Since, in the analysis, the “latent” thoughts are developed out of the “manifest” dream, the procedure of the Freudian dream analysis is to make conscious those impulses which Freud’s theory postulates as unconscious. The latent thoughts are often latent only in the dream, thanks to the “dream elaboration,” as Freud calls the process of fusion that takes place between the latent thoughts (*i.e.*, previously present in consciousness) and the repressed (*i.e.*, infantile sexual) tendencies,—the process which constitutes the dream. The dream elaboration is thus either an empty affair or results in nonsense. As a matter of fact, the first dream analyzed in Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams* is characterized as nonsense.<sup>65</sup>

3. Anxiety dreams have a sexual content. The sexual libido belonging to them has been transformed into anxiety. They offer therefore “no contradiction to the theory of wish-fulfillment”; and this is no less the case with punishment dreams, which replace the “forbidden wish-fulfillment” by its fitting punishment.

Let us give here an example of a dream interpreted in Freud’s manner. We take it from his *Collected Writings*.<sup>66</sup> It is a dream of Bismarck, which



he mentions in a letter written to Kaiser William I on December 18, 1881. The passage from the letter runs thus:

“Your Majesty’s communication encourages me to relate a dream which I had in the spring of 1863 during the most difficult days of conflict, from which the human eye saw no feasible exit. I dreamed—and told it immediately in the morning to my wife and other witnesses—that I was riding on a narrow Alpine path, to the right a precipice, to the left cliffs; the path became narrower, till the horse refused to go further, and it was impossible to turn back or dismount because of lack of space; then I beat with my whip in the left hand against the smooth wall of rock and called upon God; the whip became endless in length, the rocky wall fell like a stage-set and opened a broad way with a view toward hills and woodland as in Bohemia; there were Prussian troops with flags, and in the dream itself I thought how I would report this in all haste to your Majesty. This dream was a fulfillment, and I awoke happy and strengthened from it.”

The interpretation (given in Freud, *loc. cit.*) says with justification that “the difficult straits in which horse and rider found themselves are an easily recognizable dream-representation of the critical situation” in which Bismarck was at the time. Lonely heights, the path becomes narrower, no exit, so far as “the human eye can see no perceptible solution!”

The Alpine landscape is then—superfluously—explained by the fact that Bismarck already knew that he would pass his next vacation in the Alps; the dream has transported him thither and thus “has freed him at a single stroke from the burdens of statesmanship.”<sup>67</sup>

Further, to a person “familiar with the psycho-analytical technique of interpretation,” the riding-whip which became endless in length is necessarily a striking feature. Whips, sticks, lances, and the like are easily construed as phallic symbols. But since this whip possesses the most impressive property of the phallus, the capacity to become extended, there can be no doubt about it—even though no phallus is ever endless in length. The “exaggeration of the phenomenon” seems to point to an excessive infantile preoccupation with it. Taking the whip in hand is a clear allusion to masturbation, not to its actual practice, but to a “childhood pleasure lying far in the past.” For *left* in a dream means wrong, forbidden, sinful, and this accords with the secret onanism of childhood. Further, one is reminded of the close parallelism to the Biblical scene of the waters at Meribah, where Moses strikes water from the rock with a rod and thus saves the children of Israel from certain destruction. There, too, details appear which can very well be construed in terms of the masturbation fantasy; the phallic rod, the creation of fluidity with it through a blow, and the threat



of death, point to "all the chief features of infantile masturbation." It is the task of the dream elaboration to fuse the two "heterogeneous pictures"—the one arising from the psyche of the statesman of genius, the other from the impulses of the primitive child-soul. This is accomplished through the mediation of the Biblical passage, so that all painful factors are eradicated. Grasping the stick is a forbidden, rebellious action, signified here by the left hand. God is called upon only in the manifest content of the dream, apparently in order to dismiss these thoughts of prohibition and secrecy. Of the two promises of God to Moses, that he would in fact see the Promised Land, yet would not enter it, one is clearly represented as fulfilled [view of hills and woodland], but the other "extremely painful one is not even mentioned." The water has "probably been sacrificed through the secondary elaboration, and in place of it, the rock itself collapses." The dream is thus conceived as a distorted masturbation fantasy. As the conclusion of such a fantasy—to proceed further—one must naturally suppose that the child would wish persons of authority to know nothing of what had happened. This wish is here replaced by its opposite, to report the whole incident immediately to the king. This reversal agrees excellently and quite smoothly with the victory fantasy contained in a part of the manifest content of the dream. A dream of victory or conquest is often

the cloak of an erotic conquest-wish. To sum it all up, this dream is a model example of a successful "dream distortion," an ideal case of successful wish-fulfillment without the interference of censorship. And for this reason the dreamer awoke happy and strengthened, and it must be added—remembered these stupidities even after eighteen years.

But, psychologically speaking, what has happened here? Nothing else than that *one* product of fantasy—Bismarck's dream—is measured in terms of *another*, and moreover, a completely dissimilar one, namely, the Freudian theory. It is not possible to see how the fundamental meaning of dreams could be discovered in this way. There is no doubt that the only result of this interpretation is to give us an insight into the limitations of this key to dreams—to exhibit the narrowness of its basis in fantasy. And yet, that the Freudian theory rests on fantasy has been usually overlooked, and this has been made easier through the fact that many processes of fantasy can be satisfactorily reduced to this form. This does not alter the fact that these processes are, in their essence, fantasies, and that they must be taken as such, if we really want to bring them into agreement with their own unique themes. Fantasy must be addressed in its own language. Freud's theory can, in a certain sense, pass as typical, for his system brings together certain typical patterns of fantasy. But we see to what absurdities we are led when we



believe that a single pattern of fantasy has general validity. Nor does the distinction between the "manifest" and "latent" content of the dream help us, for there is really no such difference. This corresponds merely to the distinction between the *sensual* (*Sinnliches*) and *significance* (*Sinn*), as it must be made, and is made everywhere, except in the Freudian psychoanalysis and in materialism. Moreover, Freud uses his back-door of the latent content only when the meaning is obscure. But in the first place, it is generally known that many dreams are hard to understand; and in the second place, this is a difficulty that is not peculiar to dreams alone, or to the unconscious in general.

In conclusion, let us add a few more remarks on the *symbolism of dreams*. Freud speaks of this as the "second independent factor, next to the dream censorship," which makes dreams difficult to understand. He attributes to certain dream elements "constant translations," which correspond to no associations of the patient and are thought to be justifiable without associations. For, the meanings of these contents are given through our knowledge of the fairy-tales, myths, jokes, and witticisms of folklore, in which a similar symbolism figures, though it is of course not limited to sexual symbols. Freud himself finds that it is "not easy to explain" why dreams "employ symbols almost exclusively for the expression of sexual objects and relations." As a

matter of fact, it is not dreams that do this, but the psychoanalytical theory.

In the above example we find, among the constant "symbolic translations," the whip and the rod of Moses. Being in general lengthy objects, both are taken as signifying the penis, as "distorted" sexual members so to speak—particularly when they become extended, like Bismarck's riding whip. There is no doubt that all such objects may occasionally be given a phallic meaning. But it is clear that this is not sufficient, that we still have before us the task of discovering the meaning of this phallic symbolism. For, it is not found in childish onanism; that is a theoretical prejudice. The Biblical passage must be viewed as a myth, and even according to Freud another interpretation of it can be given. *Exodus* 17, 5, runs: "And God spake unto Moses: Take thy rod . . ." Can this be construed as meaning that the super-ego, itself, incites to "childish lustfulness"? That would be the interpretation according to the rules of this school—and it is plainly an absurdity.

If we take the trouble to read over the Biblical passage further, we see that the conflict between God and Moses arises from the fact that Moses *strikes* the rock, instead of taking his rod in his hand and *speaking* to it—as God has commanded. The situation is in fact this, that the people have lost their faith in the divine leadership through the straits



into which they have fallen, and they urge Moses to save them. But their salvation can not come from the supremacy of Moses' own power. On the contrary, the whole people must be convinced that only through his (Moses') mediation, and through the will of the All-Highest himself, can they be saved—as a sign that God himself, not Moses and Aaron, has brought the people into these straits, out of which he will again lead them at the appointed time.<sup>68</sup>

This interpretation yields a meaning that is at once deep and clear. And in dream interpretation we have no other way of understanding the meaning, except to bring the parts into their proper setting in the whole from which they arise. But we must not try to fit them into another setting, which has been constructed on the basis of a theory. For this purpose, fantasy is indispensable; but Freud commits the error of rationalizing his own fantasy into a scientific theory. He does exactly what analysis, with all its wits, attempts to avoid and unmask. In certain cases, "left in the dream" can of course mean the forbidden, the sinful. But in Bismarck's dream this is clearly not so. There it stands for the unconscious; for that which extends beyond his conscious knowledge of the situation, from which "the human eye saw no feasible exit"—with all the corresponding far-reaching consequences.

In accordance with its principle of fantasy, the

Freudian dream symbolism is thus limited to "a sphere of objects that is not large, namely, the human body as a whole, the parents, children, brothers or sisters, birth, death, nakedness—and still several others," and these are: the genital organs and their functions. "By far the greater number" of dream symbols are occupied with the latter; the group first mentioned is regarded by Freud as somewhat too impoverished in comparison with the second group.<sup>69</sup> If this were really the case, it could only mean that psychical energy as a whole revolves about this point. And, in fact, this seems to fit the Freudian theory.

As typical symbolic representations Freud gives the following: the person as a whole in the form of a house. Houses with flat façades are men, those with projections and balconies, women. The parents appear as kings and queens; brothers or sisters are vermin—"poor worms." Birth has a relation to water—going in, coming out, saving someone, and the like. To die is to depart, to take a journey. The state of death is indicated as dark or fearful. Nakedness is expressed through clothing or uniforms.

The symbolism for the genitals suffers from the disproportion between the small group of things to be indicated—genital organs, sexual intercourse—and the immensely large number of possible symbols for these things. This results in a monotony of in-



terpretation which "is displeasing to everyone familiar with these symbols. But what can be done about it?"<sup>70</sup>

The following symbols stand for the male genital organ: the sacred number three, lengthy objects, also trees, church-spires, knives, daggers, revolvers, water-faucets, watering pots, fountains, and so on. In the anxiety dreams of girls, pursuit by a man with a knife or a gun plays a rôle. Flying dreams are due to sexual excitement. The meaning of air-ships or zeppelins is disclosed in their property of "rising up against the force of gravity." Parts of the body, like the foot and the hand, stand for the male member; also hats and cloaks. Similarly, all complicated machines have reference to the genital organs. But a hat, for instance, can just as well mean "the act of protecting" or "protected"; \* it can also have a spiritual meaning, and of course also a phallic one.

The female genital organ is expressed by shafts, pits, caves, vessels, bottles, cartons, boxes, trunks, cases, chests, pockets, ships, jewelery, sweets, snails, muscles, churches, chapels. Wood—in German, *Holz*, coming from the same stem as the Greek *hyle*, meaning matter or raw material—is a symbol for

\* The play on words in German is not translatable. "Der Hut" (hat) can mean "das Behüten" (the act of protecting) or "Behütete" (protected). A hat is "a cover of the head," and "to cover the head" is to protect.—Trans.

the mother.<sup>71</sup> Apples, peaches, stand for the female breasts, and so on.

The pubic hair is represented by forests or underbrush. Landscapes with rocks, woods, underbrush, correspond to "the complicated topographical relations of the female genital parts." Representations of onanism appear in any sort of play, in sliding, slipping, tearing off branches, teeth falling out, the pulling of teeth. Rythmical activities, dancing, riding, swinging, can symbolize sexual intercourse. "The little one" (*das Kleine*), the "little son," "my little one," have a genital significance.

Freud takes these meanings as "constant translations of dream symbols." Since a dream is nothing but a product of fantasy, a theoretical decree as to what all the contents of fantasy can be is, on the one hand, a matter of no very great consequence from the point of view of the psyche; on the other hand, it constitutes a sort of *pons asinorum* for those who are professionally occupied with fantasies without having the power of fantasy themselves.

When one has realized that the psyche shapes its natural expressions in the form of fantasy, he will ask why Freud equates the life of fantasy in the soul with sexual fantasies. The reason is that Freud generalizes the case of sexual repression. He thus gives us no theory of the soul, but describes an attitude—a very frequent one, to be sure—of the conscious to the unconscious. Since the relativity of



this standpoint is not realized in the slightest degree, a sort of Ptolemaic system of the psyche results.\*

The references to Freud's *Collected Writings* given in this chapter and elsewhere are to the German edition. Most of Freud's briefer works and papers are published in an English translation by Joan Rivière, *Collected Papers*, Hogarth Press, London, 1925, 4 vols.

<sup>1</sup> Phobos, Greek = fear. Freud calls this, "false coupling" (see *Collected Writings*, Vol. I, p. 279, German ed.), which is intended to convey the notion that the emotion attaches, not to any idea whatsoever, but to one that is related in content to the original idea,—as at least must be concluded from Vol. I, p. 234 ff., where "transference" is mentioned for the first time and is subsumed, also, under the idea of "false coupling."

<sup>2</sup> Vol. I, p. 305.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. I, p. 244 (German ed.) ". . . thus the conclusion arises that voluntary or involuntary abstinence, sexual relations yielding incomplete satisfaction, *coitus interruptus*, dissociation of psychical interest from sexuality . . . are the specific etiological factors in anxiety neuroses."

<sup>4</sup> Compare, Vol. I, p. 299; also pp. 413 and 446 (German ed.), where it is declared ". . . thus the symptoms can be translated into etiological terms and the patient can be directly asked for a confirmation of the supposition as to their etiology—origin. Contradictions that arise in the beginning should not lead one astray: a firm stand can be taken upon what has been disclosed, and every contradiction is finally overcome through the fact that the original conviction is stressed as unshakable."

<sup>5</sup> Vol. I, p. 445.

<sup>6</sup> Vol. I, p. 426 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. I, p. 198 (German ed.).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 197. *Pathogenic* means "generative of illness."

<sup>9</sup> Absurd examples are published in the psychoanalytical journal, *Imago*.

<sup>10</sup> *Diagnostischen Assoziationsstudien*, Beiträge zu experimen-

\* The Ptolemaic astronomy, current till the 16th century, assumed that the earth was the center of the stellar universe.—Trans.

tellen Psychopathologie, edited by Dr. C. G. Jung, 3rd unaltered printing, 1915, Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig (1st ed. 1903). Eng. trans. *Studies in Word Association*, trans. by M. D. Eder, 1918.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *loc. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.* X. Beitrag: Emma Fürst, "Statistische Untersuchungen über Wort Assoziationen und über familiäre Übereinstimmung im Reaktionstypus bei Ungebildeten," p. 110.

<sup>13</sup> Josef B. Lang, "Assoziationstudien an Schizophrenen und den Mitgliedern ihrer Familien," im *Jahrbuch f. psychoanalytische Forschungen*, Bd. V, 2 Hälfte; also, Josef B. Lang, "Eine Hypothese zur psychologischen Bedeutung der Verfolgungsidee," *Psychologische Abhandlungen*, edited by C. G. Jung, Deuticke, 1914.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Psychologische Abhandlungen*, p. 39.

<sup>15</sup> See below, *identity*, pp. 77 and 141 ff.

<sup>16</sup> One could also speak appropriately of a delirium of *imagos* (see below, p. 74). Compare also Neisser, who already in 1898 said of such coined words as they appear in dreams, that they do not really represent words, but embody a whole process (cited in Jung, *On the Psychology of Dementia Præcox*, p. 26).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Collected Writings*, Vol. VII, p. 403 (German ed.); "Zur Einführung des Narzissmus."

<sup>18</sup> Cf. below p. 49.

<sup>19</sup> The Austrian word is "*ludeln*" or "*Wonnesaugen*"—literally "lust-sucking."

<sup>20</sup> See *Collected Writings*, Vol. V, p. 97 (German ed.); italics by the author; compare also below pp. 62, 63, and note 34.

<sup>21</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 98.

<sup>22</sup> ". . . the shibboleth . . . which separates the adherents of psychoanalysis from their opponents." *Collected Writings*, Vol. V, p. 102. See, in connection with the idea of inheritance, *loc. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Jung, *Über Konflikte der kindlichen Seele*, Vorwort und Nachtrag zur 2. Auflage. F. Deuticke, Leipzig und Wien, 1916.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Collected Writings*, Vol. V, p. 92 (German ed.).

<sup>25</sup> This state can be better described as a mean position in the distribution of energy; the energy is disposable neither for an inner or an outer object.

<sup>26</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 173 ff. (German ed.).

<sup>27</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 175.

<sup>28</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 246 (German ed.).



<sup>29</sup> "Three Essays on Sexual Theory," *Collected Writings*, Vol. V, p. 101 ff. (German ed.).

<sup>30</sup> The extraordinarily one-sided even banal interpretation of the saga of Ædipus, which has supplied Freud with the name for what he has in mind, is apparent; for instance, in his statement that the riddle of the sphinx in "Ædipus" is, "in a form easily recoverable through a slight distortion (!) the riddle of the childish mind, where do babies come from . . . ?"

<sup>31</sup> Must bottle-babies be also, daily, torn apart from their intestinal contents?

<sup>32</sup> An amusing example from ancient literature of the permanent effect of the trauma of the castration threat is cited by Hans Licht, *Kulturkurosia*, p. 189, Paul Aretz Verlag, Dresden.

<sup>33</sup> Ambivalency, ambitendency, are expressions coined by Bleuler. *Ambi* means "both," "tending in both directions."

<sup>34</sup> A similar fatal statement occurs in the *Kleinen Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, 4. Folge, *Collected Writings*, Vol. V, p. 486, to which Nachmansohn has called attention (Nachmansohn, *loc. cit.*, p. 57): "Just as Kant has warned us . . . not to take our perception as identical with the unknowable object of perception (!)—so psychoanalysis admonishes us not to put conscious perception in the place of unconscious psychical processes, which are its object." Psychical processes convey meanings, whether they become conscious or remain unconscious. Naturally, those that are unconscious must always remain more numerous. To quote our examples, which of these two thoughts is more important?—that the child surrenders the mother's breast as a sexual object as soon as he is capable of having the idea of her person as a whole (see citation on p. 44 above); or, on the other hand, that the "unconscious has the character of a wish," a statement that must always be fought through with every patient anew. (Cf. Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*.) What is the necessity of making knowledge into the mere product of an instinctive situation? It is not possible to do so. "Truth" and "falsity" have no connection with the instincts of psychoanalysis.

<sup>35</sup> For a discussion of this usual situation, and similar ones, see Jung, *The Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual*, German text, pub. by Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna. Eng. trans. in Jung, *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, trans. by C. E. Long, London, 1922.

<sup>36</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. V, p. 237. "Die infantile Genitalorganization."

<sup>37</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. V, p. 263 (German ed.).

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Collected Writings*, Vol. V, p. 114 f., note 1, and p. 399. Occasionally sublimation is similar to a new sort of repression as in *Collected Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 126, in "Bemerkungen zur Übertragungsliebe."

<sup>39</sup> Freud is of the opinion that the concept of repression could not have been formulated in the period prior to the psychoanalytical studies. As a matter of fact, it is already found in Herbart, as Nachmansohn (*loc. cit.*, p. 64 ff.) has pointed out.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Collected Writings*, Vol. V, p. 468 (German ed.).

<sup>41</sup> Freud says it is "assumed." *Loc. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 468.

<sup>42</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 510.

<sup>43</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 440, and in many other places under "childhood wishes."

<sup>44</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 480.

<sup>45</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 468.

<sup>46</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 205, namely, as a preliminary stage of "childish wishes."

<sup>47</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 501.

<sup>48</sup> German, "Instanzenzug."—Trans.

<sup>49</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 487.

<sup>50</sup> Note, *loc. cit.*, p. 508; also p. 488.

<sup>51</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 502.

<sup>52</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 360 (German ed.).

<sup>53</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 236.

<sup>54</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 400 (German ed.). *Über Psychoanalyse, fünf Vorlesungen*. Eng. trans. by A. A. Brill, *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*.

<sup>55</sup> In Jung's term, *imago*, i.e., picture.

<sup>56</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 60, "Zur Dynamik der Übertragung."

<sup>57</sup> Jung, "Morton Prince, eine Kritische Besprechung." *Jahrb. f. Psychoanal. Forsch.*, Bd. III.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. p. 141 ff.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Process of individuation.

<sup>60</sup> August Vetter, *Auslegungen der Seele* (*Zeitschrift für Menchenkunde*, edited by Dr. von Hattingberg and Niels Kampmann, Jahrg. V, Heft, 3).

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Preliminary remark to the *Interpretation of Dreams*, *Collected Writings*, Vol. II.



<sup>62</sup> "The dream itself is also a neurotic symptom," in the *Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Collected Writings*, Vol. VII, p. 79.

<sup>63</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 22 in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

<sup>64</sup> *Collected Writings*, Vol. XI, p. 207, and Vol. V, p. 441.

<sup>65</sup> The dream of Irma's injection (*Collected Writings*, Vol. II, p. 108 ff.), where Freud comes to the following result: he "takes the dream for a plea which vividly reminds him of the defense of a man who was accused by his neighbor of having brought back a kettle in a damaged condition. First, he had brought it back intact; secondly, the kettle already had a hole in it when it was loaned to him; thirdly, he had never borrowed a kettle from his neighbor." In exactly the same way, the explanations of Irma's trouble cancel one another out.—This is unsatisfactory, since the book has the intention of exhibiting the meaning of unconscious products.

<sup>66</sup> Vol. III, p. 95. The dream itself is found in Bismarck's *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, Vol. II, p. 222, of the *Volksausgabe*.

<sup>67</sup> A blow indeed to find himself enjoying such a vacation!

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Samson Raphael Hirsch (*Der Pentateuch*, IV, Verlag Kauffmann, Frankfurt a. M., 1903, pp. 287 and 289), who sees in Moses' action "an unseemly elevation of his own personality."

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *Collected Writings*, Vol. VII, *Lectures, Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 154, and other passages.

<sup>70</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 155.

<sup>71</sup> Compare *Madeira*, an island so named because of its quantity of forests: *madeira*, *materia*, *mater* or *mother*.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ALFRED ADLER

If one can speak of Freud's doctrine as a psychology of the ramifications of the sexual instinct in the human soul, the psychology of Adler traces out the relations between the individual human being and society, together with the psychological motivations arising from these relations. While Freud's theory of neuroses is orientated in the last analysis toward sex, that is, toward certain biological-chemical abstractions from sex, Adler's is orientated toward the idea of the adaptation of the individual to the collectivity. Adler sees in the *feeling of community* an integrating component of human character. Anyone who renounces this feeling and withdraws from society to live his own life, has to carry the burden of neurosis as a result. Psychological development is conceived as an adjustment between the demands of the ego-feeling and the obligations that arise for the ego as a member of society.

Before Adler turned to psychology, he had published in 1907 a *Study of the Inferiority of Organs*. There he explains how the weakness of certain sys-



tems of organs forms the pre-condition of disease in these systems, but how this weakness is, on the contrary, also the occasion of a physiological or psychological process of equalization, which compensates for—often compensates in excess, or “overcompensates” for—the functional inferiority. Through exercise [training] a functional superiority is developed, without always actually removing the intensified susceptibility to disease.

By analogy, these facts, demonstrated upon the body, become a schematic pattern for the behavior of the individual human being in the collective social organism. The individual human ego, viewed as a part of the larger whole, plays a rôle like that of an inferior system of organs. As in the latter case, an attempt at compensation is made in a dependent and helpless situation, such as that which arises in an especially marked way in childhood. The intention is to lead the ego out of the state of subordination to self-dependence. But where the child is so sensitive to its position that a false note appears in this struggle, then, from a sort of resentment, which Adler calls the *feeling of inferiority*, an *effort for recognition* [self-assertion] is generated. This is a phenomenon of overcompensation, which aims at a one-sided realization of the interests of the ego, without thought for the social whole to which the ego belongs and in which it should find its place. This effort for recognition, this desire for power, is

bound to lead to a neurosis. For, where the collectivity is not taken into consideration, a system of pretexts and fictitious reasons must be erected, and it is as such that we must view neurotic symptoms. The desire for power, stimulated by the feeling of inferiority, feeds the machinery of neurosis like a secret undercurrent. The power thus gained is the "profit of illness," by which the retreat into neurosis pays for itself.

This desire for power can seek its end in the most various ways. A frequent trick with children, as well as with adults, is the skillful use of real or imaginary helplessness. Parents, teachers or nurses, indeed even physicians themselves, can be kept in a continual state of suspense by such a patient, who tries thus to assure himself of some influence upon his environment. With women this effort for recognition, or self-assertion, frequently assumes the form which Adler calls the *masculine protest*. The peculiarly feminine rôle is rejected, every effort is made to act like a man; for to be masculine is thought to have the same meaning as to be "strong and above." Yet, just because of this attitude, the more completely a relation to man is lacking, the more difficult it is for one to come into existence. Adler speaks quite generally of the masculine protest as "the original form of the psychical impulse for recognition [self-assertion], under which all experiences, perceptions, and will-attitudes can be



grouped." It is the dynamic factor which "controls apperception . . . particularly with neurotics . . . as well as all other traits of character, and other physical and psychical aptitudes—determining the value of all experiences by the masculine aim."<sup>1</sup>

In the case of a man, also, the idea "masculine-strong-above," and its counterpart, "feminine-weak-beneath," can influence the psychological attitude. It may be that he makes a strained effort to be "on top"; or that he sexualizes his feeling of inferiority so that, for instance, states of anxiety may arise such as those that Freud considers to be expressions of the castration-complex. Or, on the other hand, the will to recognition [self-assertion] may be forced in an overstrained way into the sexual rôle, to prove that he is "a man," in the limited sense. Adler sees here, as also in the Freudian *Œdipus* situation, merely an evasion of another and, in fact, the most pressing problem, the task of life. The tie to the mother, Freud's incest-wish, is for Adler also merely a form of evasion, a failure of courage in the face of life, leading to neurosis.

The effort for power which distinguishes the neurotic character is not always, as such, completely unconscious. On the contrary. But what is lacking in the patient is an insight into the connection between his neurotic symptoms and his fundamental impulse, directed toward the end of power. He does not know that his illness is the necessary reaction

to the attitude he takes toward his life-task, in accordance with his basic point of view. Through the fact that he evades this task, he excludes himself from the society of his fellow human beings and places himself in opposition to a fundamental law of human life.

Adler distinguishes three main tasks, whose performance is sufficient to fulfill one's duties toward society. Every individual must make some adjustment to the problem of his *calling*, *his friendly relations to his fellow human beings*, and *the problem of sex*. Anyone who flinches before these tasks is inevitably caught in "the web of fiction" (Adler), that is, he must carry through the "device" (Adler) of a neurosis. This is nothing but an individual system of subterfuges and pretexts through which a solipsistic \* life, without duties toward others, can create a justification for itself.

Duties toward society do not, according to Adler, represent the command of an ethics rooted in metaphysics, but the command of mental hygiene, or a self-evident matter of fact of "life itself," from which no one can recoil. Therefore human nature can not be understood and interpreted psychologically when it is not conceived in this important relation to society. *To understand a human being means to take him in connection with the ends he*

\* Solipsism: the philosophic view that "only I and my ideas are real."—Trans.



*seeks*, says Adler. "The final intention of a pathological person is always to evade the tasks of life, social, professional, erotic; to avoid their solution."

Thus a neurosis is a mixture of ego-centricity and failure of courage. Adler attempts to view not only neuroses, but also psychoses,\* as "forms of expression of discouraged human beings." The causes leading to discouragement usually extend backward into childhood, where a faulty up-bringing has already developed the feeling of inferiority in the child. Often it happens that the child's position in the family is such as to make it particularly easy for him to feel like an underling. This danger arises where a girl grows up among boys alone, or where a child loses its parents at an early age and falls into unloving hands, or where a child in the family feels itself continually pushed into the background because of its age, or for some other reason. Also, the pampering that makes an only child or a late straggler un-self-dependent has this effect as soon as the child grows out of the home environment. Further, the usual notions of talent are often sufficient to discourage a child from an early age onward. Thus Adler stresses in a most emphatic way the triviality of so-called distinctions of talent. Just as there can be no really adequate reasons for dis-

\* A psychosis, as distinguished from a neurosis, is an exaggerated state of mental disturbance, usually incurable: in a loose sense "insanity" as distinguished from neurosis.—Trans.

couragement in general, so, least of all, can a supposed lack of talent constitute such a reason. This does not mean that no differences of talent exist, but the accent should be laid upon the fact that, in every case, more depends upon what one *wills* to do than upon what one *can* do. The notion of compensation itself shows clearly how much depends upon a real willingness to develop [train] in a directed way. And, on the other hand, cases of lack of talent are not usually due to genuine defects but have their psychological roots, which should be examined. E. Wexberg, a disciple of Adler's, cites, for example, the case of a woman student of medicine who, from her school-days, had been deficient in arithmetic. Although in the upper classes at school she was among the best in higher mathematics, even later she made the most stupid mistakes in addition and multiplication. The reason was not that she had no talent for arithmetic, but that, from her childhood, she had carried on a feud with her father, who was a financier and against whose will she had chosen a bread-winning course of study, so that she might be able to live without his money.

Individual Psychology thus emphasizes the importance of *education* according to a program. The educator must be familiar with all the factors that can operate in the direction of discouragement, and must try, from the beginning, to eradicate them before they have imprinted their stamp upon the psy-



chology of the growing human being. Thus, the educational theory of Individual Psychology is, at the same time, a practical prophylactic against neuroses.

Since an effective psychical therapy can operate helpfully only by producing *encouragement*, Individual Psychology supplies the knowledge necessary for the discovery of the fictitious schemes of the neurotic, the power-devices in his life-plan, generated by his feeling of inferiority. It is a direct means of correcting the errors which cause the illness, and of liberating the natural feeling of community, present always from the beginning onward. Proceeding from the idea of a *purposive* unity of character—Adler speaks of a “life-melody” that can be traced through the fate and history of every human being—this therapy examines the first childhood memories of the patient for their “greatest social value.” This important factor should be clearly recognizable even in childhood, and will turn up in later life in a like intensity throughout all the possible transformations brought about by the fictitious schemes of the neurotic devices of life. Here lie the real causes of neuroses! For, the type of “causality found in the psychical realm does not consist in a relation between cause and effect,” as is explicitly assumed, for instance, in the trauma theory; “but we make something into a cause and permit certain effects to follow from it,” says Adler with justification.<sup>2</sup>

Neither inherited burdens, nor psychical traumata, nor the effects of the milieu, are sufficient in themselves to compress life into a neurosis. It is really certain tendencies in the personality, as they come into contact with outer events, which make these events into apparent determining factors. Thus, those features from which Freud wishes to deduce a "sexual etiology of neuroses" assume, in this respect, *no* exceptional position.

The views of Individual Psychology determine the behavior of the practicing physician toward the patient. As in education, so in treatment, all stress upon *authority* is completely avoided. But the patient is supposed, for the first time, to be able to experience a real social relation in connection with the physician. Thus the treatment, for Individual Psychology, takes outwardly the course of a friendly conversation, avoiding anything which could put the physician in a position that sacrifices confidence and naturalness. The physician should be, and wants to be, merely a well-intentioned helper to the patient. The patient himself, by aid of his own material which he produces, is supposed to become convinced of the significance—not of the uniqueness!—of the point of view of Individual Psychology.<sup>3</sup>

The problem of dreams is also treated from this standpoint. The dream, like any neurotic symptom, becomes intelligible by imagining it to be an element



in the secret purposes of the dreamer. "The most important motive in the formation of dreams is that the dreamer makes a provisional attempt, tries an experiment, as to how he should behave toward a certain problem that lies before him. In the dream we can find the trace of the direction in which the patient is tending [training himself]." <sup>4</sup> The dream betrays, "as in a mirror, events and bodily attitudes that are orientated toward later actions." It shows, for the most part, very clearly how the patient is willing to solve his problem. For the neurotic, it is a sort of exercise [training], through which the patient is confirmed in his neurotic attitude. Through occupation with dreams during the treatment, he learns to recognize as components of his personality the processes in his psyche which are withdrawn from his conscious will, and to accept them in his responsible consciousness.

There is no answer to the question of the nature of the soul, as such, in the Adlerian Individual Psychology. But in elaborating what is meant by "courage" and its counterpart, "discouragement," this school has wisely confined itself to devising a practical distinguishing test, through which the specific neurotic reactions in the psychical process can be recognized and eliminated. Thus a solid basis is established, and a way is opened for the problem of the soul itself—a problem which is usually so thickly overlaid with undetermined factors arising

from neuroses that, even for the specialist, it is easily confused with that of neuroses. Adler, moreover, is in harmony with the best of ancient wisdom when he teaches that one must have the courage to free one's self from one's own ego. His theory of neuroses seems to rest on the wisdom which is expressed in *Mark* (VII, 35): "Whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life . . . shall save it." It also suggests Goethe's saying,

He is crowned with all achieving,  
Who perceives and then performs.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Alfred Adler, *Über den nervösen Charakter*, 3rd enlarged ed., p. 15, Bergman, München, Wiesbaden. Eng. trans. *The Neurotic Constitution*. 1926.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> Cf. E. Wexberg, *loc. cit.*, p. 314 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Adler, "Neurosenwahl und Training im Traum," *Zeitschr. f. Indiv. Psychol.*, 2 Jahrg., Heft 5; cited by E. Wexberg, *loc. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> *Faust*, Part II, Act I, Scene I; Bayard Taylor's translation.



## CHAPTER V

### C. G. JUNG'S ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

The dynamic process of the soul is for Freud a consequence of the sexual urge, he conceives psychological energy as identical with the instinctive force of sexuality. Since Freud expects a chemical confirmation of his psychology in the future, he thus awaits a solution of the psycho-physical problem.\* But the logical impossibility of deriving the mental from the physical can not be removed in the future. Logically, Freudianism will remain what it is: an attempt in the direction of psycho-physical parallelism, † where the third term uniting soul and body is not Spinoza's Substance (God), but where instinct, as a sort of *deus absconditus in testibus et ovariiis*, forms the background of the world, and is the unconscious. The reply that Freud wanted merely to construct a psychology of instinct is not pertinent, in view of the pervasive quality of his concept of instinct, which keeps to no definite con-

\* The problem of the relation of the soul to the body.—Trans.

† The theory that soul and body do not act, causally, upon one another, but run parallel to each other; perhaps they are parallel expressions of a third principle, like Spinoza's *substance*.—Trans.

tours. A specific proof that this concept is too highly colored has never been given, and is not easy to give, for the one reason that the sexual is extremely symbolical in character. Where everything is symbolical, how can the sexual alone form an exception?

So far as a neurosis can be described as a condition in which the meaning of an individual life becomes a problem, it is plain that the Freudian psychoanalysis applies only where the meaning sought is to be found in a backward orientation toward the biological functions. That this *can* be the case does not require that it *must* be so.

Freud, however, recognizes no other subject-matter, as his notion of "sublimation" proves. That which has been sublimated remains always sex—in the form of an insubstantial aggregate, one can say. This is a special kind of repression.

As early as 1913 Jung rejected Freud's notion of the libido as sexual.<sup>1</sup> Libido has for Jung merely the significance of psychical energy and otherwise is free from further qualifications. Psychical dynamics is, therefore, neither exclusively nor exhaustively sexual in nature. Thus sexuality can be assigned its proper place in a general theory of the psyche; an unprejudiced estimation of the distribution of energy is possible. The meaning of a phenomenon "charged with a certain intensity of libidinous energy" remains an open question. Con-



scious and unconscious enter again into a purely compensatory relation like that described in the classical cases of *double conscience*. (Compare, for instance, Azam's case of Félicité X, above pp. 5, 6, or Jung's case, p. 11 above.) To prove in detail the compensatory nature of the unconscious is difficult, because the relevant phenomena are almost always extremely individual in character.<sup>2</sup>

In contrast to Freud and Adler, both of whom base their theories upon a point of view already *specialized*, so that they are forced in practice to its generalization, the position from which Jung proceeds is, briefly, as follows. The ultimately recognizable factor in psychology, as in physics, is the notion of force—called *libido*—and from this the life-movement of the psyche flows. All psychical processes, conscious and unconscious, are manifestations of this force in varying intensities. The poles between which it flows are the conscious and the unconscious, where these are taken as the most general pair of psychological opposites. If the conscious is impoverished in libido, or has become devitalized, the unconscious is particularly enriched at that point; that is, the autonomous capacity of the soul for fantasy becomes particularly vivid and significant.

In addition, the unconscious must be recognized as the matrix from which the libido originates. Thus, in the specific images of the unconscious,

where the libido portrays itself directly, or assumes form, we have a picture of large and ultimate pairs of opposites. Upon such inner images rest, for example, the dualistic speculations of the gnostics. A pictorial expression of the opposites is found in the two-fold circular symbol for the conception of Yin-Yang\* of the Chinese, or in the principle of the Great Extreme or "the roof-tree" in *I-Ging*.† Through Yin-Yang, though the concept is itself one, duality comes into the world, and out of Yin-Yang the world of opposites in general arises. In Jacob Boehme, for example, a drawing that represents such a pair of opposites of a mystical, cosmographic character occurs. As examples of the fact that this level

\* *Yang* is the bright, the fiery, the male; *Yin* is the dark, the damp, the female. The original source of all things is pictured as a circle with an S-shaped line dividing this circle into halves, one of which is dark, representing Yin, and the other light, representing Yang. In the dark Yin is a tiny white spot, the germ of Yang; and in the bright Yang, a tiny dark spot, the seed of Yin. Thus, through the dividing line duality comes into the world. At the same time, this line determines above and below, right and left, before and after, in short, the world of opposites. (Freely translated from R. Wilhelm's explanation in *I-Ging*, Vol. I, p. viii, and Vol. II.)

† The *I-Ging*, an ancient Chinese philosophical classic, was translated into German and annotated by Richard Wilhelm, published by Eugen Diederichs, Jena, 1924. There are earlier English translations by Legge and McClatchie. The basic concept of the *I-Ging* is that of change: the master, Kung, standing on the bank of a river, said, "All flows away, even as this river, ceaselessly, day and night." But behind the change is a changeless source, the *T'ai Chi*, the Great Extreme or Supreme Ultimate, literally, "the ridge pole." "The *T'ai Chi* is like the roof-ridge of a house, the highest point that can be reached.



of experience, with its full content of meaning, is still accessible to-day, we can point to the drawings or paintings "out of the unconscious," which are very often made during analytical treatment.

For example, in a water-color painting of a woman patient, two dark half-circles cut from right and left into the picture, leaving a split between them. This split widens, following the contour of the circles at the top and bottom. The semi-circular pictures represent, in a primitive way, two rocks rising about halfway from the water. Above, toward the side of the conscious, as below, toward that of the unconscious, the semi-circles spread wide apart. A unification, or bridging, of this "split in conscious-

It is like the zenith in the heavens, beyond which even thought can not pass. It is the Great Pivot of the Universe, the source of all things, visible and invisible, material and moral." (J. P. Bruce, *Chu Hsi and His Masters*, Probsthain and Co., London, 1923, p. 135.) The Great Extreme generated the two elementary forms, which are equivalent to Yang and Yin and are represented, respectively, by an unbroken and a broken horizontal line. The combinations of these two forms give four symbols, and the latter, by the addition of a third line, give eight trigrams, which in turn combine into sixty-four hexagrams. The figures were used for divination. They "served to determine the good and evil issues of events, and from this determination was produced the successful prosecution of the great business of life." (Legge, translation of the *I-Ching*, in the *Sacred Books of China*, p. 373.) From the point of view of analytical psychology, the hexagrams, composed of the basic opposites, broken (Yin) lines and unbroken (Yang) lines, are visual representations of the combinations of opposites in the psyche. Each hexagram represents a psychological state, together with the way in which it grows out of and produces other psychological states.—Trans.

ness" seems impossible. Yet, at the top, contrasting with the blue sky, is a bird that can soar above the rift. Thus, perhaps *intuition* can mediate between the two halves. The symbol of unification shines forth from the unconscious: deep down in the water is a gleaming circle with a head of Janus at its center. The original is very poorly painted, or at best, without technique. For such purposes, technical skill has no importance whatsoever; all that matters is that one should take the pains to catch, and somehow represent, the inner state as one feels it—as if a self-portrait of the libido were to be produced, or allowed to make its appearance. Hence, the expression "automatic drawing," or "drawing out of the unconscious." In this way, during the treatment, continuous series of pictures are often produced, in which the inner development assumes a symbolic form. The patient has, by this means, taken possession of his unconscious. He has put into a suitable form, not outwardly imitated but inwardly developed, something that was previously formless and intangible in its effects upon him.

Whatever form, whatever degree of consciousness, a psychical event may exhibit, it must always, for one thing, constellate unconscious contents and must stand out against a relatively less conscious background. The supreme generating principle of the *T'ai Chi* is a good illustration of this.<sup>8</sup> Psychologi-



cally expressed, a psychical occurrence, wherever it arises, detaches itself from a background which is constituted through the mere existence of this psychical occurrence. This points to a universal split in the libido.\* And this is the inevitable reason why every psychological theory based on special considerations must be, *psychologically*, at once true and false.† In psychology, it can be said at the very best only with half justification, that "this phenomenon has such and such a meaning." And when this meaning is assumed to be a test-principle, the further question immediately arises—what, then, is the significance of this phenomenon together with the given explanation of it? Neither "sexuality" nor "the effort for power" can escape this relativity. That is, so far as a general theory of the soul goes, they have no preëminent psychological value, and there is nothing that can assume such a preëminent, special value. Thus, as Laotze says, "The meaning that men can decipher is not the highest meaning." This formulation is the shortest expression for what is meant by the *unconscious* in Jung's Analytical Psychology, and it indicates our attitude toward the unconscious. Through a formative act, an act that creates significance, elements are brought forth from

\* That is, the split between the foreground and the background of a psychical event, or between the conscious and the unconscious.—Trans.

† For these special considerations neglect the background, the unconscious, out of which they have arisen.—Trans.

among the possibilities of the unconscious, and take their place among the realities of the conscious. But all *created* meaning is necessarily surpassed by and contained in the "meaning of the unconscious." All that is created springs from the unconscious and returns into it again when, in the course of development, it passes over into its opposite, following the principle of its double nature,<sup>4</sup> and is thus absorbed.

The unconscious, as a concept, is purely negative. It is merely that which is not conscious. Thus, quite correctly, the unconscious is not prejudged by Jung, either as sexual or in any other way. But it occupies, in accordance with its most general character, a purely compensatory relation to the conscious. If "belonging to consciousness" is defined as "being associated with the ego-complex," then all that is *not* associated with this complex belongs to the unconscious. What can all this be? It is that which has been forgotten, or perceived beneath the threshold of consciousness, or intentionally forgotten (Freud's repression), or that which is only just appearing, the psychical in *statu nascendi* (state of birth); in other words, what has become and is in the process of becoming! Soul as "becoming" is always unconscious. What escapes from, or has escaped or been extruded from our customary schemes of behavior, comprises the whole of the unconscious. These schemes are, in general, determined by the need of adaptation to the immediate



or remote environment, into which the human being must fit, so far as he represents or strives toward a norm. But pathological cases, where no such norm exists, have shown that further contents are accessible to the psyche, contents lying wholly outside the framework that surrounds the acquisitions or experiences of personal life. This material, unconscious for us in another sense, consists of the deposit of the experiences of our ancestors, and is called by Jung the "collective unconscious."

A convincing example of how such contents come into consciousness in the case of an insane person occurs in Jung's lecture, "Mind and the Earth." <sup>5</sup>

Jung saw the patient standing one day at the window of the hospital, blinking toward the sun. At the same time he moved his head curiously from side to side. "He took me by the arm and said he wanted to show me something. He said I must look at the sun with half-shut eyes and then I could see the sun's phallus. If I moved my head from side to side, the sun-phallus would move in the same way, and that was the *origin of the wind*." Jung made this observation in about the year 1906. Several years later an edition by Dieterich of the so-called Paris magic papyrus fell into his hands. One of the visions there contained was described in these words: "Similarly there is also to be seen the so-called tube, the origin of the prevailing wind. You will see on the disk of the sun something like

a hanging tube. And towards the western regions it is as though a ceaseless east wind were blowing. But when, by reason of the other wind, the lot falls to the eastern regions, you will see that the face turns in a similar way in that direction." Jung remarks further: "The vision of my patient of the year 1906, and the Greek text first edited in 1910, should be sufficiently separated for the possibility of cryptomnesia \* on his part, and thought-transference on my part to be excluded." Jung ascribes fantasies of this sort to the contents, or functional possibilities, of the collective psyche. In these cases it is, therefore, not a question of the unconscious material of personal life, of what has been forgotten in some sense or other (only in this case could we speak of cryptomnesia), but of functional products of the collective unconscious; that is, possibilities of experience given to mankind in general, without dependence upon their individuality, education, or race. This mode of experience is heightened in schizophrenia—literally, "splitting-insanity." But it is by no means the fact that it appears only in pathological cases. Swedenborg, for example, was in no sense ill, yet he had visions and hallucinations. One must be careful in psychology not to dismiss as pathological that which fails to accord with the norm. Nor should the "complicated" and the

\* Memories working beneath the surface of consciousness.



“neurotic” be confused with one another. A person who is conscious of his problems may make an extremely complicated impression without being neurotic. Someone who does not yet grasp his problems at all may be neurotic, yet outwardly he may make an impression of extreme simplicity. In fact, even cases of latent [locked-up] psychoses—which are infrequent—may manifest themselves outwardly in an uncomplicated way. It seems necessary at least to point to these facts, for in the practice of psychoanalytical psychology there is usually, even to-day, much of the atmosphere of the sick-room. Here, however, we use the word “patient” to cover a great deal.

Psychological problems that have not been worked out may not only cause neuroses in the persons whom they directly concern, but may also affect other persons in their surroundings. It is as if the quantity of libido, dammed up in these problems, flowed out upon the persons in the environment. Thus, in many marriages, the wife is obliged to live the neurosis of her husband, or the husband, that of his wife; children, the conflicts of their parents, and so on.<sup>6</sup>

Just as consciousness may be considered as a system of adaptations to the present, so the collective unconscious must be viewed as a general, timeless form of the psyche. Its contents are related to the widest conditions of life in general, as for

instance, the course of the sun, day and night, the rhythmical movement of the constellations, the human instincts. And the form in which these experiences are portrayed corresponds to the mythical and mystical stages of the life of nature and of natural suffering. Thus the images of the collective psyche offer a strange type of fantasy which may present huge riddles to sober thought, especially when their incomprehensibility is contrasted with the peculiar fascination they exercise upon consciousness. Jung once said <sup>7</sup> that his first immediate feeling during an earthquake was that he was standing on the hide of a gigantic beast who was shaking himself. In this example, we can appreciate, to some extent, how the immediate emotional experience of a natural event may be portrayed psychically. In the course of time, through countless repetitions of typical impressions, the collective images of myths have arisen—the *archetypes*, as Jung calls these mythical motives, when they are viewed as elements in personal experience. The possibility of reviving archaic types of experience may be joined to, or may correspond to, the inheritance of the brain-structure.

The fundamental concepts of Jung's theory of the libido are, *progression* and *regression*, *extraversion* and *introversion*, *libido-transformation* and *symbol-making*.

By *progression* is meant the forward movement



of the libido, by means of which adaptation to the surrounding world is usually achieved. This is, to be sure, not implied in the concept of progression, and would only follow as a general effect, since the state of the progressive libido can be described as a sense that "things are in movement," life "is in flux." The process of adaptation results *specifically* from a *directed attitude*, that is, from the fact that this forward movement of the libido always takes the same direction. "To assume an attitude means the same as to have an *a priori* direction toward something definite, no matter whether this is represented as definite or not," says Jung in *Psychological Types*.<sup>8</sup>

Psychologically, every individual has some attitude or other. When a person pursues a single calling, a single point of view toward life, when he always adopts or defends the same theory, he assumes a definite attitude. That is, he chooses from among all the possible general directions he might take that particular one which he wishes to pursue, or rather must pursue. For the direction in which adaptation can be reached is determined, very often, by the necessities of life, which can be met only by consistent work along a certain line.

On the other hand, a directed attitude, continuously pursued, results, psychologically, in a one-sided use of certain functions.<sup>9</sup> A one-sided psychological attainment can do justice neither fully nor per-

manently to the manifold circumstances of the surrounding world in their continually changing relations. Where an attitude that has become habitual fails because of an alteration in outer or inner demands, the progression of the libido ceases. This situation can easily arise, since people are apt to assume, for the most part, that their adapted function is absolute, and in fact to identify themselves with it. They take it, erroneously, for the one possible attitude.

Where such an identification occurs, a person supposes that he is, for example, what he professionally represents, or what he observes in himself as a specially developed disposition, activity, or predilection. In this sense, for instance, a person thinks of himself as "sarcastic" or as "ultimately certain of himself"; that is, he takes his stand upon a certain trait of character or course of life, corresponding to his everyday practices, yet, even if no demands in excess of this attitude have been made over a long period of time, it need by no means fit all the possibilities of life. At any moment, these possibilities may alter so completely with respect to this attitude, that the person who has identified himself with it may then feel that he can no longer fit into life. One is reminded, in this connection, of the fate of the professional officer after the war.

Such identifications often find their expression in a judgment that is passed upon persons or things of



a different mental sphere. The conscientious official who takes the artist for a sort of do-nothing, the natural scientist who explains that God is a vertebrate of gaseous outlines,\* or religion a form of infantilism, exhibit definite attitudes; from the standpoint of the one, the existence of art is not recognized, and from that of the other, religion appears as the sort of religiosity that can be found in homes for the aged or hospitals.

When progression ceases, the state of "dammed, [or checked] libido" ensues. This is characterized by a subsidence of the feeling of life and an uprush of certain contents of consciousness of an unlovely and tormenting kind, so that the person becomes irritable and inclined to emotional storms. What he has performed till then with satisfaction, even with love and passion, has suddenly become empty of content and irritating, or completely meaningless. The more deep-seated inner upheavals of this sort are, the more critical they can be. It is the situation of Faust (in the first act), whose study has become "a damnable, gloomy hole in the wall." The only way of escape from the inanity of his existence—

Shall here a thousand volumes teach me only  
That men, self-tortured, everywhere must bleed,  
And here and there one happy man sits lonely? <sup>10</sup>

\* Haeckel made this statement.

—seems to be “to tear away the portals, past which all gladly slink away.” Thus Bismarck, too, stood upon the threshold of suicide before he found the right channels for the expenditure of his energy.

In certain cases, the actual course of the libido—that is, of the unconscious—forms a most curious contrast to personal wishes that have been preserved for years. And the autonomous violence with which such psychical reversals occur is particularly evident at the moment when these wishes can finally be fulfilled. The ideal of the *rentier*,\* “to retire in peace” and “live as one would like to,” is often paid for by a most frightful neurosis when the time finally arrives. The super-personal, tragic essence of all wish-fulfillment is expressed in the verses of *Faust*:

The sun comes forth! Alas, already blinded,  
I turn away with eyesight pierced and wounded.  
'Tis thus, when, unto yearning hope's endeavor,  
Its highest wish on sweet attainment grounded,  
The portals of fulfillment widely sever.<sup>11</sup>

In the “flood of flame” that now “bursts from those eternal spaces,” the nothingness of these personal wishes becomes apparent and the change

\* A person who lives on the interest of his investments; especially a French ideal of retiring as early as possible from business life in order to “*planter les choux*” in more than one sense of the word.



takes place, "so that our glances once more earthward turn." \* "Sun," "fire," are well-known libido symbols, very often used to signify something extremely impressive.<sup>12</sup> But before the opposites are united in the new form, before the person can enter again, renewed, into life, he must have experienced the decay of the pair of opposites in himself, perhaps even a complete split in his personality, through the damming of his libido. This would show itself, in the most extreme cases, in the opposition of the will to live and the will to self-annihilation—a breach that even suicide could not close. For no man can kill his whole self, he only murders that part of himself which he can not accept, and in this struggle one side of his personality becomes a victim to the other. Or it may be that the transitoriness of all things cripples him in every action, and at the same time incites him to a hasty seizure of the passing moment. The principle of opposites, which previously, in the state of progression, contributed to balance, stability, and limitation, appears in this arrested condition as an absolute opposition.

\* This refers to the passage in *Faust* that immediately follows the one quoted above:

But if there burst from those eternal spaces  
A flood of flame, we stand confounded ever;  
For Life's pure torch we sought the shining traces,  
And seas of fire—and what a fire!—surprise us.  
Is't Love? Is't Hate? that burningly embraces,  
And that with pain and joy alternate tries us?

Being and becoming, willing and not willing, no longer supplement each other; an ambivalent, indeterminate state, which is as much the one as the other, and is really neither of the two, arises. Intellect ranges itself against feeling, or the opposition between inner and outer becomes so powerful that the person withdraws into the inner world and feels the outer world to be hostile; or, on the contrary, he flees from his own secret thoughts and plunges into the whirl of living. The demands of the inner world contradict the demands of the outer world; "yes" and "no" have become equal in psychical value, and balance one another in the scale. The longer this situation continues, the more enriched with associations does each side of the opposition become. The conflict grows acute, and a complete split, or dissociation, of the personality ensues.

The classical example of a dissociated psyche is Hamlet, from act two on, after he meets his father's ghost. Numerous excellent examples are found in Hamsun; for instance, in *Mysteries*, where almost all that the hero says is a result of the interference of two or more complexes speaking in him.

If the split is deep enough—so that it does not exhaust itself, as in the examples just given, in the sphere of thought and speech, thus causing no particularly decisive changes at the psychical level—it produces phenomena like those described under cases of *double conscience*.<sup>13</sup>



A famous example from literature is the story of Robert Louis Stevenson, "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." It is the tale of a fantastic double existence. The generally well-known and respected physician and scientist, Jekyll, leads a second life as Mr. Hyde. This man Hyde is the opposite of Jekyll, not only morally but also physically. He is short, and so ugly as to arouse horror. He commits all sorts of evil deeds and finally a murder. In his concluding remarks, Jekyll makes some interesting psychological observations on the development of his two egos and their relations to one another. He was by nature of a good character, and in the beginning his only fault was nothing more than "a certain impatient gayety of disposition," which, however, would have been ill adapted to his "imperious desire to carry his head high, and wear a more than commonly grave countenance before the public." Hence, he concealed this harmless aspect of himself, since it was not compatible with his intensely high ideal of his personality. That was the beginning. Thus the opposition—also a bond—between good and evil in human nature became an insoluble problem for him. That the two were plainly irreconcilable seemed to him the curse of humanity, and he dreamed that each of the two elements was personified in a separate region of his soul, so that he might thus make life supportable to himself. When Hyde first appeared, after the use of a secret potion

which Jekyll concocted and drank, he seemed smaller and also more youthful than Jekyll. For nine-tenths of the latter's life was devoted to self-control, and his other side must therefore remain correspondingly small. The process that brought Hyde to life was one of renewal, and so long as Jekyll was able to cause Hyde to disappear by the use of the potion, all went well. But finally this ability left him, the transformation came about by itself. Hyde had developed to some extent. And since Jekyll could not produce new ingredients for the potion when he had changed, against his will, into Hyde—the aid of his intellect having failed him—the opposites drew nearer together and Jekyll was forced to disappear. Mention should also be made of the reason why Jekyll had the idea that such a bodily transformation lay within the realm of possibility. He had discovered, he says, that the body itself is a manifestation of the same force that produced his mind, and that the secret potion influenced this force.<sup>14</sup>

When the conflict does not reach an issue in the sphere of reality, as it does in the examples above, but is dealt with as a psychological problem, the regressive movement of the libido revives the contents of the unconscious. As energy is drawn into these unconscious contents, the oppositions in consciousness are weakened in the same degree.

As an illustration of such a case—one that re-



mains within the psychological sphere through the criticism of the intellect, and where the resolution of the conscious conflict is effected by activating the unconscious power of fantasy—we are reminded of the example given by Jung in *The Relations of the Ego to the Unconscious*. The patient, a woman, was held up in her analysis at a stage where the conflict which had brought her to the treatment had been transferred to the doctor. The fact that he represented to her both “father” and “lover,” at once, seemed to offer a direct solution of her problem. The question then became how to dissolve this transference. Needless to say, neither of these two possibilities could be realized in fact; but the question was how to pass beyond the dead point that had been reached. A cessation of movement in life is the same thing as a neurosis. Merely to break off the treatment would naturally have been no solution. Jung decided to find out what “course nature would take to reach a satisfactory solution of this standstill of the transference.” Hence, he determined to observe her dreams very carefully, since these “are nothing other than a self-portrait of the life process.” Now, her dreams revolved continually about the father-daughter relationship. But the “doctor-father” now appeared as supernaturally large, now as very ancient, or strangely interwoven with nature. The dreamer, on the contrary, was small, the father cradled her like

a child in his arms, while the wind swept over the wheat fields. The dreams obviously "carried out the fantastic standpoint as against common sense." It was as if they wanted to *make a god* of the person of the doctor. But though the unconscious appeared to be reaching out toward a person, it seemed to intend something deeper and stronger than love for a human being. The super-personal guidance thus developed enabled the patient to outgrow the ties that had produced the conflict. Jung speaks here of a "guiding function" of the unconscious. It seemed as if the unconscious, through an influx of energy, was imperceptibly released from the bonds that caused the conflict. The patient then found her way into a new relation suited to the possibilities of life.

So long as the tendencies and situations expressed in such unconscious images are contaminated by the conscious attitude—that is, so long as they are not distinguished from this attitude, and hence do not constitute material that can be dealt with—they must continue involuntarily to disturb the process of adaptation. They are, therefore, constantly held in check by inhibiting considerations of expediency, coming from the conscious. While these inhibitions operate, the unconscious can find only indirect avenues of expression. Among these are the disturbances in the flow of consciousness which Freud has described as "symptomatic acts"; also the signs that



indicate complexes in association experiments, mentioned above; <sup>15</sup> and in addition, speaking quite generally, all the symptoms of neurotic states.<sup>16</sup>

The inhibitions exercised by consciousness are expedient for this reason, that the importance of the adaptation already achieved must be defended, as against the primitive, undifferentiated, concrete contents of the unconscious, *i.e.*, contents that have "grown together," or "into one another." Yet these contents can not be rejected, for they indicate a need of adaptation to the inner world. "The conscious is confronted with the problem of the soul," as Jung expresses it. "Soul" means here simply the unconscious, which demands recognition.

Progression and regression, as necessary phases in the outer and inner adaptation of the individual, are connected with the demand for individuation—the unification of the psychical functions so that all parts of the soul find their proper expression. Progression and regression, viewed as energetic processes, are transitional points, where psychical energy undergoes a transformation. Thus, for instance, the adaptation reached through progression operates as a means to bring about a regression. The inner world manifests itself in the outer, as Jung puts it, and the regression introduces a new sort of progression. We can understand this more easily if we remember that the content in which the progressive movement completes itself forms a part of the notion

of progression. *Every* content is limited; no one can move forward continuously in a single direction; hence he must necessarily regress to other contents; that is, he must discover other psychical activities in himself by turning his energies in an opposite direction. He will then return to his original direction with renewed and transformed powers. The character of the regressive content is already prepared during the progressive movement, and vice versa; for a progressive movement in a certain direction excludes elements of a perfectly definite sort, and these appear in the regressive movement.

We see that this triad, progression, regression, altered progression, corresponds to the three steps of dialectical thought in the Hegelian philosophy: affirmation, denial, new affirmation—or thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Regression is a sort of “*reculer pour mieux sauter*.”

The psychical experience of the progressive and regressive libido has been portrayed from the most ancient times onward. In the myth of the whale-dragon,<sup>17</sup> the night journey on the ocean, or the overcoming of the monster from within, symbolize the attainment of adaptation to the conditions of the inner world. The escape with the aid of a bird—the rising of the sun—is the beginning of the new progression. When the regression of the patient, caused by the damming of his libido, goes deep enough, the stratum of unconscious mythical images



is reached, and he produces fantasies like those found in the myths of various peoples.

The father-god example (p. 127 above) is such a motive, passing quite beyond the purely personal sphere. All "big" dreams—dreams that employ materials other than those of personal reminiscence—belong in this category.<sup>18</sup>

Needless to say, a merely psychopathological explanation is insufficient in such cases and results in warped judgments; it dwarfs the psyche. For the phenomenon of regression is a general occurrence, and can not be blamed upon the individual. In itself, it is not a step backward, not a relapse or degeneration—as of course it would be if the person remained in this condition. It is a phase, through which he must necessarily pass, and in which the consciousness of development is completely lacking.

While progression and regression represent regular forms of the transformation of energy, *extraversion* and *introversion* refer to the dynamic directions of progression and regression. The progressive movement of life can be extraverted, *i.e.*, turned toward the outer object, or introverted. In the latter case, it is turned toward the inner object. Not only can regression be a "withdrawal from the outer world," introversion, but also an excessive living in the outer world, extraversion. One may flee not only into illness, but also into the world. A person may become neurotic to shirk his obligations, but

he may also attempt to escape the obligation of being alone with himself by being "everywhere at once." Such is the case of the student who suffers from a so-called "fear of going to bed" (*Budenangst*), or of the fashionable woman who is so insatiable in her longing for the mental stimulation of a man, or of men, that she gets indigestion from partaking of the fruits of the tree of knowledge.

As a preliminary explanation of what is meant by the outer and inner object, one naturally thinks of the old distinction between the physical, outer world and the mental, inner world. But it should not be forgotten that we are speaking of a *world*, and not merely of those mental processes which people believe, through habit or ignorance, to be their own personal, inner lives. Yet it is true that, starting with these aspects of life, we can break through to that world which is open to the person whose spirit is turned inward. We would then see the peculiarities, which we previously believed were so important to us personally, in a wholly different light; perhaps as a thoroughly unimportant part of the whole, common to all of us. Only when the inner world is confused with the world of one's own ego, does a person live in a state of *neurotic* introversion. As a matter of fact, all neurotics make this confusion, excepting where the neurosis assumes a definitely hysterical form—an extraversion neurosis. When a person is conscious not only of the "things of the



world" as such, but also, with like intensity, is conscious of his own relations to these things, he experiences the outer world in an introverted attitude of mind. A mind like that of Kepler, who developed his system from within and took extreme pains to make each forward step fit into the scheme of the whole as he knew or divined it, can be taken as a pattern of the introverted (thinking) type, in contrast to the extraverted Tycho Brahe, whose system was based wholly on the data of experience.

As an extreme example of the inner feeling of responsibility for the whole, here suggested, we can cite the fact that the Pueblo Indians believe that through their sunrise ceremony they give back the light of the day to their American brethren.

Every human being exhibits both of these two attitudes. That is to say, everyone stands between two worlds, and his libido must now be turned toward one and now toward the other, according to his disposition or the requirements of his life. Thus a stamp is placed upon the person's behavior, and he can be spoken of as "extraverted" or "introverted." But it is often difficult to distinguish the two, since mixed types arise, to compensate for the one-sidedness necessarily displayed by the pure type. The purpose of this distinction is not, in the least, to put individual human beings into one or the other of two pigeon-holes, but it is this—to characterize the double sense of the direction taken by the libido. It is

indispensable to an orientation in the intricate maze of the psychical processes.

Thus it is a mistake to believe that introversion is more or less the same as neurosis. As concepts, the two have not the slightest connection with one another.<sup>19</sup> The inner object may quite as well be the content of an attitude which is completely free from neurosis, while extraversion may be the expression of a neurosis. The question is, Do the outer and the inner intersect one another in the wrong way? And this is always the case in a neurosis. Either what belongs within is turned outward, or the reverse.

A person who tries with all his might during the day to tire himself out, and yet has to take a drug before going to sleep, to silence his inner voices or prevent the images of his fantasy from rising before his eyes, will understand what is meant by the statement that the "inner" has its proper place within, and the "outer," without. A person who postpones decisions too long in the hope that things will settle themselves in a god-given dream or in some change in the situation "to-morrow," is just the opposite. In the first case there is a high tension of activity, and the person is ill from "inner" causes; in the second, activity is so restricted that the person lives only from his unconscious.

An insufficient separation of the inner from the outer is displayed not only in neuroses, but also in



psychological theories, particularly in the early trauma theory. It must be said in criticism of this theory that it neglects the subjective element in favor of the outer occasion, though the former is the determining factor in the occurrence of a trauma.

It is not surprising that the introverted and extraverted attitudes are especially striking in neurotic cases. A pathological or abnormal state of affairs, in general, often exhibits psychological characteristics in their most explicit form. The outward maladroitness often peculiar to introverts—they can not “bring themselves out,” so that, judging superficially, they may make a neurotic impression—depends largely on the fact that for an introvert the bare mastery of some field merely by the use of a *single* function, for instance the intellect, seems quite insufficient. For in every situation, life as a whole is always a problem for this type, we might say. “To wish to adopt the peculiarly effective authority of the sciences without an adequate progress in the wisdom of life is quite as mistaken as to try to put a pair of boots on a naked foot,” says Hugo von Hoffmansthal.

Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*, which first appeared in 1913, attempts to exhibit the analogies between the structure of the psychology of the individual and mythical, ethnological-psychological material. The thought upon which the book is based can perhaps be best expressed briefly in the follow-

ing quotation: "We gain . . . the insight that these heroes"—namely, those of religious myths: he is speaking of Dionysos and Christ—"as well as their typical destinies, are portraits of the human libido and its typical destiny. They are *images* (images) like the figures that appear nightly in our dreams . . . through which we are enabled to guess at the secret story of the individual's psychological development . . ." <sup>20</sup> The destiny of the individual's libido is portrayed in his dreams, as the general destiny of mankind is represented in myths, the dreams of humanity. Jung explains how each of these, in their mutual relations, throws light upon the other, and for this purpose he makes use of the fantasy material of a young American woman, Miss Frank Miller, published under the title, "*Quelques faits d'imagination créatrice subconsciente*," in the *Archives de psychologie* (publisher, Th. Flournoy, Vol. V, 1906).

Miss Miller, an extraordinarily suggestible young woman, with an ever-ready capacity for sympathy (*Einfühlung*) and identification with others, took a long journey through Europe at the age of twenty years. During the sea voyage she gave herself up freely to revery. "The stories, legends, and myths of various lands, which I had known from afar, came back dimly, enveloped in a sort of shining mist in which things lost their reality, while dreams and thoughts alone took on the aspect of true reality



. . . Then"—in a dream—"certain words slowly emerged and arranged themselves into three verses; in fact, they were in my own handwriting . . . on a page of my old poetry album. In short, they appeared to me exactly as I wrote them down a few minutes later in my book." The first of these products is a "Hymn to Creation." Jung indicates the connections of these products with the actual motives of the personal psychology of the authoress, and at the same time exhibits the threads leading from them to analogous products of fantasy, spread throughout the whole world.

It should be emphasized that the point of attack upon dream analysis thus reached differs as radically from that of Freud as does the way in which the two authors conceive the libido. The technical term *libido*, as used by Jung goes back to the original meaning of the word. In Cicero<sup>21</sup> *libido* is taken as the opposite of *laetitia*: he defines the latter as "delight in a present good"; *libido*, on the contrary, refers to something in the future, and connotes a deep, vivid, full experience, not limited to rationality. Yet this experience can be inspired by reason or can fasten passionately upon an intellectual object. The term *libido* indicates the intensity of the attitude. I take some attitude toward every possible object, indeed an attitude toward my attitude, so that this becomes an object for me. For we are not considering here merely objective things, but

rather a manner of behavior, and how its degree of intensity can be psychologically characterized. That toward which I can take no attitude is my *self*, *i.e.*, the subject which can never be an object. (Compare Jung's concept of the *self* <sup>22</sup> . . . "we can not say anything about the content of the self. The ego is the sole content of the self which we can know.")<sup>23</sup>

Thus it is clear from another angle why a psychological theory, no matter how "correct" it may be, is only a make-shift if it leads to a rigid point of view. For at best, it can achieve nothing more than to produce life through putting a theory into practice in life. But life is truly life only through our own free decisions, and not through any sort of outward maxims giving a theoretical interpretation of the meaning of existence.

What is described in Freud's theory of the libido as a more or less pathological psychical phenomenon—as a "wish" or a "childish wish"—appears in Jung as the psychical experience of a force corresponding in its multiplicity and power to the Will, in Schopenhauer's meaning of this term. Thus, while Freud's psychological analysis rests essentially upon the personal reactions of the nursery, which are supposed to be typical and to operate as causes, Jung's analysis is rooted in a super-personal course of events in nature. These events are viewed under the aspect of myths, in which the stream of life, in its eternally



changeless energy, assumes form. It is this stream which is called libido. In the personal experience of the libido, the individual destiny attempts to unite itself with that of life in general. In analysis, a way is sought that leads out of the personal toward this unification, for thus the powers that re-create the personality, giving it *psychical individuality*, are brought to life<sup>24</sup> through the union of personal interests with those of mankind in general, in a unique relationship. This end is reached by *introversion*, that is, by a conscious surrender to the inner object, to fantasy. Introversion does not involve a pathological state, even though the contents that arise may coincide with those that appear in psychoses. The difference between normal introversion and the compulsive introversion of the insane depends upon the function of reality. While the insane person substitutes his fantasies, which once in the course of history or in prehistoric times had a genuine significance, for the realities of the present, this does not occur in the case of a person who is mentally sound: he takes the products of his introversion as *symbols*.

We are reminded here of a case that occurred in Zürich. A young man who had discovered that his fiancée had fallen in love with someone else, went one night in deep despair to the Limmat bridge with the intention of throwing himself into the water. Then he became aware of the stars reflected in the

river, and it was to him as if they were drawn in pairs, two and again two, into a happy union. . . . He changed his mind, gave up his notion of suicide, and tried at four o'clock in the morning to force his way into the stellar observatory—and was taken up by the police.

Through the plenitude of meanings in symbols, we experience connections of realities other than those that belong to the actual order of things. Thus, we can look at the complexes, which entered earlier in our discussion,<sup>25</sup> from this point of view. To transpose these complexes into the realm of symbols plainly helps to dissolve their rigid, closed unity in a general whole of thought, in the stream of life, whose flow is renewed by means of these symbols. While an insane person would take such inner experiences as real, common sense, with its usual lack of insight, would dismiss them as mere nonsense. But common sense ends where individual experience begins! If we view a complex as the result of a certain attitude toward reality, which has caused the soul to congeal, we find that the soul is trying to assert itself through this complex from another side, from within: the symbolic image of the soul's form appears against the dark background of the unconscious. A transposition into eternity, such as that which happened to the young man in the example just given, shattering the powers of his mentality, would have caused a more capable mind "in



youthful drapery to disguise itself." \* If the psychical reality of the situation, represented in altered form through the symbols, is not accepted without reservation, the experience is not understood and the moment of psychological development goes by unheeded. In such an acceptance of a psychical reality, the "objectively real" world remains undisturbed in its integrity. What is experienced in such a transposition is nothing but the great wisdom of "letting go."

The chief characteristic of the primordial, unconscious state of the psyche is that it is not differentiated from the object—a condition that is distinctive of children and primitive peoples. We are reminded of the sacred oak of the Teutons. For them, the religious experience was identical with the tree; when Christian missionaries took an ax to the tree they believed that the world would collapse. And it is true that a world did go to pieces then, but outwardly nothing happened. The possibility of suggestion rests on such states of identification.<sup>26</sup> The same situation exists in the delusions of paranoiacs concerning their relations to others, they read their own subjective contents into the other person, since these contents obscure their perception of the objective relationship. We then say that these are "projected" into the object. Such projections often manifest themselves when a person defends himself

\* *Faust* II, Scene 1.

against an attack which has not been made upon him. Jung cites the case of an insane girl who could not be persuaded out of the notion that her innocence was suspected. This condition passed finally into a violent erotic mania.

Lévy-Bruhl calls this state of complete non-differentiation from the object in which primitives live, "*participation mystique*." For instance, the primitive is one with the soil of his native land, in a mystical sense. No matter how brave he may be at home, his courage deserts him as soon as he sets foot upon foreign territory. Dead material things are so charged with "soul-power" that a magic effect proceeds from them, *e.g.*, fetishes, mascots, and so on. Thus arrows are poisoned somehow or other, not as we would think, but through the fact, for instance, that they have been fitted with a point made from human bones, and have acquired a *mana* power.\* In order to avoid fever in the wound, a person who has been hit sees that the arrow, or any part of it which he can get in his possession, is taken to some damp place where it is wrapped in fresh leaves. Everything impressive, unexpected, striking, effective, has a "charm" against which one must protect one's self by magic means, so as not to succumb to it. Otherwise, the individual would become too dependent upon the object, it would be as

\* *Mana*, a Melanesian word meaning "extraordinarily effective," "magic," and so on.



if he had lost his soul in the object. To the primitive, the loss of the soul is a matter of being thus sucked up by an object. This corresponds psychologically to the way in which an unconscious relationship (or complex) becomes autonomous, being noticed for the first time only when it has taken the form of a complete projection. So long as the projection is not withdrawn—that is, so long as the subjective factors through which the compulsive effects arise are not made conscious—the individual is apparently forced in a certain conscious direction by the object. Similar phenomena appear among civilized peoples. The relation of transference can assume this character at times, when the patient wrestles with the doctor as Jacob did with the angel: "I will not let thee go, except thou bless me." But it would be better to recognize that neither the health nor illness of the soul is connected with any particular person.

Jung relates the story of a recruit of nineteen years, who announced that he was ill and gave, himself, the diagnosis of inflammation of the kidneys. The examination showed no organic illness, but revealed an identification with a foster-father whom the patient loved very much. The foster-father had just written him that he had been obliged to go to bed again on account of his kidney trouble. The recruit's illness was easily cured when he realized that it had been caused by the fear that he would

lose his beloved foster-father. Similar cases are not unknown. They might well be brought to mind in this connection, for they illustrate in a way that is easily appreciated, a simple type of absorption in an object, and a partial union with it. Children live in a relation to their parents which is a sort of primitive, unconscious identification. For this reason, young children can take over the conflicts of their parents and suffer from them as if they were their own.

Jung describes the case <sup>27</sup> of a nine-year-old girl whose parents were unhappily married. As the necessity of solving the conflict became urgent, though no decision was yet reached, the child fell ill. She became languid, lost her appetite and had a sub-normal temperature, though the doctor could find no reason for this condition. When the parents finally decided to separate and the situation was cleared up, the child was informed that she would have two homes now. It became plain—quite contrary to the mother's expectations—that her condition was improved. It appeared from her dreams that she was suffering from anxiety that her father would go away—and, in fact, would go to the grandmother who was (in the dream) "nothing but one big mouth." Obviously the child had been affected by the state of her father's libido. When a husband has no real relation to his wife, his libido naturally seeks some other outlet: it had regressed on the one



hand to the image of his mother—the opened mouth in the child's dream suggests the swallowing of the father by the grandmother; and on the other hand it had directly infected the daughter.

The rites of exorcism among primitives are precautions against such a threatened "loss of the soul." Their purpose is to reduce the overpowering influence of the object to its source, to their own inner states; thus these rites are a process of adjustment to overpowering inner experiences. The influence proceeding from the object, in which the god appears, is transposed into a power within their own souls. For the primitive, therefore, nothing is more important than these rites. Though they are directed toward a practical end, they nevertheless have a religious character. They are a very serious business for the primitive, and the older he becomes the greater is the part he takes in them, until they finally occupy by far the largest part of his thoughts.<sup>28</sup>

The rights of initiation into maturity among the California Indians, for example, are dictated by the idea that the young girl has entered upon a critical condition which constitutes a latent danger not only for her, herself, but also for the community. To exorcise these dangerous powers, proverbs are sung over her, or dancers move about her during the night.<sup>29</sup>

The primitive suffers from the loss of his soul

as from a grave illness. He also attributes serious bodily illnesses to the loss of the soul. But on the other hand, he believes, too, that possession by a spirit is a cause of illness. The rites are intended not only to banish this spirit, but to lure the bird of the soul back into the sick man again.<sup>30</sup>

Only where consciousness takes the lead is it possible to have control of the object and a relation to it. Unconsciousness is a state of compulsive unity with the object. When a conscious relation to the object is established, that is, when the psychical contributions to the object are reduced to a degree which corresponds to the facts and the purpose at hand, then corresponding amounts of energy, which were till then unconsciously projected into the object, are set free. If this energy returns into the unconscious, it stimulates a renewed activity there. Thus a need of introversion arises. When this need is not understood, the unconscious processes are inhibited by consciousness, and the result is some kind of indirect expression, such as symptomatic acts or disturbances of the flow of consciousness. A process that creates inner images, not unlike the rites of exorcism,<sup>31</sup> should intervene here and should continue until it is brought to a rational conclusion upon the next higher level.

In this process—following the scheme of the psychological course of events—libido is differentiated and transformed from natural to cultural applica-



tions. The primitive makes use of "analogical charms" probably quite intentionally as a means to such a *transformation of the libido*. The formality of the ceremonies employed for this purpose proves how immensely difficult such a diversion from natural channels is for him.<sup>32</sup> So far as the *will* can bring about such a diversion, as in the case of civilized man, a quantity of energy sufficient for this purpose is at the disposal of consciousness. Yet closer observation shows how often it is impossible to break the power of an unconscious disposition of the libido directly through the will. The primitive is in this state; with a naïve or pious spirit, he subordinates his personality to things, and thus lives through the meaning they have for him.

In the introverted attitude, the chief stress is upon the experience of inner images. The introverted and extraverted attitudes alternate as the individual—in a special case—undergoes progressive and regressive movements of the libido. When the movement in one direction reaches its culmination, a counter-movement begins, following the law of *enantiodromy*—of passage into the opposite (Heracleitus). Viewed psychologically, the process of *enantiodromy* is a means to the development of individuality. So long as one attitude prevails, the movement passes into its opposite, for one-sided attitudes are not individual but belong to a type. They present collective reactions to collective situations, that

is, they correspond to a part of the collective psyche arbitrarily cut off from the rest. The factor of individuality is present only unconsciously, and is absent from the conscious attitude.<sup>33</sup> A specific process begins when such typical attitudes have been lived through to their completion and Jung calls this the *transcendent function*.<sup>34</sup>

Before we describe this process more fully, let us turn to Jung's scheme of the structure of the psyche. Jung distinguishes four basic psychical functions which are essentially dissimilar, and which correspond to four aspects of experience in the psychical realm. These are thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition.

The *function of sensation* includes, first, the elementary psychical phenomenon of sense awareness, which transmits to us the perception of the immediately "given"—for example, the perception of surrounding objects through the sensations of vision, and so on. Since this function is one of pure perception and is not directed by reason, Jung speaks of it as an *irrational* function. Sensation (*Empfindung*) must be distinguished from feeling (*Gefühl*), though the two words are often used synonymously in German.

The psychical product of sense perception always has, of course, a feeling-tone; the data coming from the sense organs are always fused with feelings, thoughts, and ideas. Hence, they appear as complex



wholes, all the functions play a part in their production, and sensation can only be theoretically dissociated from the whole.

When the sensory component of a person's psychological experience is stressed, so that his attitude takes this general direction, he belongs to the *sensation type*. The psychological character of such a person is determined by the nature of this function. The "merely given" is the real. What is psychologically most striking to the sensation type is the situation of the present moment, as directly sensed; bare existence (*So-Sein*) as an irrational fact, whose presence carries conviction; the world as here and now. Thus Jung also calls sensation "conscious perception" and contrasts it with intuition, the "function of unconscious perception."

He further distinguishes "abstract" sensation from "concrete." The former, like all abstraction, is a product of differentiation; this means that it is properly controlled by the will, due to an increase of consciousness. Thus abstract sensation has reference to the possibility of applying this function, itself irrational, in a rational, purposive way. The artist, for instance, has this peculiar ability, which is the perceptual medium of esthetic experience. In a work of art, the concrete material of sensation is dissociated from personal sensory factors and thus becomes suitable for reproduction. (As in Wagner's case, the experience with Frau von Wesendonck re-

sulted in *Tristan and Isolde*. Cézanne, a person *sensitif de colorations*.) With primitives and children, sensation is over-emphasized, not so much in comparison to intuition, which can be strong, as in contrast to thinking and feeling. If some way of estimating its quantity is assumed, the normal strength of sensation is that amount which we would expect to arise from a given physical stimulus. When the sensation falls below or exceeds this quantity, it is either inhibited through anticipation or exaggerated through an abnormal fusion with some other function. This exaggeration is reduced to normal when the function in question is separated out, and operates in its own right. The psychology of neuroses offers especially good examples of such fusions. We are reminded, for instance, of "intellectual eroticism," a phenomenon which seems to be more frequent among men than among women.

Jung also selects *intuition* as a basic function. *Intueri* means to "look at." The perceptual product of intuition depends upon unconscious combinations of unconscious patterns. This is the specific "dream-function." How far the possibilities of intuition extend remains still an unsolved psychological problem. The possibility of clairvoyance plainly belongs here. It is uncertain whether "psychical television"—Swedenborg, as is well known, saw the burning of Stockholm in the year 1756 from Gothenburg, which is fifty miles distant—can be spoken of as intuition, or how far it is due to materials of



thought and feeling which have remained beneath the threshold of consciousness, and which suddenly present themselves to consciousness as complete wholes, as visions or revelations. Anyway, it is plain that the certainty attaching to an intuition depends on material that has thus remained unconscious, whether the situation in question is an outer or an inner one.<sup>35</sup>

Intuition also grasps the immediately given, it is an irrational function. Collective images, the "dominants" of the unconscious (Jung), are particularly accessible to introverted intuition. The father-god image in the case cited above<sup>36</sup> belongs to this category; also the devil, the saviour, the wandering Jew, the Green Face,<sup>37</sup> Faust, Siegfried the hero, and so on. In abnormal cases, where such archetypal images are fused with the personal psychology, the individual may be most enigmatical and difficult to understand. Let us recall the young man who wanted to break into the stellar observatory.<sup>38</sup> The local policeman who arrested him at an early hour in the morning would only have considered him fit for Burghölzli, the Zürich insane asylum. Psychological analysis means in such cases simply this—making conscious the images that are involved, into which the person has, so to speak, fallen. But in addition, the intuitive type present a riddle difficult of solution to other, non-intuitive persons—to those who are therefore without especially keen psychological perceptions—so far as his motives in every-

day life are concerned. He often has the reputation of being reserved, no matter how candid he may be.

Jung speaks of sensation and intuition as the "matrix from which thinking and feeling, as rational functions, develop."

The *thinking function* arranges psychical material from a purposive or reasonable (logical) point of view. "Thinking is an activity of the will, which gives a particular direction to the stream of ideas, checks it, organizes it, and so on."<sup>39</sup> Jung distinguishes active, directed thinking from fantasy, or passive thinking, and calls the latter in *Psychological Types*, "intuitive thinking" or "intellectual intuition." Thinking can also be directed by feeling—"affective thinking"—when it does not follow logical principles but is employed to serve the ends of feeling.

The *feeling function* is contrasted with thinking, since its principle of judgment originates in purely subjective sources, and produces in the individual a positive or negative attitude toward things—an attitude of agreement or disagreement.


Passive, undirected feeling, or "felt intuition," presents judgments of feeling (evaluations) which are unintentional on the part of the subject, or contrary to his intentions. Feeling, as feeling-tone, is associated in an appropriate degree with every psychical process. As this feeling-tone increases in intensity, it assumes the character of an affect or



emotion; the psychical state becomes one of feeling shot through with sensory elements—excitations of the nervous system. The psychical rapport established between doctor and patient—a most important factor in psychiatric diagnosis, and the necessary condition of transference—can be viewed as an expression of the feeling function. Feeling produces a relation to the object which is dynamic in quality. In its differentiated form, it establishes a general mood of feeling, or an atmosphere. An individual who is chiefly directed by this function belongs to the feeling type.

Each of the four functional types can occur in an extraverted or an introverted form.

If the functions are arranged in a circle according to their relations of opposition, we have the following figure:



The radius of the circle represents a definite mental width, which makes it possible in the first place sufficiently to distinguish, or separate the particular functions. The primitive psyche would be represented by a circle of smaller radius; the functions would blend into one another on the circumference and would be indistinguishable. This would correspond to the type of mentality which Thurnwald, in his refutation of the Freudian concept of taboo, characterizes in the following way: <sup>40</sup> "Prohibitions among primitive peoples have a transcendent character, due to the narrowness of their idea of the world; all regularities in their world dissolve into one another without the proper plasticity or gradation. Thus, in their eyes, stepping over a barrier of any sort is a way of imperiling the whole order of the world and of life." In the state of primitive psychological bondage to the object (*participation mystique*), every factor of experience is immediately related to the whole of the world—the inner and outer world being undistinguished.

Directly opposite to that point on the circle which would indicate the most highly developed function—e.g., in the figure DF stands for this differentiated function—lies the *inferior function*. This term refers to the *least developed*, in contrast to *the most favored*, function.<sup>41</sup> Modern civilized life—which is a sort of "Taylor-system"—hardly ever permits a sufficiently harmonious exercise of all the functions,



since almost all human beings are forced to lead a one-sided life. This is often the occasion of serious disharmony. Where too much libido is persistently withheld from the inferior function, that is, where this function is barely allowed to play its part in life, or perhaps not allowed at all, it lapses into the unconscious and thus into regression. Then the levels of the unconscious which contain collective images are activated. We have already seen what a serious danger to mental balance is involved in the intermingling of the individual psyche with the collective unconscious. But it is useless to try, by means of causal explanations, to reduce such collective ideas to personal experiences. The normal outcome—and we can also say the one that is willed by nature—is not facilitated by extracting the elements formed by memories or instinctive tendencies that may be present. What is needed is an adjustment to the unconscious: Jung calls this the *transcendent function*. The necessary condition of this function is that the unconscious be allowed to speak without hinderance and—we might say—without prejudice. We must not assume in advance that we know better, on grounds of misplaced theoretical certainty. Only thus can the natural course of events bring about a genuine reconciliation, the *new mean between the opposites*.\*

\* It should be carefully noted that "function" as here used in the expression "transcendent function" must not be confused with one of the four basic functions.

This mean makes its appearance through the fact that the opposites are for once clearly separated, so that the ego experiences and recognizes in itself a complete split—between the psychical ego and the non-ego, for example. In the process of transcendence, that is, of passing beyond the opposites, a complex of functions (*i.e.*, of the basic functions) is selected, or constellated, and thus enters into a compensatory relation to both sides of the opposition, to the thesis as well as the antithesis.

An example that I can point to here is the case of the dissolved transference mentioned above.<sup>42</sup> In his *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, Jung gives a detailed account of such a development, connected with a dream in which the patient has the notion of crossing a small stream. She finds no bridge. When she has at last found a place where she can get across, a large crab takes hold of her foot, and she awakens filled with anxiety. Jung looks upon this dream as a rendering of the archetypal motive of “crossing the ford”—a decisive and dangerous undertaking. At this moment a regressive portion of the libido, hidden in the unconscious—the crab in the water—is activated. Not only can this stop the course of the development, but it can transform it into a regression—until the energy thus activated is consumed.

Here it is only a question of making clear the principle upon which such a situation depends.



Jung wishes to show that the animal symbol, the crab, is not analytically clarified by interpreting it as an expression of anxiety connected with certain persons in the patient's environment—which would be the result of an analysis of her associations. The solution of the problem would then be transferred exclusively to the province of the personal unconscious, that is, the ego side of the conflict would be over-emphasized. The antithesis, the impersonal forces in the psyche, would be repressed, and the result would be the formation of further symptoms. *Symbol-making*, as a means of unifying the opposites, takes place, on the contrary, only when the ego becomes fully aware of both sides of the opposition. Plainly, this process can occur in the present case only when the non-human factor—here the disturbing animal factor—is taken into account “through a conscious confrontation of the collective unconscious,”<sup>43</sup> as an archaic residuum of the collective psyche. In this way the energy that has gone into the collective unconscious should again become available. Through this adjustment, it is then possible to transcend the previous boundary line—hence, *transcendent* function. The next step in development can be taken, leading to a new attitude, which is indicated in the present dream by the other bank of the stream.

Neither the pure products of consciousness, nor those that are exclusively unconscious have the con-

vincing quality of a symbol. On the contrary, it is left partly to the good sense and imagination of the individual to determine how to draw the line between a symbol and a symptom. For it is obvious that we can discover and emphasize the analogical or symbolical aspects of all things. Where the symbolic unification of the opposites, with their mutual tension, is not firm enough—because the ego has not been completely split but has remained more upon one side than upon the other—the union must again be dissolved. This dissolution may operate to the advantage of one side, with the result that the ego is identified anew with the most favored function: it is through this function, in general, that the separation of the opposites again comes about. In cases that take the opposite direction, the ego is swallowed up by the unconscious, and this leads to pathological consequences.

A living symbol is the “best and highest possible expression of what is glimpsed but not yet known.”<sup>44</sup> It is an image that gives to all parts of the soul their right to existence, and thus becomes a new content of the psyche, dominating the whole attitude of mind. It frees the ego from its split condition, by forcing its oppositions into a new course. Jung speaks of the symbol as “the psychological mechanism which transforms energy”<sup>45</sup> or, in other passages, as the “figurative expression of the libido”—as a qualitative and quantitative equivalent of available energy.



When an expression of the psyche possesses the character of a symbol, or has such a character attributed to it through the fact that consciousness, in accepting it, is brought into touch with a more inclusive pattern of meanings, the widening of consciousness, of which we spoke in the beginning, is achieved. That particular organization appropriate to the individual case, which makes the transition to a new attitude possible by unifying the opposites, is the transcendent function.

Symbols, in the more restricted sense, always arise spontaneously. They are not produced by a conscious effort of will, for the conscious is, in this instance, biased. In *The Secret of the Golden Flower*,<sup>46</sup> symbols having the form of mandalas are reproduced. Mandala means circle, specifically "magic circle."<sup>47</sup> Magic, because the protecting figure of the enclosing circle is supposed to prevent any "outpouring," that is, to prevent consciousness from being burst asunder by the unconscious, or by partial psychical systems—complexes split off from the whole. At the same time, the mandala gives form to the transformation of inward feeling, such as Paul, for instance, has in mind when he recognizes that "it is not I who live, but Christ who lives in me"—Christ being here the symbol of the mystical fact of transformation. This inner conversion, the assumption of a unique individuality, is

described by the Chinese as the production of the "diamond body" or the "sacred fruit."

The meaning of these ideas is illustrated by one of the reproductions in the book, *The Secret of the Golden Flower*. It represents a wise man in contemplation, his head surrounded by blazing fire. Five human figures rise from the flames, and from these figures, twenty-five smaller ones—a graphic representation, in all its stark reality, of the tendency of the psyche to split into parts. Yet the Chinese text warns the reader: "The shapes and figures created by the fire of the spirit are only empty forms and colors." Similarly, the Thibetan Book of the Dead instructs the dead man not to confuse the dull glow of such figures with the pure white light "of the divine body of truth," that is, not to project the light of the highest consciousness into concretized figures. The state of fulfillment plainly consists in a withdrawal of consciousness, as if to some sphere beyond the world, where it is at once empty and not empty. Psychologically speaking, this is a complete abolition of the original undifferentiated state of subject and object. The center of gravity of the whole personality is transferred from the conscious center of the ego to a sort of hypothetical point between the conscious and the unconscious—to Jung's "Self."

The certainty that *something lives through me, rather than that I myself live*, is the expression of the highest psychical tension. Through this tension



man bridges the gap between instinct and spirit and takes hold upon life—attacks life—in a more profound sense than before. For man's original fall into sin is intellectual; it comes about through the emancipation of his intellect. In the reconciliation of the differentiated and the inferior function, the "great Tao—the meaning of the world"—is discovered.

The most powerful archetypes, in addition to the ones mentioned above,<sup>48</sup> are those that create close human relations, such as the relation of father and mother, woman and child. The mother is closely knit to the child, whose mentality is still deeply imprisoned in collective experience, and she activates the powerful archetype of the *mother-imago* \* in the child. Even later, when the personal figure of the mother has long since been freed from the mists of projection, the *imago* of the mother may exert its power in the unconscious and influence a per-

\* *Imago* is a technical term in Jung's psychology, and is derived from the Roman use of this word to designate the tiny images of members of the family which were kept in houses, or tombs, the *lares* and *penates*. Jung wishes, by the term, to indicate a difference from Freud; Freud thinks of the mother-image or father-image, which appears in dreams, as referring to the real mother or father, but this is not so with Jung. The *imago* of mother or father is a living, active figure in the unconscious, but does not mean the real father or mother—it refers to the archetypal father or mother, or to fatherhood and motherhood as cosmic facts, rather than personal experiences. The *anima* and *animus* are also *imagos*; the *anima* is woman as a cosmic factor in man's psychology, and the *animus*, man as a cosmic factor in woman's psychology.—Trans.

son's relations to the world. From Freud onward, many observations on this point have appeared in the literature of psychoanalysis, showing how, for instance, the image of the mother can influence the choice of a mate, whether this choice runs parallel to the mother or takes the opposite direction. Jung emphasizes the general and positive character of the influence of the *imagos* of the parents. If this influence did not operate in the rise of a new generation, there would be no guarantee of the continuity of life; "parents would not be reborn in their children," the adult would not be able to integrate his childhood with his later life and hence would be obliged to remain unconsciously a child—a condition that is favorable to neurosis.

The archetype of the *father* influences our relations to society, to the state, to the country, to spiritual life, in short, to the organized world, the cosmos, and is enlarged into the image of God, the creative principle, whose purposes are undiscoverable and whose power is unlimited; while the *mother* on the other hand becomes the sheltering womb of all growth.

Just as the images of the mother and the father express the relation of human beings to the world in its most general form, in its material and dynamic aspects, so the figures of the *animus* and the *anima* represent, respectively, man's unconscious experience of woman, and woman's unconscious experience



of man. *Anima, animus*, mean in Latin soul or spirit. Jung separates the concepts of soul and psyche. By the latter he means the totality of psychical processes, conscious as well as unconscious, whereas the "soul" (*Seele*) is a definite functional complex within this totality. The reason for this distinction was the experience that "soul" is portrayed in the unconscious as a soul-image—not unlike one of the personalities that were mentioned at the outset in cases of *double conscience*.

The unconscious grouping of functions that constitutes the anima or animus image is essentially dependent upon the constitution of the functional complex that we call consciousness, for this reason: we mean by consciousness those functional parts of the psyche which characterize our adaptation, or attitude, to the outer world. Jung takes this attitude as the "persona," which is another figure. For the outward attitude is likewise represented in dreams by images, often through those of known persons, who display in a particularly marked form the qualities in question. Thus one patient dreamed repeatedly of a very popular German general as the representative of abilities which had earned for him the title, the "genius of sergeant-majors." There is, naturally, no contradiction in the fact that the persona, although it is created by the conscious functions, can in its turn appear in the unconscious as a representation of the attitude taken by these func-

tions, and thus that it can figure in dreams. Indeed, to make conscious what is unconscious can have no other meaning than that the unconscious, in such a case, extends beyond the conscious and also includes it; thus the conscious can be widened. The *persona* is unconscious, for instance, when the subject, the ego, is not distinguished from the outward attitude, but is identified with it. Then there is no conscious relation to the process of adaptation to the outer world; and in this case, a conscious relation to the inward processes must also be lacking; that is, the ego is identical with the soul. The *persona* as an image of the outward attitude, and the *anima* as an image of the inward attitude, are then both unconscious. A conscious relation (either to the outer world through the *persona*, or to the inner world through the *anima*) is only possible when consciousness, the ego, succeeds in detaching itself on one or the other of these two sides, *i.e.*, when it dissolves this identification. Then the *persona* and the *anima* behave as definite psychological complexes of functions, in general as compensations for one another. Everything that is not present in the outward attitude can be found in the inward attitude.

Just as the *persona* is the typical result of the influence of a certain environment, so the *anima* is the result of a typical reaction to the stimuli coming from within one's self. Hence, both of these are "collective personalities"; they are reproduc-



tions of collective types of attitudes to the outer and the inner world. Both can develop in different persons in the most diverse ways. When the persona is more or less undeveloped or primitive—either as a result of adaptation to a milieu that is too primitive or because of an abnormal predominance of the influence of the anima—a typical, though also an unsatisfactory, attitude toward the outer world then arises as a matter of course. On the other hand, a typical inward attitude arises when the inner processes are wholly, or almost wholly neglected. If the inner attitude is defective, the anima (or animus) takes on the archaic traits of the unconscious, together with the symbolical forms that are appropriate to their meanings.

Since a man's attitude is usually determined in its outward relations by logic and a sense of objectivity, and is characterized in its inner relations by feeling, while the opposite is usually the case with a woman—her feelings are turned outward and her thoughts inward—the “soul” of a man is a feminine figure (*anima*) and the “soul” of a woman, on the contrary, is masculine (*animus*). In brief, while the anima is *feeling*, the animus is *thinking*—not, to be sure, the calm thinking of pure logic, but rather what can be described as the emotional argumentation of a woman who refuses to be convinced. Jung speaks of the animus in one place as “the unconscious assumption of an unreasoned judgment.”<sup>49</sup>

In answer to the objection that women come off badly in this psychology, we stress the point that it is not women, but rather the *feminine principle* which is under discussion, and a man also has this principle in him (his *anima*).

If these figures of the unconscious are not recognized as such, they operate psychologically as if they were in bondage to the outer object, that is, they are projected. Relations of direct dependence upon the object then arise: in the case of an animus or anima projection, a close, compulsive tie to the particular person who seems fitted to carry this soul-image. All attractions between the sexes, which operate as if by magic, depend upon unconscious projections of the soul-image. In so far as the experience of such projections is directly compulsive, the "soul" is unconscious, that is, there is no knowledge of inner processes or of one's relation to his own inner life. The ego is identified with the persona. If the image of the soul is not projected at all, it remains with the subject, who himself becomes the "soul" and lives this "soul"—an identification with the anima. He then believes that the way he acts within his own inner world exhibits his true character. In this case the persona is projected, and in fact upon a person of the same sex. This is frequently the basis of relations tinged with homosexuality, of extravagant friendships, or of father transferences in the case of a man, and mother trans-



ferences in the case of a woman. The failure of adaptation in such cases is not difficult to perceive. But at the same time, a tendency to overcome the comparative lack of adaptation is present in such relations, and this leads to development. Here a task is set for the recipient of a transference—whether he be the doctor, teacher, or a person in any relation whatsoever to the person who has the transference.

So long as identifications with the outer rôle or with the anima persist, collective attitudes prevail, toward the side of the conscious or the unconscious. The factor of individuality is still unconscious and, indeed, still associated with the "soul" (anima or animus). Psychological individuality, yet to be born, appears often in the symbols of dreams as connected with the archetypal picture of the birth of the hero; or often a new attitude is symbolized by a young child. When the significance of the events thus indicated is not understood, and for some reason or other the libido invested in them becomes regressive, this fact may be unconsciously represented by the starvation or death of the child.

If the soul-image is not projected at all, a man has no relation to women, and a woman no relation to men. The more compelling the character of this bond, the more extensive is the unconscious material constellated in the person who makes the projection, through his relation to the person upon whom the

projection is made. The occurrence has the autonomous character of an unconscious oneness with the object. Presentations of the *anima figure*, together with her effect upon a man, are found in the fantastic tales of Rider Haggard, particularly in *She*. Also *l'Atlantide* by P. Benoît is a story of this sort.

*She* is the adventurous tale of Horace Holly, who is just about to devote himself to an academic career when the unconscious announces itself. One night, about twelve o'clock, someone knocks at the door of his study, and the visitor places his five-year-old son under Holly's guardianship, and gives him a casket, with instructions not to open it before the child has reached his twenty-fifth birthday. In order to care for Leo, the boy, Holly is obliged to live in a new way; and after Leo has grown up, the chest is opened—layer after layer, he proceeds into the unconscious, till he finds at the bottom an antique potsherd and a scarab. The potsherd bore an inscription which told the story of Kallikrates, who broke his priestly vows for love of Amenartas, and fled with her. They came before the queen of a distant land. She was endowed with magical powers and eternal youth, and repaid everyone who sought her out by delusion and death. But She loved Kallikrates, "the beautiful in strength," and wanted to marry him. By terrible ways She led the pair to where a pit is, in which an old philosopher lay dead, and where "the pillar of life rolls, whose voice



is as the voice of thunder." She swore to give Kallikrates eternal life if he would slay his wife, against whom the power of She was of no avail. But he would not do this, and protected his eyes with his hand, so that he might not behold the beauty of She. So She killed him. But Amenartas escaped from the country. She bore a son, and as she died, she gave him this message: "Go and seek out the woman and learn the secret of life, and if thou mayest find a way, avenge thy father, Kallikrates; but if thou doth fear or fail, then I say this to all of thy seed that come after thee, till at last a brave man may be found among them who shall bathe in the fire of life and attain immortality." Holly and Leo seek a way to She in the story that follows—it is the way of life, ever the same, which they take. During thousands of years it has not altered; it is an archetypal motive of the collective unconscious. It appears in the myth of Osiris, who cohabited with his two sisters, Isis and Nephthys, in his mother's womb; Isis the queen of day, Nephthys the queen of night. The battle for the love of the hero rages between the two, as between She and Amenartas, or—in the sequel to Rider Haggard's tale of *She*, *The Return of She*—as between She and the Tartar queen, who has now become the representative of the nocturnal principle. Rider Haggard's attitude toward this archetypal motive is clear in the lines of dedication in *She*, where he says that all these

things happened, not in the distant land of Kôr, but in the human heart. There She reigns—the imperishable image of an unrealized, buried love, irresistible in her power of attraction.

Mary Hay's *The Evil Vineyard* is an animus story. Here the starting-point from which the uncanny, compelling power of the unconscious develops is the marriage of a young girl to a scholar, twenty years older than herself. She marries without loving him, fascinated by his learning, and following blindly the projection of her animus image, of which he is the carrier. The marriage leaves her instinctive life completely unsatisfied, and her spiritual needs are also unfulfilled. The older man, in his turn, sees her as his anima. Thus the fantasies of "the little trapped bird" develop, and only a younger man can set her free. As she withdraws, the husband's jealousy is aroused. And when he rents an ancient castle, called Casa di Ferro, as a dwelling place, things have gone so far that he identifies himself with its former owner, Henrico von Brunnen, imprisons and almost kills his wife—driven by his jealousy and the hidden power of his wife's un-lived instincts, which give birth to fantasies that he must translate into reality.

Selma Lagerlöf's Gösta Berling is also a well-known type toward which women often react with an animus projection. An excellent example of an anima projection is Richard Wagner's experience



with Frau Wesendonck. He writes even after many years, "She is, and will always be my first and only love! It was the high point in my life."<sup>50</sup>

These images of the anima and animus often appear in archaic, ancient guise. The two examples described above are of this type. When one's personal psychology is not separated from these images, either personal relations do not come into existence at all, or relations that seem genuine are suddenly broken off irreparably. This is the result of the fusion of collective images with the personal psychology. Through such a fusion, the ego is pathologically distended, a condition which Jung designates as *inflation*. In H. G. Wells' *Christina Alberta's Father*, the hero, the respectable Mr. Preemby, is transformed one day into Sargon, King of Kings—moved by something within him which tells him that the life he leads here as a "gentleman in furnished rooms" can not possibly exhaust the meaning of existence. And so he revolts psychologically against the demon of banality.

Speaking generally, we can distinguish three effects which these collective forces, *i.e.*, anima and animus, have in the psyche, depending on the position they assume. They may be projected unconsciously into the object, in which case effects will be attributed to the object, when these really proceed from the subject. They may be identified with consciousness—inflation. Or they may be turned

inward as functional complexes which mediate between the conscious and the unconscious, and unite them. As an example of the first case, we can point to personal relations through the anima or animus. States of inflation are particularly characteristic of "prophets," such as Heusser, Weissenberg \*—and here Rudolf Steiner also comes to mind, though with reservations. Only the last case, where the anima or animus is turned inward, is unobjectionable from a technical, psychological point of view. It permits a conscious relation to the autonomous contents of the psyche, so that the ego is no longer the plaything of oppositions between outer and inner needs, but occupies a mean position between the two, depending neither on the one nor the other. The ego then constitutes a form of unity between these opposites.

Psychical individuality, as a form of consciousness, presupposes a complete separation from the object. Before this is reached, individuality is of

\* Joseph Weissenberg, the founder of a so-called "City of Peace," lives in Berlin and is the head of a religious movement called "The Evangelical Church of John, according to the revelations of St. John." In a newspaper, *Der Weisse Berg*, the White Mountain, published by his sect, it is declared that, "Joseph Weissenberg not only possesses all the miraculous powers of our Savior, but he can also pass these on to his disciples, just as our Savior did." Weissenberg, who professes to be a magnetic healer, was born in 1855. In his early years he was a bricklayer, a coachman, and the proprietor of a public house. Heusser was a similar German "prophet," now dead. Rudolf Steiner is the founder of "Anthroposophy."—Trans.



course present, but not consciously; there exists only a collective psychology of consciousness, or an insufficient separation from possible objects. This process of differentiation, through which conscious individuality is developed, is called by Jung psychical *individuation*. It should be clear without further discussion that the process of individuation runs parallel to the differentiation of the inner attitude, to the "education" of the anima and animus functions. For a soul-image is a collection of subjective influences which can obscure the relation to the object, and thus result in defective adaptation, damming up the libido and intensifying affective reactions. So long as one can say without qualification that "every inner phantom contains an affirmation,"<sup>51</sup> the relation to the inner world is still too undifferentiated. Before the consciousness of psychical individuality can arise, the process of individuation, proceeding from the undifferentiated unconscious, must first conform to collective norms, so far as this is necessary and possible for that individual. For the more elementary processes of the psyche, which are always collective, can certainly never be expressions of individuality; nor can special attitudes, in the sense here meant, such as the persona attitude, express individuality, for these always correspond to more or less accidental selections from the psyche as a whole, and are likewise chiefly collective in nature. The only form of personal de-

velopment which is individual is that which originates in a disposition already present and, having passed beyond collective norms, follows the line of growth previously indicated in connection with the *transcendent function*.<sup>52</sup>

Though individuality presents a certain opposition to collectivity, this opposition is in fact only apparent; for collective norms are nothing but the totality of individual ways of life. They assume an *absolute* validity only when an individual way of life is elevated to the position of a norm as against these collective norms—which happens in the case of extreme individualism. But the individuality that develops from the transcendent function does not pass over into opposition to the collectivity, that is, into isolation, but leads to a closer union with the collectivity.

The narrower and more one-sided the persona attitude is—having not become conscious—the more extensive will be the materials of a personal nature included in the anima image. If these materials are made conscious, the relation to the outer world (the persona) is correspondingly broadened. What we have spoken of as a compensatory relation between the anima and the persona can be made specific through observations of the following sort: A man who is identified with his persona is, of course, master of his persona world, but on the other hand, he is in the power of a woman, the anima—either as



a projection, in which case this is a real woman, or as the feminine side of himself. And the domination of the anima, even in his outward life, begins where the realm of the persona ends, that is, where adaptation ceases. So long as the need of inner adaptation is unfulfilled, the anima remains an autonomous complex. We can speak of extraversion or introversion, depending on which attitude, the outer or the inner, is stressed.

The dynamic value of the autonomous complex which displays itself as anima, or animus, is called by Jung "prestige" or "mana"—the latter being an expression used in primitive psychology. As the contents of the anima image become conscious, consciousness is widened to that extent. The identification with the persona is broken up and finally wholly dissolved, in the moment when the anima as a whole becomes a content of consciousness; only its relating function to the unconscious is left over. Then the ego has plainly acquired the *mana* (magic power) of the anima or animus. If the anima was "irresistible in its strength," this power has now been wholly transferred to the ego.

"I must now have great power over men," writes Richard Wagner, on the 24th of November 1858, from Venice, three months after his flight from his haven with Frau Wesendonck in Zürich.<sup>58</sup> This is the period when "Tristan" was composed, and is three weeks after a night on a "darkly flowing

canal," when his decision to die moved him to a new existence.

Such an attitude, however, constellates a new opposition to the unconscious. Another archetype appears in the unconscious, that of the "old wise man" or the "great magician," in a man's case, or of the "great mother," the "all merciful," in a woman's case.

The philosopher in the pit to which She leads Kallikrates is a similar figure, or Merlin, the most wise master, who is in bondage to "a woman who keeps me here"—the anima.<sup>54</sup> He is also "the most foolish of fools, for he taught his beloved how she could bind him beyond all unloosing, and delivered all his strength and all his knowledge into her hands."

Again and again, one is threatened in his personal psychology by the encroachment of collective images: the "theft of mana" by the ego from the anima is an attack that is answered by a counter-attack from the unconscious. Only when the ego ceases to make claims of superiority—that is, when the content of the "mana personality" becomes conscious once more—does the mana find its way to the desired *middle point of the personality*. Jung calls this the *self*, which can be psychologically characterized as "a sort of *compensation* for the *conflict* between the inner and the outer."<sup>55</sup>

Here the goal of individuation is reached: "The



individual ego feels itself to be the object of an unknown and super-ordinate subject."

In conclusion we shall add a few words on the notion of the dream in the Jungian psychology. This follows, first, from the compensatory relation in which the conscious and the unconscious stand to one another. But dreams also arise from the autonomous activity of the unconscious itself, whose processes may come into our awareness even in the waking state, if their energetic value exceeds that of the conscious processes. Unconscious contents then arise in consciousness in the form of fantasies—"passive fantasies" (Jung). That is to say, consciousness remains passive to these contents, as in sleep, where this passivity reaches its highest degree, so that even very weak compensatory processes in the psyche are perceived.

If we want to understand the meaning of a dream, we must first be acquainted with the conscious psychology of the person who has the dream. There are no constant interpretations of dreams; we must know *who* it is that "puts up" the dream, for here as everywhere else the statement holds, that "if two persons do the same thing, it is not the same thing."<sup>56</sup> Alfred Adler's formula, that the dreamer cultivates [trains] his neurotic attitude in the dream, is justifiable only when a neurotic attitude is present, and—it should be carefully noted—only when this acts as a source of dreams. Every other atti-

tude, also, casts its unconscious reflection upon the dark background of consciousness—not to mention the fact that dreams testify to objective, and even to telepathic experiences—in a limited sense of the term “telepathic.” We should not sacrifice dreams to the god of neurotic psychology.

It is not necessary to explain further that the contents of the unconscious, when they are once introduced into the continuum of psychical life and become conscious contents, can be viewed in the same light as any others. They result, like all other contents, from certain causes and are directed toward certain ends, and we can regard them from either of these angles. If the dream is linked up to its causes, a *reductive* method of interpretation is applied; that is, it is reduced to its physiological or psychological roots. But a dream can be viewed *constructively* or synthetically. It is clear that we are influenced by a sort of synthetic *effect* of dreams when we take any interest at all in them, whether or not dreams themselves are reductively [causally] or synthetically [purposively] interpreted.

Since the object of all dream interpretation, from a medical point of view, is to reconstitute a harmonious relation between the conscious and the unconscious of the patient, reductive methods can be applied while a disharmonious state still exists, that is, so long as the problems of his personal psychology separate him from the collective foundations of life.



But the 'synthetic point of view alone is effective when a connection with collective norms has been established and the specific process of individuation, following the path already indicated, begins. From then on, the character of dreams assumes another form.

<sup>1</sup> C. G. Jung, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C. G. Jung, "Allgemeine Gesichtspunkte zur Psychologie des Traumes" (General Aspects of the Psychology of Dreams), in *Über die Energetik der Seele*, Rascher, Zürich.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 110, note.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Enantiodromy, below, p. 147.

<sup>5</sup> Contained in *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, by C. G. Jung, Eng. trans. by H. G. and C. F. Baynes, New York, 1928; pp. 108-109.

<sup>6</sup> Compare this with our example on p. 144 ff.; as well as the effect of an animus projection in Mary Hay's *The Evil Vineyard*, p. 170.

<sup>7</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> p. 526, Eng. ed., trans. by H. G. and C. F. Baynes.

<sup>9</sup> See p. 147 ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Faust*, Part I, Act I, Scene I; Bayard Taylor's trans.

<sup>11</sup> *Faust*, Part II, Act I, Scene I; Bayard Taylor's trans.

<sup>12</sup> Jung, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*.

<sup>13</sup> Compare the case of Azam, sketched above, p. 5 ff., and also that of Jung, p. 11 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. also the episode of Fuchs-Penicke in Anton Mayer's story, *Peregrinus Windesprang*, Horen-Verlag, 1926, in the chapter, "Zwienatur."

<sup>15</sup> pp. 31, 32.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. the case from Freud mentioned on p. 20 ff.—Numerous examples of symptomatic acts are found in Freud's *The Psychopathology of Every-Day Life*.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Jung, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, and L. Frobenius, *Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes*, 1904.

<sup>18</sup> Compare the dream of the "white and black magicians," which Jung cites. Here the question is essentially one of op-

posites, the motive of the disciple and of a treasure which is difficult of access. Jung, "Analytical Psychology and Education" in *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 367 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Yet Adler and Freud make this mistake; cf. Alfred Adler, *Praxis und Theorie der Individualpsychologie*, p. 8, pub. by Bergman, Munich. Eng. trans. *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*. 1929.

<sup>20</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 118 (German ed.).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *loc. cit.*, p. 119, Cicero, *Tusculanarum quæstionum*, Book IV.

<sup>22</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 125 and 135.

<sup>23</sup> Jung, *Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten*, p. 207. The second of the two essays in Jung's *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, trans. by H. G. and C. F. Baynes, 1928.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Individuation*, below, pp. 172-3, and also pp. xxxix, xl, of the Introduction.

<sup>25</sup> Above, p. 34.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. above, pp. 8, 9, 38, 77.

<sup>27</sup> C. G. Jung, "Analytical Psychology and Education" in *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*.

<sup>28</sup> See N. Soederblom, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens*, Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig, 1926.

<sup>29</sup> See R. Thurnwald, "Mädchenweihe," in *Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte*, Walter de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin.

<sup>30</sup> Compare, C. G. Jung in *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, the essay "The Psychological Basis of the Belief in Spirits."

<sup>31</sup> Cf. our example, above, p. xi, or Jung's case described on p. x.

<sup>32</sup> The spring ceremonies of the Watchandis: they dig a pit, lengthwise in form, in the ground and surround it with brushwood. They dance about this pit, holding their spears before them, and then, throwing them into the ditch, they shout: "*Non fossa, sed cummus!*" No participant is allowed to look upon a woman during the ceremony. Cited by Jung, *loc. cit.*, p. 71 ff.

<sup>33</sup> Compare what is said below, p. 166, on the question of *persona* and *anima* identifications.

<sup>34</sup> See p. 155.

<sup>35</sup> The "original dispositions" (*Urbilder*) of Goethe can be taken as an example of such intuitions; for they were "ways of



looking at things" (*Anschaungen*), as Goethe insisted against Schiller when the latter took them for "ideas."

<sup>36</sup> p. 128.

<sup>37</sup> See the story of this name by Gustav Meyrink.

<sup>38</sup> p. 139 above.

<sup>39</sup> See Eisler's, *Handwörterbuch der Philosophie*.

<sup>40</sup> R. Thurnwald, "Ethnologie und Psychoanalyse," p. 132, in *Krisis der Psychoanalyse*, edited by H. Prinzhorn.

<sup>41</sup> Compare, for instance, the personification of the inferior function in Mr. Hyde, above p. 125; of the "ugliest man" in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, and so on.

<sup>42</sup> Above, p. 127.

<sup>43</sup> Jung, *loc. cit.*, p. 143.

<sup>44</sup> Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 678.

<sup>45</sup> "On Psychical Energy," in *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 76.

<sup>46</sup> A Chinese Book of Life, translated into German and annotated by Richard Wilhelm, with a European commentary by C. G. Jung, Dornverlag Grete Ullmann, Munich. There are ten reproductions of splendid mandalas in the book. Translated into Eng. by Cary F. Baynes.

<sup>47</sup> Jung has published the mandala of a somnambulist in his *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*.

<sup>48</sup> pp. 151, 156.

<sup>49</sup> Jung, "Mind and the Earth," in *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*.

<sup>50</sup> Quoted from, *Richard Wagner an Mathilde und Otto Wesendonck, Tagebuchblätter und Briefe*, ed. by Dr. Jul. Kapp, Hesse and Becker Verlag, Leipzig.

<sup>51</sup> H. Taine, *Tout phantôme interne renferme une conception affirmative*.

<sup>52</sup> p. 155.

<sup>53</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 148.

<sup>54</sup> Karl Vollmoeller, *Parcival*, Inselbucherei, Nr. 115.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Jung, *Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewussten*, the second essay in *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*.

<sup>56</sup> *Si duo faciunt idem non est idem*.





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